WHEREAS, the standardization of the electoral schedule is beneficial to the further development of non-political activity in Talossa, and
WHEREAS, the nationwide discussions on consensus have demonstrated a desire to fix the length of Cosă terms, and
WHEREAS, this makes modifications to confidence votes and Cosă dissolutions necessary,
BE IT RESOLVED that the following Amendments to the Organic Law are made:
- Article IV, Section 7, which currently reads:
QuoteA newly elected Ziu shall convene on the first day of the month after its general election, to coincide with the publication of the first Clark. Its term shall be equal to seven Clarks, subject to the provisions elsewhere in this Organic Law. During its last month, the King shall issue a Writ of Dissolution ending its term. Whenever the Cosâ may be dissolved, all its members shall resign.
shall be amended to read:
QuoteA newly elected Ziu shall convene on the first day of the month after its general election, to coincide with the publication of the first Clark. Its term shall be equal to six Clarks, subject to the provisions elsewhere in this Organic Law. During its last month, the King shall issue a Writ of Dissolution ending its term. Whenever the Cosă may be dissolved, all its members shall resign.
- Article IV, Section 8, which currently reads as follows:
QuoteThe Seneschal may insert between any two Clarks, or after the final Clark, a "month of recess" in which no Clark is published. No more than one "month of recess" may be declared during any one term of office.
is hereby amended to read:
QuoteThe Seneschal may insert in place of any single Clark, a "month of recess" in which no Clark is published. No more than one "month of recess" may be declared during any one term of office.
- Article IV, Section 9, which currently reads as follows:
QuoteThe Seneschal may appeal to the King to issue a Writ of Dissolution to dissolve the Cosa before its term has expired and call new elections. If the appeal is presented accompanied by the explicit support of members of the Cosa representing a majority of seats therein, the King shall dissolve the Cosa effective immediately or, should there be a Clark in progress, upon the completion of the Clark. If the appeal lacks such an explicit expression of support from a majority of the Cosa, the King shall not act on the appeal for a period of three days following its receipt, and shall then accede to the appeal but only if the Crown has not been presented during that time with a petition, supported by members of the Cosa representing more than half the seats therein, praying that the Cosa be not dissolved. A Writ, once issued, takes effect only at the end of the month in which it was issued, and may be rescinded before it has taken effect.
is replaced in its entirety with the following:
QuoteThe King shall issue a Writ of Dissolution to dissolve the Cosă in the month of August in odd-numbered Gregorian years, and in the months of April and December in even-numbered Gregorian years. A Writ, once issued, takes effect only at the end of the month in which it was issued, and may not be rescinded before it has taken effect.
- Article VI, Section 2, which reads:
QuoteThe Seneschal shall be selected by each newly elected Cosâ. When the King is presented with a petition to appoint a Seneschal, signed by MCs who together hold a majority of seats in the Cosâ as then constituted, the person named in the petition shall be appointed by the King to be the Seneschal. Should no such petition be made by the first day of the first Clark, that Clark shall include a Ranked Choice Vote to select the Seneschal. Each party holding seats in the Cosa may nominate one candidate for this election.
is amended to read:
QuoteThe Seneschal shall be selected by the Cosă, including a mandatory selection by each newly elected Cosă. Whenever the King is presented with a petition to appoint a Seneschal, signed by MCs who together hold a majority of seats in the Cosă as then constituted, the person named in the petition shall be appointed by the King to be the Seneschal. Should no such petition be made by the first day of the first Clark, that Clark shall include a Ranked Choice Vote to select the Seneschal. Each party holding seats in the Cosă may nominate one candidate for this election.
- Article VI, Section 3, which reads:
QuoteThe Seneschal has duties of the State. He may advise the King to dissolve the Cosâ and to appoint and remove members of the Cabinet, and such advice to the King shall not be refused. He may also declare war and write treaties with the approval of the Ziu, expedite the Ziu's consideration of legislation, and issue Prime Dictates.
shall be amended by removal of the phrase "to dissolve the Cosâ and ". - Article VII, Section 8, which currently reads:
QuoteThe Clark must contain, in every edition, a Vote of Confidence. Each MC may answer this question in his Clark ballot every month, either with a "yes" or a "no." If at the end of any Clark the "no" vote outnumbers the "yes" vote, the King shall dissolve the Cosa and call new elections.
is amended to read:
QuoteThe Clark must contain, in every edition, a Vote of Confidence. Each MC may answer this question in his Clark ballot every month, either with a "yes" or a "no." If at the end of any Clark the "no" vote outnumbers the "yes" vote, the Leader of the Opposition shall become Seneschal.
- Article VI, Section 10 of the Organic Law is created to read:
QuoteAll political parties holding seats in the Cosă but not having representation in the Cabinet shall be known as El Contrapharti Fieir da Sieu Maxhestà, or "His Majesty's Loyal Opposition" in English, or in short El Contrapharti or "The Opposition". Unless and until the members of the Opposition decide otherwise by majority vote , the "Leader of the Opposition" shall be the leader of the party within The Opposition with a plurality of seats.
Uréu q'estadra så:
Mic'haglh Autófil MC
As a brief explanation of each change:
#1 clarifies that there are six months to a Cosă term; coupled with the two months required for an election, this produces an eight-month long cycle overall, which means three Cosăs over a span of two years.
#2 changes months of recess in that they no longer push subsequent Clarks back, becoming a simple substitution to keep elections on schedule.
#3 changes when the King may (or must, going forward) issue Writs of Dissolution.
#4 clarifies that majority petitions to name a new Seneschal may be presented at any time, while still mandating that they be performed at the start of a Cosă term.
#5 removes the Seneschal's ability to request a premature Writ of Dissolution.
#6 alters the Organic basis of how Votes of Confidence work, creating the Constructive Motion of No Confidence in its place.
There are a few changes that are also necessary to El Lexhatx to fully complete this portion of the reforms, which I do already have a draft of, but I see no sense in formally proposing those before this amendment is ratified by the people.
It was expected but is still, no less, disappointing to not see annual elections in the package. Something to keep championing, I suppose. I'm glad you've gotten this far Mic'haglh. Open Society supports this legislation.
Quote from: Mic'haglh Autófil, SMC EiP on November 14, 2024, 05:39:26 PM#3 changes when the King may (or must, going forward) issue Writs of Dissolution.
#5 removes the Seneschal's ability to request a premature Writ of Dissolution.
Why?
Quote#6 alters the Organic basis of how Votes of Confidence work, creating the Constructive Motion of No Confidence in its place.
I disagree with this fundamental change to how the Cosa has always operated. Also, what would prevent an MC from bringing a motion every single Clark, effectively functioning as the VoC?
Quote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on November 14, 2024, 07:40:15 PMIt was expected but is still, no less, disappointing to not see annual elections in the package. Something to keep championing, I suppose. I'm glad you've gotten this far Mic'haglh. Open Society supports this legislation.
We can keep pushing for it. Perhaps it's just because I have Thursday Night Football on at the moment, but sometimes it's better to take the three points and kick the field goal, you know?
Quote from: Munditenens Tresplet on November 14, 2024, 08:54:24 PMQuote from: Mic'haglh Autófil, SMC EiP on November 14, 2024, 05:39:26 PM#3 changes when the King may (or must, going forward) issue Writs of Dissolution.
#5 removes the Seneschal's ability to request a premature Writ of Dissolution.
Why?
Quote#6 alters the Organic basis of how Votes of Confidence work, creating the Constructive Motion of No Confidence in its place.
I disagree with this fundamental change to how the Cosa has always operated. Also, what would prevent an MC from bringing a motion every single Clark, effectively functioning as the VoC?
On your first question, premature Writs of Dissolution would seem incompatible with the idea of a fixed electoral schedule, would they not?
On your second -- in addition to the current VoC model being incompatible with a fixed term length -- in those El Lex. changes I mentioned earlier, it is required that the CMoNC name a specific candidate to take over as Seneschal. Since identical (or even substantially identical) bills are prohibited from being proposed twice in the same term, the Opposition would need to propose a new candidate every month. Seems like it would be smart to not completely empty your clip of prospective candidates beforehand, no?
Chiming in against my own better judgement because I should really get back to work, but 1) I broadly support this bill, and 2):
Quote from: Mic'haglh Autófil, SMC EiP on November 14, 2024, 09:28:36 PMSince identical (or even substantially identical) bills are prohibited from being proposed twice in the same term, the Opposition would need to propose a new candidate every month.
Technically this provision is not applicable - a CMoNC would be a motion by its own definition, not a bill.
(Incidentally, this would also mean Senses of the Ziu are not limited by H.2.1.6.1. - a nonbinding resolution is also not a bill.)
I agree with Sir Luc that the constructive motion is exactly that, a motion, not legislation. If it isn't hoppered, the law against duplication doesn't apply. The same person could move for the same Seneschal as many times as he or she wished to under this legislation.
Quote from: Sir Lüc on November 15, 2024, 08:40:39 AM(Incidentally, this would also mean Senses of the Ziu are not limited by H.2.1.6.1. - a nonbinding resolution is also not a bill.)
Music to my ears, these words.
Quote from: Sir Lüc on November 15, 2024, 08:40:39 AMChiming in against my own better judgement because I should really get back to work, but 1) I broadly support this bill, and 2):
Technically this provision is not applicable - a CMoNC would be a motion by its own definition, not a bill.
(Incidentally, this would also mean Senses of the Ziu are not limited by H.2.1.6.1. - a nonbinding resolution is also not a bill.)
Quote from: Sir Txec dal Nordselvă, UrB on November 15, 2024, 09:00:02 AMI agree with Sir Luc that the constructive motion is exactly that, a motion, not legislation. If it isn't hoppered, the law against duplication doesn't apply. The same person could move for the same Seneschal as many times as he or she wished to under this legislation.
If that bit about skipping legislative review were removed, but then Lex.H.2.1.2 were further amended to permit these to bypass the CRL, which was really the intent to begin with, would that move it into the territory of "non-repeatable act"?
Quote from: Mic'haglh Autófil, SMC EiP on November 14, 2024, 09:28:36 PMOn your first question, premature Writs of Dissolution would seem incompatible with the idea of a fixed electoral schedule, would they not?
It is absolutely compatible. We can still have a fixed election schedule of Clarks while allowing for the possibility of a premature Writ of Dissolution. It would merely shift the schedule. The only "issue" with our current election schedule is the idea that months of recess can be added rather than replace Clarks.
I think it's ridiculous to suggest that the remedy for no confidence in a government would not be to call for an immediate election, but rather just to have the current Cosa try to elect a new Seneschal. Especially when each motion requires a candidate to be selected, meaning that the Cosa that already has no confidence in the current government must somehow solidify behind another individual? So, in other words, a government which lost the confidence of its parliament gets to remain in power because that same parliament will also not agree on a midterm replacement.
And not to belabor the point, but assuming this situation arises, how bad is this government? Did the ministers resign en masse? Will Talossa's entire cabinet be led by a single individual Seneschal who doesn't possess the confidence of its parliament for several months because the King no longer possesses any power to call for early dissolution, and the Cosa no longer has the power to order it either?
By the way, I won't repeat what has been said above about a motion of no confidence technically allowing for the same Seneschal candidate to be placed on each Clark, which defeats the purpose of removing the VoC. But I would point out, nothing prohibits
multiple motions from being made in the same Clark for different people. (Nor should it, because forcing a first come first serve motion would encourage the government to put up a deputy for every motion just to vote them down.) Additionally, nothing prevents a single MC (hint) who isn't afraid of stirring the pot from making several no confidence motions in the same Clark each nominating another MC to be Seneschal (because nothing requires the nominated MC to accept the nomination, which would create more issues), repeating in
every single Clark, until the Clarks are nothing more than entire lists of no confidence motions each time.
And if we decide to make this motion non-repeatable if the same candidate is listed, then nothing stops the government from doing what I just said above, only all in the first Clark, thereby preventing anyone else from nominating anybody in a subsequent Clark.
Or, we could just keep the VoC.
(And I forgot, if the Cosa elects a new Seneschal with 30-60 days left in a government term, would this be enough time for the outgoing government to transition the information necessary to run the country to the new Seneschal's government? Is there a known period of delay built in like there would be with, say, a general election period?)
Quote from: Munditenens Tresplet on November 16, 2024, 01:06:11 AMAdditionally, nothing prevents a single MC (hint) who isn't afraid of stirring the pot from making several no confidence motions in the same Clark each nominating another MC to be Seneschal (because nothing requires the nominated MC to accept the nomination, which would create more issues), repeating in every single Clark, until the Clarks are nothing more than entire lists of no confidence motions each time.
👁👄👁
Quote from: Munditenens Tresplet on November 16, 2024, 01:06:11 AMWe can still have a fixed election schedule ... It would merely shift the schedule.
(https://www.enworld.org/media/princess-bride-you-keep-using-that-word-gif.92915/full)
QuoteI think it's ridiculous to suggest that the remedy for no confidence in a government would not be to call for an immediate election, but rather just to have the current Cosa try to elect a new Seneschal. Especially when each motion requires a candidate to be selected, meaning that the Cosa that already has no confidence in the current government must somehow solidify behind another individual?
Seems to be working rather well for Norway, actually. The Storting is constitutionally required to serve its full term, but the Norwegian PM must retain the chamber's confidence.
QuoteAnd not to belabor the point, but assuming this situation arises, how bad is this government? Did the ministers resign en masse? Will Talossa's entire cabinet be led by a single individual Seneschal who doesn't possess the confidence of its parliament for several months because the King no longer possesses any power to call for early dissolution, and the Cosa no longer has the power to order it either?
That situation (emphasis mine) is entirely what the motion's availability
avoids in the first place.QuoteBy the way, I won't repeat what has been said above about a motion of no confidence technically allowing for the same Seneschal candidate to be placed on each Clark, which defeats the purpose of removing the VoC. But I would point out, nothing prohibits multiple motions from being made in the same Clark for different people. (Nor should it, because forcing a first come first serve motion would encourage the government to put up a deputy for every motion just to vote them down.) Additionally, nothing prevents a single MC (hint) who isn't afraid of stirring the pot from making several no confidence motions in the same Clark each nominating another MC to be Seneschal (because nothing requires the nominated MC to accept the nomination, which would create more issues), repeating in every single Clark, until the Clarks are nothing more than entire lists of no confidence motions each time.
And if we decide to make this motion non-repeatable if the same candidate is listed, then nothing stops the government from doing what I just said above, only all in the first Clark, thereby preventing anyone else from nominating anybody in a subsequent Clark.
Fair enough, I will concede that the bill as originally written does produce a better outcome. I do want to touch on the part I've italicized though -- expand on these issues you foresee.
QuoteOr, we could just keep the VoC.
Sure, if a failure thereof would simply result in the Leader of the Opposition becoming Seneschal, so as to not derail the schedule.
Quote(And I forgot, if the Cosa elects a new Seneschal with 30-60 days left in a government term, would this be enough time for the outgoing government to transition the information necessary to run the country to the new Seneschal's government? Is there a known period of delay built in like there would be with, say, a general election period?)
There is not, but I can see the wisdom in building in a transitional period.
You assume that a government which loses the confidence of parliament would choose the leader of the opposition as Seneschal. This may not always be the case. If a Seneschal loses the support of its ministers, why would the ministers coalesce around the leader of a party that doesn't share their ideologies? And if they put up someone else in a motion, why would the opposition parties want to coalesce around someone who they still detest, just perhaps detest less?
A VoC as currently used would cut out these problems, by leaving any problems up to the people to resolve in a GE--with the leaders making their cases directly to them.
And, yes, a fixed election schedule is still possible. How many times has a VoC actually failed? How many times has the King been petitioned for a Writ of Dissolution? It is exceedingly rare, but yet, it needs to remain a possibility. And if the rare situation happens, then the "schedule" of say July elections becomes a "schedule" of March elections instead. One tiny shift owing to circumstances that are unlikely to repeat is not going to derail the entire fixed election scheme. Moreover, it's not like this is going to permanently change either, since a Ziu in a few years might decide to do something different and change the law again.
As far as requiring an MC to accept the nomination of Seneschal before a motion is submitted to a Clark, now you have to have some period of time built in for the person to respond to the nomination that they would accept it. A week? 10 days? Ok, so what if something catastrophic happened in the government inside that timeframe, now the Cosa has to wait another month before they could potentially vote on someone to replace the Seneschal?
If you want to remove the possibility of Writs of Dissolution to ensure the government can't mess with a set election schedule, fine, but I think that the VoC should be kept for those rare instances where it is necessary for the people to weigh in on a change in government.
I will concede, though, that a VoC which automatically results in the leader of the largest party in opposition becoming Seneschal (rather than this motion thing) would take away a lot of these arguments above, save for my belief that the voters should immediately weigh in.
Quote from: Mic'haglh Autófil, SMC EiP on November 16, 2024, 04:09:37 PMSeems to be working rather well for Norway, actually. The Storting is constitutionally required to serve its full term, but the Norwegian PM must retain the chamber's confidence.
I agree with MC Autofil's point here and am in full support of this reform. If a new proposed Seneschal, from the governing party or coalition, can garner the Ziu's confidence then it avoids another heated and unnecessary election. The procedure by which confidence is tested is something on which I am open but eliminating the failed VOC > immediate dissolution > election process (with no ability to test confidence for other proposed PMs is something I support.
Quote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on November 16, 2024, 06:35:14 PMQuote from: Mic'haglh Autófil, SMC EiP on November 16, 2024, 04:09:37 PMSeems to be working rather well for Norway, actually. The Storting is constitutionally required to serve its full term, but the Norwegian PM must retain the chamber's confidence.
I agree with MC Autofil's point here and am in full support of this reform. If a new proposed Seneschal, from the governing party or coalition, can garner the Ziu's confidence then it avoids another heated and unnecessary election. The procedure by which confidence is tested is something on which I am open but eliminating the failed VOC > immediate dissolution > election process (with no ability to test confidence for other proposed PMs is something I support.
You are shifting the election to the Ziu rather than the people. And given Talossa's electoral history, I would doubt that any Ziu would coalesce behind another single individual to lead them. So, once again, we're back to keeping in an unsupported government. Comparisons to real world examples are fine, except when we remember that Talossa is a very small community with very personal disagreements that extend into the political realm.
Quote from: Munditenens Tresplet on November 16, 2024, 06:53:29 PMQuote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on November 16, 2024, 06:35:14 PMQuote from: Mic'haglh Autófil, SMC EiP on November 16, 2024, 04:09:37 PMSeems to be working rather well for Norway, actually. The Storting is constitutionally required to serve its full term, but the Norwegian PM must retain the chamber's confidence.
I agree with MC Autofil's point here and am in full support of this reform. If a new proposed Seneschal, from the governing party or coalition, can garner the Ziu's confidence then it avoids another heated and unnecessary election. The procedure by which confidence is tested is something on which I am open but eliminating the failed VOC > immediate dissolution > election process (with no ability to test confidence for other proposed PMs is something I support.
You are shifting the election to the Ziu rather than the people. And given Talossa's electoral history, I would doubt that any Ziu would coalesce behind another single individual to lead them. So, once again, we're back to keeping in an unsupported government. Comparisons to real world examples are fine, except when we remember that Talossa is a very small community with very personal disagreements that extend into the political realm.
Yes, the Ziu is a body elected by the people of Talossa so shifting it to the Ziu should the previously elected Seneschal lose confidence outside of the normal election schedule is within that democratic framework and is supported by examples in other parliamentary regimes globally as was referenced by Mic'haglh.
I don't share your skepticism that the governing party or coalition would be unable to agree on a suitable alternative should the standing seneschal lose confidence.
Quote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on November 16, 2024, 07:45:57 PMI don't share your skepticism that the governing party or coalition would be unable to agree on a suitable alternative should the standing seneschal lose confidence.
Okay, so pick someone (https://www.talossa.ca/files/cosa_members.php?cosa=60&clark=4) and let's play test it before
amending our constitution.
Quote from: Munditenens Tresplet on November 16, 2024, 08:43:34 PMQuote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on November 16, 2024, 07:45:57 PMI don't share your skepticism that the governing party or coalition would be unable to agree on a suitable alternative should the standing seneschal lose confidence.
Okay, so pick someone (https://www.talossa.ca/files/cosa_members.php?cosa=60&clark=4) and let's play test it before amending our constitution.
I'm going to refrain from continuing to argue this point. I don't think we are going to get anywhere. I support the bill and hope to vote in support of it soon. In the meantime I'll keep beating the drum on annual elections.
Quote from: Munditenens Tresplet on November 16, 2024, 05:56:14 PMI will concede, though, that a VoC which automatically results in the leader of the largest party in opposition becoming Seneschal (rather than this motion thing) would take away a lot of these arguments above, save for my belief that the voters should immediately weigh in.
This is ultimately what I was looking for -- if this is an opportunity for me to reach a compromise (despite having done so already), then I am willing to explore it at a minimum.
What if we did something like this:
Quote(6): Article VII, Section 8, which currently reads:
QuoteThe Clark must contain, in every edition, a Vote of Confidence. Each MC may answer this question in his Clark ballot every month, either with a "yes" or a "no." If at the end of any Clark the "no" vote outnumbers the "yes" vote, the King shall dissolve the Cosa and call new elections.
is replaced in its entirety with the following:
QuoteThe Clark must contain, in every edition, a Vote of Confidence. Each MC may answer this question in his Clark ballot every month, either with a "yes" or a "no". If at the end of any Clark the "no" vote outnumbers the "yes" vote, the Leader of the Opposition shall become the Seneschal.
This particular change may require a slightly more formalized process for naming a Leader of the Opposition, but those changes would be relevant to El Lexhatx, not the Organic Law.
Apart from the calling of new and too-frequent elections -- which as Member Tzaracomprada has already noted is what this legislation is explicitly intended to do away with -- would you say that this addresses your main concerns?
Quote from: Mic'haglh Autófil, SMC EiP on November 17, 2024, 01:52:17 PMApart from the calling of new and too-frequent elections -- which as Member Tzaracomprada has already noted is what this legislation is explicitly intended to do away with
Yes this is a very good start. Hopefully we can build on it in the near future.
Unless I'm mistaken, the position of Leader of the Opposition doesn't exist at all in the OrgLaw at present. I think it's risky to give important OrgLaw responsibilities to positions that depend completely on lower-level law for their existence.
Quote from: C. M. Siervicül on November 20, 2024, 07:31:10 AMUnless I'm mistaken, the position of Leader of the Opposition doesn't exist at all in the OrgLaw at present. I think it's risky to give important OrgLaw responsibilities to positions that depend completely on lower-level law for their existence.
That's a valid concern. I had actually drafted this as part of a change to El Lexhatx to formalize the LotO selection process, but I see no reason we couldn't insert it into OrgLaw instead.
QuoteTitle H, Section 4.3, which currently reads:
QuoteMembers of the Cosâ who (in a given session of the Cosa) have voted NON on the most recent Vote of Confidence, or intend to do so on the next Vote of Confidence, shall be known as El Contrapharti Fieir da Sieu Maxhestà, or "His Majesty's Loyal Opposition" in English, or in short "El Contrapharti / The Opposition". Unless and until the members of the Opposition decide otherwise by majority vote , the "Leader of the Opposition" shall be the leader of the party with the most Cosa seats assigned to MCs who voted NON on the last Vote of Confidence.
shall be amended to read
QuoteMembers of the Cosâ who (in a given session of the Cosa) are not present on a Petition to Appoint a Seneschal shall be known as El Contrapharti Fieir da Sieu Maxhestà, or "His Majesty's Loyal Opposition" in English, or in short "El Contrapharti / The Opposition". Should a Vote of Confidence fail to pass, all MCs who voted PER shall become the new Opposition. The "Leader of the Opposition" shall be elected by majority ballot of all Cosa seats held by MCs in Opposition, including but not limited to at the beginning of a new Cosa term and upon the failure of a Vote of Confidence.
Why not simplify it further by stating that the largest party NOT represented in the Cabinet shall be the loyal opposition.
Quote from: King Txec on December 01, 2024, 08:41:20 PMWhy not simplify it further by stating that the largest party NOT represented in the Cabinet shall be the loyal opposition.
I'm not opposed (no pun intended) to that -- a sort of Canadian-style "Official Opposition" -- but I wanted to have some sort of consensus-process in place if we're going to be making that person the Seneschal when a VoC fails. If people think that the Official Opposition approach is easier, we can go that way too, I'm open to ideas.
Why don't we remove the "parties that voted Non" part and replace with the leader of the largest party outside of government? I think this is the common tradition across other parliamentary democracies. (That may be what King Txec is proposing). I do not see it as a positive that a third or fourth party could lead the opposition with minimal public support in the last election.
Quote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on December 01, 2024, 10:27:56 PMWhy don't we remove the "parties that voted Non" part and replace with the leader of the largest party outside of government? I think this is the common tradition across other parliamentary democracies. (That may be what King Txec is proposing). I do not see it as a positive that a third or fourth party could lead the opposition with minimal public support in the last election.
That is exactly what I am proposing.
- Txec R
Yes, I think all three of us are discussing the same change at this point. I'd be interested in hearing from
@Munditenens Tresplet and
@C. M. Siervicül to see if the proposed changes thus far would assuage some of their concerns.
I still think that a failed VoC should go to an immediate GE. But the changes are much better than originally proposed, so I will withdraw from expressing my disapproval publicly.
This proposal has been altered to reflect feedback received; specifically, provisions 6 and 7.
It is still rather odd for us not to simply go with the tried and true convention that the Leader of the Opposition is the leader of the largest party outside of Government. What is the reason for changing this?
@Mic'haglh Autófil, SMC EiP Are you planning to move forward with this for the final clark?
Quote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on December 23, 2024, 01:42:32 AM@Mic'haglh Autófil, SMC EiP Are you planning to move forward with this for the final clark?
As a matter of fact I am. Would the Secretary of State please move this to the CRL for their review?
@Sir Lüc
Approved.
On the last article, the definition of Opposition currently includes DIEN, despite being classified as "External support" (see the Wiki entry related to current Cosa (https://wiki.talossa.com/Cosa)).
What happens if the 2 biggest Opposition parties have the same number of seats ? Should there be a vote among Opposition MCs between the 2 leaders, followed by a toss if a tie ?
Quote from: þerxh Sant-Enogat on January 12, 2025, 03:18:17 PMOn the last article, the definition of Opposition currently includes DIEN, despite being classified as "External support" (see the Wiki entry related to current Cosa (https://wiki.talossa.com/Cosa)).
What happens if the 2 biggest Opposition parties have the same number of seats ? Should there be a vote among Opposition MCs between the 2 leaders, followed by a toss if a tie ?
I think that seems like a logical tiebreaker. What if that article looked like this?
QuoteArticle VI, Section 10 of the Organic Law is created to read:
QuoteAll political parties holding seats in the Cosă but not having representation in the Cabinet shall be known as El Contrapharti Fieir da Sieu Maxhestà, or "His Majesty's Loyal Opposition" in English, or in short El Contrapharti or "The Opposition". Unless and until the members of the Opposition decide otherwise by majority vote , the "Leader of the Opposition" shall be the leader of the party within the Opposition with a plurality of seats. Should more than one Opposition party possess a plurality of seats, Opposition MCs will hold a majority vote upon the seating of a new Cosa to select a Leader of the Opposition from among those parties tied for a plurality, including multiple rounds of balloting as necessary in the event more than two parties are initially so tied. In the event this vote results in a tie among the final two participants, one of those two shall be chosen by random draw conducted by the Chancery.
QuoteIn the event this vote results in a tie among the final two participants, one of those two shall be chosen by random draw.
Who is supposed to administer this?
Quote from: King Txec on January 13, 2025, 03:39:14 PMQuoteIn the event this vote results in a tie among the final two participants, one of those two shall be chosen by random draw.
Who is supposed to administer this?
I have updated my proposed change to include that the draw, if necessary, is conducted by the Chancery.
I know we've tried to avoid adding too many things to the SoS's plate recently but given the fact that this is a fairly unlikely outcome, while it is still smart to include a contingency plan, I don't think it unreasonable to assign it to their duties.
No objection on the Bill if it includes your latest version of Article VI, Section 10.
A suggestion on Article VII, Section 8 : could we replace "if at the end of any Clark the "no" vote outnumbers the "yes" vote, the Leader of the Opposition shall become Seneschal." By "If at the end of any Clark the "no" vote outnumbers the "yes" vote, the Leader of the Opposition shall nominate the Seneschal, whether themselves or someone else who accepts"
@Mic'haglh Autófil, SMC EiP A quick reminder on this if you want it to move forward this term.
Quote from: þerxh Sant-Enogat on January 19, 2025, 09:36:23 AMNo objection on the Bill if it includes your latest version of Article VI, Section 10.
Yes, the updated version of Org.VI.10 as taken from feedback is the change listed and intended.
QuoteA suggestion on Article VII, Section 8 : could we replace "if at the end of any Clark the "no" vote outnumbers the "yes" vote, the Leader of the Opposition shall become Seneschal." By "If at the end of any Clark the "no" vote outnumbers the "yes" vote, the Leader of the Opposition shall nominate the Seneschal, whether themselves or someone else who accepts"
I'm not opposed to that idea -- I think it allows for some good flexibility -- but given the turnaround from one Clark to the next is roughly 10 days, it may be best to have the transfer remain an automatic one. Given that they've offered good feedback thus far, I'd be interested in seeing what
@Breneir Tzaracomprada ,
@Munditenens Tresplet , and
@King Txec have to say.
My recommendations:
I greatly prefer this new definition of the Leader of the Opposition over the one that's currently in the OrgLaw, but that does mean this amendment immediately creates an inorganic Lexhatx article. I'm not sure if anyone has gone through the lexhatx to see if there are any other conflicts, but generally I think it's bad practice to make sweeping OrgLaw amendments and then fix (or have someone else fix) the lexhatx later, so ideally this bill would be accompanied by the appropriate changes to the lexhatx (including removing lex H.4.3) before it gets clarked.
I see no other immediate technical issues.
Quote from: Glüc da Dhi S.H. on January 29, 2025, 04:20:06 PMMy recommendations:
I greatly prefer this new definition of the Leader of the Opposition over the one that's currently in the OrgLaw, but that does mean this amendment immediately creates an inorganic Lexhatx article. I'm not sure if anyone has gone through the lexhatx to see if there are any other conflicts, but generally I think it's bad practice to make sweeping OrgLaw amendments and then fix (or have someone else fix) the lexhatx later, so ideally this bill would be accompanied by the appropriate changes to the lexhatx (including removing lex H.4.3) before it gets clarked.
I see no other immediate technical issues.
I have gone through the relevant portions of El Lexhatx to take note of necessary changes, though I thought it prudent to wait and see how this bill fared both with the Ziu and a referendum before changing Lexh.