The current case of del Val v. Tzaracomprada et al. doesn't really interest me that much and I originally planned to just sit and watch it unfold, however there is something about the Complaint, specifically point 32, that I found peculiar:
Quote32. This action relies principally, although not exclusively, on the understanding of torts in the common law of Talossa, which is derived necessarily from the common law of the state of Wisconsin.
As far as I, admittedly as a layman, could tell, this is not true. If the laws and precedents of Talossa make no mention of civil trials, let alone what a "tort" is, then... what would that mean? That civil trials cannot exist in Talossa? The idea of simply taking the Wisconsite version for the purposes of Talossan law also seems pretty weird to me. I suppose its based on the fact that, until recently, some portions of the Wisconsin Statutes were imported into el Lexhatx, del Val acknowledges this in fact in the very next sentence,
QuoteAlthough the Ziu has enacted statutes which dis-incorporate Wisconsin crimes from Talossan law, [...]
which might make it sound like (1) the entirety of the Wisconsin Statutes were incorporated into el Lexhatx and (2) only the parts dealing with criminal law were edited out recently, but if you actually look at el Lexhatx before this change was made, the results might surprise you. For reference, here's the relevant section:
Quote1. The Ziu hereby adopts the following portions of the civil and criminal codes of the American state of Wisconsin as law within the territory of the Kingdom of Talossa: (35RZ21)
1.1. Chapters 240-243 Fraudulent Conveyances and Contracts
1.2. Chapters 401-411 Uniform Commercial Code
1.3. Chapters 421-429 Wisconsin Consumer Act
1.4. Chapters 700-710 Property
1.5. Chapters 939-951 Criminal Code
1.6. Chapter 961 Controlled Substances, subject to A.1.6.1
Do any of the sections named above define what a tort is, or what a plaintiff would be entitled in return for suffering a tort? There is a section for Civil Procedures in the Wisconsin Statutes, Chapters 799 to 847, which as you can see was never part of Talossan law, but maybe I'm missing it. If not, where does it leave us? If it's defined in US federal law somewhere, or through some precedent set in some case within or outside of Wisconsin, would that actually matter for our purposes?
And if civil trials are indeed not a thing in Talossa, what does it mean that the Talossan courts' powers "extend to all matters, in law and equity", if the latter is ill-defined?
Just some
2 AM ramblings food for thought.
The Organic Law VIII.2 (http://wiki.talossa.com/Law:2017_Organic_Law#Article_VIII:_The_Courts) begins as follows:
QuoteThe judicial authority of the Cort pü Inalt shall extend to all matters, in law and equity, arising out of a case or controversy...
This part of the OrgLaw was written by Justice V, who is qualified as a lawyer in the United States, and in Anglo-American law, equity has a technical meaning (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equity_(law)). I flunked out of law school, but I hope I'm getting this one-sentence summary right: "equity is a set of rules for courts to right wrongs which are left unaddressed by statute law or common law".
I should also draw attention to El Lexhatx A.1.1:
QuoteTalossan courts shall interpret Organic and Statute Law through the lens of the Covenants of Rights and Freedoms, and otherwise in accordance with Talossan juridical precedent. Judges may also use precedent from other legal systems with which they are familiar to guide their decisions, though such precedent shall not be binding.
Because precedent is binding (subject to the Convenants),
Talossa has its own indigenous common law - which is not bound by Wisconsin, US or other Anglo-American law, but may be influenced by it, as the CpI and other corts may decide. It is to be found in the records of CpI decisions.
However, Marcel is 100% right that there is no grounds for suggesting that the equity law or common law of Wisconsin or the United States or of any other jurisdiction applies in Talossa. I argue that Açafat is dead wrong in suggesting that Talossan common law derives from Wisconsin common law - this is precisely what I wanted to reject by reforming the criminal statutes.
But the OrgLaw mandates that
some form of equity applies, the rules of which will have to be set by Talossan courts for Talossan circumstances. What Açafat is doing is using Anglo-American principles of equity and common law, as those he's familiar with, and hoping that the General Cort and CpI judges will find these persuasive or applicable in the Talossan context. We are utterly in uncharted territory and reliant on the wisdom of the judiciary. It's exciting, isn't it?
Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on March 20, 2022, 11:46:45 PMWe are utterly in uncharted territory and reliant on the wisdom of the judiciary. It's exciting, isn't it?
Can't help but think that this, as well as how Criminal Procedures are supposed to work since we still dont have any set guidelines for those IIRC, shouldve been decided by the legislature forever ago instead of leaving it up to the judges to make up the rules as they go. But maybe thats just my lack of familiarity with common law speaking, I dont know.
Nah, our statute law is sprawling and hard to parse at the best of times. Best to leave some things to improvisation.
The question of whether running a common-law system with binding precedent is appropriate for Talossa or not is a different story altogether. But as long as it's the consensus that our courts should operate on the principle of stare decisis, that's how it will be.
Ha, damn, this thread was used as evidence in the trial just now. Something to put on my CV!
The fact that the judicial system is running so smoothly - with trial and appellate courts both involved and a Clerk of Corts organising the whole thing - suggests that the FreeDems-led Justice reforms of the last few terms were well thought out, which is a relief.