WHEREAS, in parliamentary democracies, the upper house of the legislature functions as a "house of sober second thought"; andWHEREAS, this role requires that the Senäts be able to review and approve of bills, but ought not to have the ability to block those with widespread support in the Cosă; andWHEREAS, this blocking ability ought to remain in place in the case of Organic amendments; thenBE IT HEREBY RESOLVED, that Article III, Section 4 of the Organic Law is amended by the addition of the following bolded text:
QuoteThe Senäts shall have equal powers with the Cosa in respect of all proposed laws, except that bills appropriating revenue or moneys shall not originate in the Senäts, and the Government shall require the confidence of the Cosa only to remain in office. In the event of the Senäts twice rejecting a bill appropriating revenue or moneys which is passed by the Cosa, upon it being passed a third time by the Cosa, it shall not require the consent of the Senäts to be given Royal Assent and take effect. Bills for the imposition or appropriation of fines or other monetary penalties, or for the demand or payment or appropriation of fees for licenses or services, shall not be taken to appropriate revenue or moneys. In the event the Senäts rejects a bill that does not amend this Organic Law, appropriate moneys, or override a Royal Veto, should the same Cosă pass that bill again by a three-fifths majority, it shall not require the consent of the Senäts to be presented for Royal Assent or take effect.
Uréu q'estadra så:
Mic'haglh Autófil (MC - URL)
For the reason specified in the latter half of the second whereas clause, I support this amendment. I will be asking fellow Green Party members to vote in support during the coming election should it pass the Ziu.
I'm not particularly convinced that either of the first two clauses are factually true (though perhaps they are morally true or desirable, by a given standard).
Quote from: owenedwards on June 22, 2025, 11:45:30 AMI'm not particularly convinced that either of the first two clauses are factually true (though perhaps they are morally true or desirable, by a given standard).
Quote from: wikipedia link=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upper_house#Parliamentary_systemsIn parliamentary systems the upper house is frequently seen as an advisory or a "house of review" chamber; for this reason, its powers of direct action are often reduced in some way. Some or all of the following restrictions are often placed on upper houses:
- Lack of control over the executive branch. (By contrast, in the US and many other presidential systems, the Senate or upper chamber has more control over the composition of the Cabinet and the administration generally, through its prerogative of confirming the president's nominations to senior offices.)
- No absolute veto of proposed legislation, though suspensive vetoes are permitted in some states.
- In countries where it can veto legislation (such as the Netherlands), it may not be able to amend the proposals.
- A reduced or even absent role in initiating legislation.
- No power to block supply, or budget measures. (A rare example of a parliamentary upper house that does possess this power is the Australian Senate, which notably exercised that power in 1975.)
[...]
The role of a revising chamber is to scrutinise legislation that may have been drafted over-hastily in the lower house and to suggest amendments that the lower house may nevertheless reject if it wishes to. An example is the British House of Lords. Under the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, the House of Lords can no longer prevent the passage of most bills, but it must be given an opportunity to debate them and propose amendments, and can thereby delay the passage of a bill with which it disagrees. Bills can only be delayed for up to one year before the Commons can use the Parliament Act, although economic bills can only be delayed for one month.
Something I find interesting is that there is less of an Organic barrier to depowering the Senäts than there is to simply changing its provincially based nature!
Can you explain to me why having an upper house that has the authority to reject bills or send them back down is a bad thing? I can perhaps understand the ability of the Cosa to override but do we need to strip them of power in order to accomplish the same purpose?
Quote from: Dr. Pôl dal Nordselvă on June 23, 2025, 05:47:21 AMI can perhaps understand the ability of the Cosa to override but do we need to strip them of power in order to accomplish the same purpose?
Tell me another way that we could give the Cosa final say over legislation
Quote from: Dr. Pôl dal Nordselvă on June 23, 2025, 05:47:21 AMCan you explain to me why having an upper house that has the authority to reject bills or send them back down is a bad thing?
These are two separate things; at the moment, it already has the power to reject bills; this would be
partially transformed into a "send bills back" power under this amendment.
For that matter, the Senate is
also already fully empowered to "send bills back", as Senators may choose to offer their reasoning for voting against a bill. The catch is that the matter cannot be considered again by the same Cosa session unless "substantially amended". In other words, the Senate currently possesses both powers at their fullest extent.
I should perhaps reiterate that this amendment would not allow a razor-thin majority to force bills through; bills rejected by the Senate must gather support from including across the aisle within the Cosa; bills with such widespread support as to be deemed not just desirable, but practically necessary.
Further, this amendment does not affect the Royal Veto; it is certainly possible that the King, when considering a bill that has been presented to him over the Senate's refusal, will consider, among other things, the margin of support for the bill (both on its initial Clark run and the re-passage), the reasons Senators may have given for opposing it, and/or the reasons the bill is deemed necessary in its current state, and find it does not have his assent -- at which point the bill must achieve the usual Organic threshold for overriding a royal veto. As a matter of fact, this intermediate threshold of 3/5 majority was chosen precisely because it sits between the standard majority and the 2/3 supermajority needed to overcome a royal veto (which, in a monarchy, logically sits as the toughest threshold to overcome).
QuoteI can perhaps understand the ability of the Cosa to override but do we need to strip them of power in order to accomplish the same purpose?
Quite literally, yes -- the Cosa does not currently have that power. Adding it, by nature, is a mild alteration to the balance of power between the two houses.
I support keeping the Senate with powers that exist today. Perhaps the notable efforts being made in this activity could be redirected to other issues.
Quote from: xpb on June 24, 2025, 11:59:50 AMI support keeping the Senate with powers that exist today. Perhaps the notable efforts being made in this activity could be redirected to other issues.
Do you like the set of super-legislators overwhelmingly dominated by one party which can trash anything your party puts forward, despite majority opinion, because you think one day you'll get that majority?
It is possible to think something is a good idea even if you don't think you're likely to benefit from it in the near future.
Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 24, 2025, 07:11:08 PMIt is possible to think something is a good idea even if you don't think you're likely to benefit from it in the near future.
I mean, you have to decide whether your argument is one for legislative quality; or a "philosophical conservative" argument that anything which stops the majority passing legislation is a good one. And you just can't argue with the latter.
If the former, then there is an excellent case the House of Review option, in that currently, a bill shot down by the Senäts is finished for the rest of the term. I think it would be excellent for legislative quality for such a bill to be able to be re-presented by the Cosa, after sober second thought with amendments or otherwise.
So we're agreed that such changes may be "frequent" but are not essential to Parliamentary democracy.
Honestly I don't mind the "send back" concept, however I do think that after this stage, the Senate should be able to amend the legislation as part of its role as a reviewing chamber before sending the legislation back to the Cosa. Or even just sending the reasons (both requiring a majority of senators to agree on what is send to the Cosa) it has been rejected. Although this is a more complicated system, but might be a sort of middle ground solution. And help with making the senate feeling more useful than it realistically is at the moment.
Quote from: Antaglha Xhenerös Somelieir on July 21, 2025, 05:14:02 PMHonestly I don't mind the "send back" concept, however I do think that after this stage, the Senate should be able to amend the legislation as part of its role as a reviewing chamber before sending the legislation back to the Cosa. Or even just sending the reasons (both requiring a majority of senators to agree on what is send to the Cosa) it has been rejected. Although this is a more complicated system, but might be a sort of middle ground solution. And help with making the senate feeling more useful than it realistically is at the moment.
Effectively sending the bill to "reconciliation"? (At least that's what it's called in the States.)
@Mic'haglh Autófil, O.Be I very much hope this bill will move forward in the coming term.
Quote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on November 14, 2025, 04:50:36 AM@Mic'haglh Autófil, O.Be I very much hope this bill will move forward in the coming term.
@Mic'haglh Autófil, O.Be Hoping we will be discussing and voting on this during a live session this term.
Quote from: Antaglha Xhenerös Somelieir on July 21, 2025, 05:14:02 PMHonestly I don't mind the "send back" concept, however I do think that after this stage, the Senate should be able to amend the legislation as part of its role as a reviewing chamber before sending the legislation back to the Cosa. Or even just sending the reasons (both requiring a majority of senators to agree on what is send to the Cosa) it has been rejected. Although this is a more complicated system, but might be a sort of middle ground solution. And help with making the senate feeling more useful than it realistically is at the moment.
As Senators are already permitted to describe their reasons for voting against bills, I'm not sure any sort of
official reconciliation process might be necessary, but I'm open to hearing what others think before sending this to the CRL.
Quote from: Mic'haglh Autófil, O.Be on January 17, 2026, 04:23:17 PMQuote from: Antaglha Xhenerös Somelieir on July 21, 2025, 05:14:02 PMHonestly I don't mind the "send back" concept, however I do think that after this stage, the Senate should be able to amend the legislation as part of its role as a reviewing chamber before sending the legislation back to the Cosa. Or even just sending the reasons (both requiring a majority of senators to agree on what is send to the Cosa) it has been rejected. Although this is a more complicated system, but might be a sort of middle ground solution. And help with making the senate feeling more useful than it realistically is at the moment.
As Senators are already permitted to describe their reasons for voting against bills, I'm not sure any sort of official reconciliation process might be necessary, but I'm open to hearing what others think before sending this to the CRL.
Delighted to see this is moving now.
I note that this bill would make the first sentence of the modified clause a lie. "The Senäts shall have equal powers with the Cosa in respect of all proposed laws" will no longer be true. There will only be two categories of bills for which the Senäts will be equal to the Cosa. That might be something you want to fix.
Quote from: M:sr Pôl dal Nordselvă, D.Div, M.Ed on June 23, 2025, 05:47:21 AMCan you explain to me why having an upper house that has the authority to reject bills or send them back down is a bad thing? I can perhaps understand the ability of the Cosa to override but do we need to strip them of power in order to accomplish the same purpose?
I thought this was still a good question that didn't actually quite get answered. The explanation went into the nature of the change in detail, but without saying why it was desirable. Why would we want to do this?
Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on January 17, 2026, 04:48:21 PMI note that this bill would make the first sentence of the modified clause a lie. "The Senäts shall have equal powers with the Cosa in respect of all proposed laws" will no longer be true. There will only be two categories of bills for which the Senäts will be equal to the Cosa. That might be something you want to fix.
Under your interpretation, the first sentence of the modified clause is already a lie -- the clause goes on to describe a class of bills in which the Senäts is already unequal to the Cosă. I'm interested in hearing what others think about the wording, though.
QuoteQuote from: M:sr Pôl dal Nordselvă, D.Div, M.Ed on June 23, 2025, 05:47:21 AMCan you explain to me why having an upper house that has the authority to reject bills or send them back down is a bad thing? I can perhaps understand the ability of the Cosa to override but do we need to strip them of power in order to accomplish the same purpose?
I thought this was still a good question that didn't actually quite get answered. The explanation went into the nature of the change in detail, but without saying why it was desirable. Why would we want to do this?
There are a few reasons:
- One, it does not allow
truly vital legislation to be hung up forever on the Senäts. Since, of course, bills addressing a given issue can only be considered once per term, this allows the Senäts to effectively kick the can down the road on any issue they wish to obstruct the government on.
- The more overarching, "philosophical" reason is that Talossa is not a federal nation. I know we've compared our constitutional structure to Australia before -- and in fact I believe
@Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC has stated that similarities are intentional -- but the reality is that we are more like Spain than Australia: a unitary state, divided into provinces that may legislate on certain areas on their own. A "strong" upper house (or at least one as strong as the Senäts) is incompatible with the concept of responsible government in a unitary state. To return to the Australian comparison, they
are federal in nature, and this juxtaposition between responsible government and federalism precipitated what is likely their most dire constitutional crisis (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1975_Australian_constitutional_crisis):
QuoteAs in most Westminster system parliaments, Australia's government is ordinarily formed by the party enjoying the confidence of the lower house of parliament, the House of Representatives. Australia's Parliament also has a powerful upper house, the Senate, which must pass any bill initiated by the House of Representatives if it is to become law. The composition of the Senate, in which each state has an equal number of senators regardless of that state's population, was originally designed to attract the Australian colonies into one Federation. Some at the time of Federation saw the contradiction in the Constitution between responsible government, in which the executive owes its existence to the legislature or one dominant house of the legislature, and, federations with the houses of bicameral legislatures operating independently and possibly deadlocking. Certain delegates predicted that either responsible government would result in the federation becoming a unitary state or federalism would result in an executive closer to federal theory. For instance, delegate Winthrop Hackett stated at the 1891 Convention that as a result of the combination of a strong Senate with responsible government, "there will be one of two alternatives—either responsible government will kill federation, or federation in the form in which we shall, I hope, be prepared to accept it, will kill responsible government".
A few things I would ask sceptics to keep in mind:
- A "house of sober second thought" is the usual role for the upper house in parliamentary legislatures (House of Lords, Canadian Senate, the German and Austrian Bundesrats, the House of Councillors in Japan, etc.)
- This change will also likely lead to a "de-politicization" of Senäts elections, which is healthy if we're trying to make Talossa a more tolerable place for people to spend their time.
- I know you personally have expressed several points of opposition to unicameralism before, chief among those being a safeguard on excessive Organic amendments. Please note that the requirement of the Senäts' consent is not affected in cases of Organic amendment.