Wittenberg

Estimats cünpartizaes,

As most of you are aware, the aftermath of the last election was a bit of a blessing in disguise, as it showed that the URL is the Party of Talossan Democracy. With this better-defined identity in mind, we have set about over the first half of this term working to define just what a more democratic Talossa would look like (https://wittenberg.talossa.com/index.php?topic=4794.0) in order to know what paths we should prioritize and the directions in which we would like to move as a united party. To that end, I submit to you now that agenda for the Party's endorsement.

The following is something that I have drafted based on the summary of ideas in this post (https://wittenberg.talossa.com/index.php?topic=4794.msg41132#msg41132), but is still ultimately open to amendment, as I cannot singularly speak for the party as a whole. As a result, all items are currently open to proposed amendments to their wording (including re-arranging them in a different order to show our priorities). Once our Convention prepares to adjourn, we will move to adoption of each item as it then exists.

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LAS TOCĂS DEMOCRÄTICI DA L'URL

THE DEMOCRACY AGENDA OF THE URL

We, the members of the Union of Free Reformists, the Party of Talossan Democracy, in order to not only safeguard Talossa's fragile democracy, but strengthen it, hereby formally adopt the Democracy Agenda. This package of reforms will bolster the democratic nature of Talossan government, granting actions taken by the state even greater legitimacy. It is intended to show the Talossan people, in plain terms, our intentions in both this Cosă session and in future sessions, particularly those in which they see fit to grant us a Cosă majority.

• Cosă Size: With the passage of 62RZ09, the Democracy Agenda has already succeeded in right-sizing the Cosă to 20 seats. The URL's aim here going forward will be to defend this change, and prevent future Cosă sessions from undoing it.
• Electoral Method Reform: In the interest of lessening the power of party bosses, increasing the power of the voters, and improving the ability to hold individual MCs accountable, the URL supports transition to a form of personalized proportional representation -- any method that combines proportional representation for parties with voter control over which candidates actually receive Cosă seats. We support further debate on the specific method to be adopted.
• Party List Reform #1: The URL supports legislation to prioritize party lists, ensuring that "off-list" candidates can only receive seats if no "on-list" candidates are eligible, in order to improve transparency and allow voters to better judge the intentions of the parties on the ballot.
• Party List Reform #2: The URL supports legislation requiring candidates to confirm with the Chancery their consent to appearing on a party list, in an effort to further lessen the power of party bosses.
• Upper House Reform: Taking into account Talossa's unitary nature and the requirements of responsible government, the URL supports the transition of the Senäts' role to that of a "house of review" in the vein of the British House of Lords, the Canadian Senate, or the Japanese House of Councillors. This reform will retain Senators' ability to critique and improve legislation on behalf of their province's citizens, including a veto on Organic amendments, but will allow the Cosă to insist on its decision on standard legislation if there is sufficient democratic support.
• Public Ballot Reform: The secret ballot is one of the cornerstones of free and fair elections. We support the continued right of Talossans to publicly declare their electoral choices, but believe the polling process on Wittenberg should be reformed so that public ballots are only published after polls close.
• Parliamentary Reform: The URL supports codifying and strengthening the powers of the Tuischac'h and Mençei to allow them to better maintain order and enforce parliamentary procedure within their respective chambers.
• Royal Veto Reform: The URL supports reforming the power of the Crown to veto legislation. This would involve a "suspensory" veto, in which the Crown's veto still serves as an opportunity for the Ziu to reconsider legislation, but can be overriden by a simple majority of both houses. In parallel to this, we support reworking advisory opinions to allow the King to consult with the CpI on a bill's organic Compliance.
• Reform Org.XII.4: This organic provision makes some parts of the OrgLaw almost impossible to amend, anchoring the country in ways that are not justifiable in a democratic nation. The OrgLaw already has a rigorous amendment process for normal amendments; there is no good reason to have such onerous additional requirements.