Wittenberg

WHEREAS, in parliamentary democracies, the upper house of the legislature functions as a "house of sober second thought"; and

WHEREAS, this role requires that the Senäts be able to review and approve of bills, but ought not to have the ability to block those with widespread support in the Cosă; and

WHEREAS, this blocking ability ought to remain in place in the case of Organic amendments; then

BE IT HEREBY RESOLVED, that Article III, Section 4 of the Organic Law is amended by the addition of the following bolded text:

QuoteThe Senäts shall have equal powers with the Cosa in respect of all proposed laws, except that bills appropriating revenue or moneys shall not originate in the Senäts, and the Government shall require the confidence of the Cosa only to remain in office. In the event of the Senäts twice rejecting a bill appropriating revenue or moneys which is passed by the Cosa, upon it being passed a third time by the Cosa, it shall not require the consent of the Senäts to be given Royal Assent and take effect. Bills for the imposition or appropriation of fines or other monetary penalties, or for the demand or payment or appropriation of fees for licenses or services, shall not be taken to appropriate revenue or moneys. In the event the Senäts rejects a bill that does not amend this Organic Law, appropriate moneys, or override a Royal Veto, should the same Cosă pass that bill again by a three-fifths majority, it shall not require the consent of the Senäts to be presented for Royal Assent or take effect.

Uréu q'estadra så:
Mic'haglh Autófil (MC-PdR/¡Avant!)

For the reason specified in the latter half of the second whereas clause, I support this amendment. I will be asking fellow Green Party members to vote in support during the coming election should it pass the Ziu.

I'm not particularly convinced that either of the first two clauses are factually true (though perhaps they are morally true or desirable, by a given standard).

Quote from: owenedwards on June 22, 2025, 11:45:30 AMI'm not particularly convinced that either of the first two clauses are factually true (though perhaps they are morally true or desirable, by a given standard).

Quote from: wikipedia link=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upper_house#Parliamentary_systemsIn parliamentary systems the upper house is frequently seen as an advisory or a "house of review" chamber; for this reason, its powers of direct action are often reduced in some way. Some or all of the following restrictions are often placed on upper houses:

• Lack of control over the executive branch. (By contrast, in the US and many other presidential systems, the Senate or upper chamber has more control over the composition of the Cabinet and the administration generally, through its prerogative of confirming the president's nominations to senior offices.)
• No absolute veto of proposed legislation, though suspensive vetoes are permitted in some states.
• In countries where it can veto legislation (such as the Netherlands), it may not be able to amend the proposals.
• A reduced or even absent role in initiating legislation.
• No power to block supply, or budget measures. (A rare example of a parliamentary upper house that does possess this power is the Australian Senate, which notably exercised that power in 1975.)

[...]

The role of a revising chamber is to scrutinise legislation that may have been drafted over-hastily in the lower house and to suggest amendments that the lower house may nevertheless reject if it wishes to. An example is the British House of Lords. Under the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, the House of Lords can no longer prevent the passage of most bills, but it must be given an opportunity to debate them and propose amendments, and can thereby delay the passage of a bill with which it disagrees. Bills can only be delayed for up to one year before the Commons can use the Parliament Act, although economic bills can only be delayed for one month.

Something I find interesting is that there is less of an Organic barrier to depowering the Senäts than there is to simply changing its provincially based nature!

Can you explain to me why having an upper house that has the authority to reject bills or send them back down is a bad thing? I can perhaps understand the ability of the Cosa to override but do we need to strip them of power in order to accomplish the same purpose?

Quote from: Dr. Pôl dal Nordselvă on June 23, 2025, 05:47:21 AMI can perhaps understand the ability of the Cosa to override but do we need to strip them of power in order to accomplish the same purpose?

Tell me another way that we could give the Cosa final say over legislation

Quote from: Dr. Pôl dal Nordselvă on June 23, 2025, 05:47:21 AMCan you explain to me why having an upper house that has the authority to reject bills or send them back down is a bad thing?

These are two separate things; at the moment, it already has the power to reject bills; this would be partially transformed into a "send bills back" power under this amendment.

For that matter, the Senate is also already fully empowered to "send bills back", as Senators may choose to offer their reasoning for voting against a bill. The catch is that the matter cannot be considered again by the same Cosa session unless "substantially amended". In other words, the Senate currently possesses both powers at their fullest extent.

I should perhaps reiterate that this amendment would not allow a razor-thin majority to force bills through; bills rejected by the Senate must gather support from including across the aisle within the Cosa; bills with such widespread support as to be deemed not just desirable, but practically necessary.

Further, this amendment does not affect the Royal Veto; it is certainly possible that the King, when considering a bill that has been presented to him over the Senate's refusal, will consider, among other things, the margin of support for the bill (both on its initial Clark run and the re-passage), the reasons Senators may have given for opposing it, and/or the reasons the bill is deemed necessary in its current state, and find it does not have his assent -- at which point the bill must achieve the usual Organic threshold for overriding a royal veto. As a matter of fact, this intermediate threshold of 3/5 majority was chosen precisely because it sits between the standard majority and the 2/3 supermajority needed to overcome a royal veto (which, in a monarchy, logically sits as the toughest threshold to overcome).

QuoteI can perhaps understand the ability of the Cosa to override but do we need to strip them of power in order to accomplish the same purpose?

Quite literally, yes -- the Cosa does not currently have that power. Adding it, by nature, is a mild alteration to the balance of power between the two houses.

I support keeping the Senate with powers that exist today.  Perhaps the notable efforts being made in this activity could be redirected to other issues.

Quote from: xpb on June 24, 2025, 11:59:50 AMI support keeping the Senate with powers that exist today.  Perhaps the notable efforts being made in this activity could be redirected to other issues.

Do you like the set of super-legislators overwhelmingly dominated by one party which can trash anything your party puts forward, despite majority opinion, because you think one day you'll get that majority?

It is possible to think something is a good idea even if you don't think you're likely to benefit from it in the near future.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 24, 2025, 07:11:08 PMIt is possible to think something is a good idea even if you don't think you're likely to benefit from it in the near future.

I mean, you have to decide whether your argument is one for legislative quality; or a "philosophical conservative" argument that anything which stops the majority passing legislation is a good one. And you just can't argue with the latter.

If the former, then there is an excellent case the House of Review option, in that currently, a bill shot down by the Senäts is finished for the rest of the term. I think it would be excellent for legislative quality for such a bill to be able to be re-presented by the Cosa, after sober second thought with amendments or otherwise.