Wittenberg

If possible, I'd like to open up some discussion on Ziu reform.  This has been a topic of perennial interest to many, and I think it might be smart to have a good-faith discussion about some possibilities that might be useful for us.  We just recently switched to a 20-seat Cosa instead of a 200-seat Cosa, but that doesn't fundamentally change that much.

A few things from my perspective, to begin:

• We should probably err on the side of preserving things like the Senats, as an important institution that has often been important to slowing down the pace of very significant legislation (without ever actually becoming an undemocratic block on it forever) and as a provincial representative.  So at least for me, I wouldn't want to make changes that would just be an obvious set-up to eliminating the Senats. 
• There are numerous good things we should try to achieve: proportionality, direct accountability, low barriers to entry, simplicity, intuitiveness, and ease of implementation.  Not all of these are equally important, but we should be honest about trade-offs.
• While we're a highly educated people, with 71% of our citizens holding some form of college degree, we have a majority of American-Talossans, and so most of our electorate is going to be familiar with our current system and then their own American one.  In recent elections, many people failed to use RCV even when directly and repeatedly instructed to do so.  Simplicity is going to be key!

Some people have been talking about Mixed-Member Proportional systems.  As best I understand it, this entails people voting for a candidate for their area and also for a party.  Each candidate wins based on the local vote, and then a big chunk of seats are divided up according to the national party vote.  Sometimes it's always the same number of seats, and sometimes it's a fluid number that varies depending on how many additional seats are needed to make the results very proportional.  There's also a version where the plurality party gets a "majority bonus" of extra seats.

So what are some ideas people might have about this system, or a different system that might work better?

My country has used Mixed Member Proportional for more than 30 years and I think it works pretty well, ask me anything.

The simplest way to work it in Talossa would be to have one Cosa seat elected by each Province (8 seats) then the other 12 seats "topping up" to proportionality. So: say a party wins 2 provinces, but 40% of the vote. 40% of the vote entitles you to 8 seats. So: they also get 6 seats from the top of their party list.

There is a quirk called "overhang" which happens if a party gets *more* local seats than their party vote would justify - for example, if an Independent who didn't have a party won a province. Then that local seat is ignored when the party seats are handed out; which means there end up being "extra" party seats, in our case, more than 20. Not a big problem IMHO.

The only real issue I see here is that if you want to keep the Senäts as is, then you have each province electing an MC *and* a Senator, which seems otiose and redundant. The clear compromise here is: elect the Senäts differently. The best alternative I've hard so far is Lüc's suggestion of electing 4 Senators from the whole Kingdom at large every term.

My country pioneered MMP in 1949, ask me anything as well.

As much as I think the system has served Germany well, it is a bit difficult to understand at times, especially with regards to overhang seats and independents.

For instance, in the German way, independents who win a local seat do not constitute an overhang, and instead reduces the total number of seats taken in account for top-up purposes by one, i.e. if an independent wins their district in a 20-seat Cosă, the total number of seats stays at 20. However, because independents don't affect the party-based distribution of the remaining seats, people who voted for a winning independent have their party vote ignored, lest they have double the influence on the result as other voters. This step is necessary because otherwise, local candidates could all choose to run as independents while the party vote stays unaffected, transforming Mixed-Member Proportional into Mixed-Member Majoritarian à la Japan.

Yeah; while I like the MMP system there are simpler forms of personalised proportional representation. But, any Ziu reform which means actual control by voters over who sits in the Cosa would be great.

I know that we keep citizenship eligibility at 14 for historical reasons but we should consider a minimum age limit for being an MZ. I would suggest 18 or 21 (if this does not run afoul of the OrgLaw). If we are serious about making  structural improvements to the Ziu then it might be worth considering whether 14 or 16 is generally just too young to effectively participate in national decision-making.

ADDED: I mean no offense to our youngest citizens but wanted to broach the topic.

As someone who has advocated for MMP before, I'm certainly glad to see folks starting to soften to the idea. Even just discussing it is a good start.

I do agree that maintaining some sort of provincial representation is worth doing, but that having provincial representation in both houses goes too far. If we wanted to move the Cosa to an MMP setup, then I would agree that implementing something like Sir Luc's idea would be a good change for the Senats.

Overhang seats can of course be a concern, but as Miestra and Sir Marcel have both already pointed out, there are methods to reduce these. Though I would prefer a fixed size to the Cosa, I don't mind the method where seats are added to negate overhang seats. Especially if we take the German method of excluding party list votes for successful independent voters, that likely minimizes the number of overhang seats anyway, so one every few elections isn't objectionable.

One thing I don't really support is the majority bonus or majority jackpot system; yes, not using them makes government formation and stability a bit harder, but that just means you might have to actually negotiate things on occasion. C'e la vidă.

One of the nice things about MMP, in my opinion, is that it seems to be fairly flexible in the details of how you choose to implement it. As an example, there is nothing preventing us from still electing the party seats via an open-list method, or from using ranked-choice voting for provincial seats.

Okay, so it seems like there's a lot of offers of help with figuring this out.  I think I have a sense of my caucus, and I think I can say that there would be flat-out no real support for anything that gets rid of the Senats unless it was demonstrably better in very specific and practical ways.  My strong suggestion is that we focus on versions of this that would work with the Senats, not eliminate it, if we want to come up with something that has broad support.

So looking at the nuts and bolts here, we could:

• Elect a senator from each province at the current interval.
• Elect an MC from each province every election.
• Choose a party as well.

It doesn't seem like this would interfere with RCV for the Senats at all, and it seems like we'd have enough people for this, right?

Miestra has proposed that we'd add however many seats necessary to ensure that the results would be proportional to the vote.  But that's a question of degree, right?  Like... let's say that Party A won 50%, Party B won 25%, and Party C won 25%.  In a 20-seat Cosa, that's 10 seats for A, 5 seats for B, and 5 seats for C.  But if B won six of the provincial seats, then they'd have 30% (more than their share of the national vote) and so A and B would need extra until things were proportional.  How does that look?  How close would things need to be?

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on April 27, 2026, 04:44:12 PMlet's say that Party A won 50%, Party B won 25%, and Party C won 25%.  In a 20-seat Cosa, that's 10 seats for A, 5 seats for B, and 5 seats for C.  But if B won six of the provincial seats, then they'd have 30% (more than their share of the national vote) and so A and B would need extra until things were proportional.

You could do it that way, but that's the harder way. The simpler option would be to just live with the overhang. Let's say A and C both won 1 province. Then, Party A gets 9 party list seats (to sum up to 10) and Party C gets 4 seats (to sum up to 5). So that's a total Cosa of 21 seats. Party B gets a small bonus.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on April 27, 2026, 05:55:36 PM

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on April 27, 2026, 04:44:12 PMlet's say that Party A won 50%, Party B won 25%, and Party C won 25%.  In a 20-seat Cosa, that's 10 seats for A, 5 seats for B, and 5 seats for C.  But if B won six of the provincial seats, then they'd have 30% (more than their share of the national vote) and so A and B would need extra until things were proportional.

You could do it that way, but that's the harder way. The simpler option would be to just live with the overhang. Let's say A and C both won 1 province. Then, Party A gets 9 party list seats (to sum up to 10) and Party C gets 4 seats (to sum up to 5). So that's a total Cosa of 21 seats. Party B gets a small bonus.

Yeah, that's the original MMP system that is still in use in New Zealand. What AD mentioned are called compensatory seats and Germany moved to a system with compensatory seats because the Constitutional Court ruled that the old system was unconstitutionally disproportional (mainly Bavaria's fault), which in turn lead to ever bigger parliament sizes... the system we use now caps parliament size at 630, and abolishes overhang seats entirely: now, if a party wins more constituencies than their party vote would justify, the candidates that won by the narrowest margin simply don't get in, meaning some constitutuencies (IIRC again mainly Bavarian ones) not having a local representative.

I'm of the opinion that the former of the two methods (the one Miestra describes) is better. As much as Germany's newer method fixes the size of the legislature, and while I did mention that I like that sort of thing on principle, I don't like the idea of a constituency being represented by someone who didn't really win it.

An easier way to describe that method might be to say that the size of the Cosa is increased by a number of seats equal to the total number of overhang seats won. In this example, Party B wins one overhang seat, and is the only party to do so; the Cosa is therefore 21 seats for the term.

I should note that using ranked-choice voting for the provincial seats instead of first-past-the-post would also reduce the odds of overhang seats occurring. A candidate that secures a majority of the vote in a province is more likely to come from a party that has a broader base of support nationwide.

I do notice that in his most recent post, the Baron appears to have glossed over the issue of double-representing provinces in the Ziu. While I would like to give him the benefit of the doubt and assume this was an oversight on his part, in the event it was intentional, may I reiterate for the benefit of him and his caucus that the method proposed by Sir Luc does not eliminate the Senats' existence or even alter its powers, simply the method by which it is elected.

Another thing which has been glossed over so far is the other side of the coin re: "giving voters effective control over who sits in the Ziu", and that is making sure party seats (as far as practicable) go to candidates whose names were on the ballot and who the voters were aware of. Considering the Seneschal has previously talked about taking a Cort case to declare party lists unconstitutional, that's something we have to sort out right now.

The current standard of "maximum 33% off-list" is a bare minimum, perhaps with an OrgLaw amendment to render it constitutional to the Seneschal's standards. I'd prefer 25% or even 20%; I understand that some wiggle-room is acceptable.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on April 24, 2026, 02:42:05 PMIf possible, I'd like to open up some discussion on Ziu reform.  This has been a topic of perennial interest to many, and I think it might be smart to have a good-faith discussion about some possibilities that might be useful for us.  We just recently switched to a 20-seat Cosa instead of a 200-seat Cosa, but that doesn't fundamentally change that much.

A few things from my perspective, to begin:

• We should probably err on the side of preserving things like the Senats, as an important institution that has often been important to slowing down the pace of very significant legislation (without ever actually becoming an undemocratic block on it forever) and as a provincial representative.  So at least for me, I wouldn't want to make changes that would just be an obvious set-up to eliminating the Senats. 
• There are numerous good things we should try to achieve: proportionality, direct accountability, low barriers to entry, simplicity, intuitiveness, and ease of implementation.  Not all of these are equally important, but we should be honest about trade-offs.
• While we're a highly educated people, with 71% of our citizens holding some form of college degree, we have a majority of American-Talossans, and so most of our electorate is going to be familiar with our current system and then their own American one.  In recent elections, many people failed to use RCV even when directly and repeatedly instructed to do so.  Simplicity is going to be key!

Some people have been talking about Mixed-Member Proportional systems.  As best I understand it, this entails people voting for a candidate for their area and also for a party.  Each candidate wins based on the local vote, and then a big chunk of seats are divided up according to the national party vote.  Sometimes it's always the same number of seats, and sometimes it's a fluid number that varies depending on how many additional seats are needed to make the results very proportional.  There's also a version where the plurality party gets a "majority bonus" of extra seats.

So what are some ideas people might have about this system, or a different system that might work better?

When did we start doing this?

Quote from: Mximo Malt on April 28, 2026, 06:03:09 PMWhen did we start doing this?

When did we start doing what, exactly?

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on April 29, 2026, 01:31:13 PM

Quote from: Mximo Malt on April 28, 2026, 06:03:09 PMWhen did we start doing this?

When did we start doing what, exactly?

Reduced Cosă seats

Quote from: Mximo Malt on April 29, 2026, 03:07:31 PM

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on April 29, 2026, 01:31:13 PM

Quote from: Mximo Malt on April 28, 2026, 06:03:09 PMWhen did we start doing this?

When did we start doing what, exactly?

Reduced Cosă seats

It is not a good look for potential voters that you apparently didn't have a good look at 62RZ11 (https://database.talossa.com/ziu/bills/62RZ11) before you voted on it

He might have been asking about when we started with a Cosa of just 20, since it's not currently in effect.

The Cosa won't actually reduce in size, Mximo, until like halfway through 2027... I think like two elections from now?

Quote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on April 26, 2026, 05:49:25 PMI know that we keep citizenship eligibility at 14 for historical reasons but we should consider a minimum age limit for being an MZ. I would suggest 18 or 21 (if this does not run afoul of the OrgLaw). If we are serious about making  structural improvements to the Ziu then it might be worth considering whether 14 or 16 is generally just too young to effectively participate in national decision-making.

ADDED: I mean no offense to our youngest citizens but wanted to broach the topic.

In my humble opinion, this would be terrible.

I totally get why we might not want to have minors here at all (even though it would be unfortunate given our founding), but assuming they are here, why would we not want them to participate in the thing most people find the most interesting? The stakes of "national decision making" are, all things considered, much to low to allow for that.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on April 28, 2026, 05:12:28 PMAnother thing which has been glossed over so far is the other side of the coin re: "giving voters effective control over who sits in the Ziu", and that is making sure party seats (as far as practicable) go to candidates whose names were on the ballot and who the voters were aware of. Considering the Seneschal has previously talked about taking a Cort case to declare party lists unconstitutional, that's something we have to sort out right now.

The current standard of "maximum 33% off-list" is a bare minimum, perhaps with an OrgLaw amendment to render it constitutional to the Seneschal's standards. I'd prefer 25% or even 20%; I understand that some wiggle-room is acceptable.

Do we have to sort it out right now?  It doesn't seem like that's structural here, so maybe we want to leave that until later.  If you're trying to work out a consensus view, it's often helpful to focus on strong points of agreement and progress, rather than focus on problems -- unless there's something I'm missing about this, and we need to figure it out before proceeding.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on April 27, 2026, 05:55:36 PM

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on April 27, 2026, 04:44:12 PMlet's say that Party A won 50%, Party B won 25%, and Party C won 25%.  In a 20-seat Cosa, that's 10 seats for A, 5 seats for B, and 5 seats for C.  But if B won six of the provincial seats, then they'd have 30% (more than their share of the national vote) and so A and B would need extra until things were proportional.

You could do it that way, but that's the harder way. The simpler option would be to just live with the overhang. Let's say A and C both won 1 province. Then, Party A gets 9 party list seats (to sum up to 10) and Party C gets 4 seats (to sum up to 5). So that's a total Cosa of 21 seats. Party B gets a small bonus.

From my (limited) research, though, it seems like the overhang can get pretty bad.  I don't have any numbers on hand, but it seems like it could get pretty disproportionate.  Since this part isn't voter-facing, it might make sense to make it as good in as many ways as possible, even if the allocation gets complicated.

This might be a nonstarter but does the system have to be party-focused? Have we considered transitioning to a candidate-centric voting system for the Cosa?

I would argue it would eliminate many of the issues we're having as far as accountability and party transparency. If we use a system like Single Transferable Vote for example, we can elect individual candidates based on their merits instead of voting for a party who then decides which candidates to give seats to. I imagine this would reduce the propensity of MCs to vote solely based on party interests as they would be directly accountable to the electorate and it would allow citizens to split their votes if they choose instead of being forced to side with one party and tacitly endorse everyone on the list regardless of preference.

Quote from: Sir Ian Plätschisch on April 29, 2026, 04:37:23 PM

Quote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on April 26, 2026, 05:49:25 PMI know that we keep citizenship eligibility at 14 for historical reasons but we should consider a minimum age limit for being an MZ. I would suggest 18 or 21 (if this does not run afoul of the OrgLaw). If we are serious about making  structural improvements to the Ziu then it might be worth considering whether 14 or 16 is generally just too young to effectively participate in national decision-making.

ADDED: I mean no offense to our youngest citizens but wanted to broach the topic.

In my humble opinion, this would be terrible.

I totally get why we might not want to have minors here at all (even though it would be unfortunate given our founding), but assuming they are here, why would we not want them to participate in the thing most people find the most interesting? The stakes of "national decision making" are, all things considered, much to low to allow for that.

First, thanks for responding Ian.

I actually do support a higher minimum age for citizenship, I do suspect though, for some, it is a non-starter. But there are other ways for our youngest citizens to be involved...political parties could still accept them as members, etc. Honestly, the proposal comes from observing recent events as I think the actions of a few of our younger members of national politics have been motivated by immaturity. A period for participation as an observer for those between the ages of 14 and 16 or 18 would allow for some learning and maturation before entry into the nation's parliament. I do not think it is a good idea to throw 14 years (especially) into a nation's political fray as soon as they are citizens.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on April 29, 2026, 04:06:49 PM

Quote from: Mximo Malt on April 29, 2026, 03:07:31 PM

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on April 29, 2026, 01:31:13 PM

Quote from: Mximo Malt on April 28, 2026, 06:03:09 PMWhen did we start doing this?

When did we start doing what, exactly?

Reduced Cosă seats

It is not a good look for potential voters that you apparently didn't have a good look at 62RZ11 (https://database.talossa.com/ziu/bills/62RZ11) before you voted on it

Then I just won't seek a second term, and I'd bet you'd loooooooooooove that! How bout them apples!?

We use RCV for the Senats, but I don't know how you have parliamentary democracy without party politics.  Also that might be a bridge too far for right now.  I don't know, though?

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on April 29, 2026, 07:26:43 PMWe use RCV for the Senats, but I don't know how you have parliamentary democracy without party politics.  Also that might be a bridge too far for right now.  I don't know, though?

Parties will always exist, but I guess it's a matter of how institutionalised they are.

With the current closed party list voting system, parties are strongly institutionalised, and ultimate power ultimately rests with party leadership.

With a more open and direct voting system, hopefully power would be transfered to the voters and the MZs they elect, regardless of party affiliation (if any). I've spent several years researching proportional voting systems that do not require strongly institutionalised parties to function, and I feel like they might bring a positive change to the current culture.

We have seen in recent elections that many Talossans are confused or offended by ranked-choice voting for single seats (in the Senäts). Ranked-choice voting for multiple seats - while a great system in many ways - is far harder to explain to a hostile nation, especially its counting system.

The other problem with STV at a Talossan level is that either you'd have to divide the country into 3 or 4 voting districts (making gerrymandering possible), or elect 20 MCs at large, which would mean a "tablecloth ballot" (https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/about/Pages/Unlocking-the-House-exhibition-The-1999-Tablecloth-Election.aspx).

A possible simpler candidate-focused system would be that used in Kosovo, where you vote for a party and also for one person on that party list. So the seats are proportionate between parties but if a party gets X seats, they go to the top X individual vote winners

Quote from: Mximo Malt on April 29, 2026, 07:03:18 PMThen I just won't seek a second term, and I'd bet you'd loooooooooooove that! How bout them apples!?

Tell you what, Max, why don't you join the URL. We can mentor you.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on April 29, 2026, 04:56:50 PMFrom my (limited) research, though, it seems like the overhang can get pretty bad.

Not in the NZ system. I think this parliament (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_New_Zealand_general_election) we've had the biggest overhang ever (3 seats out of 120), because Te Pāti Māori won 6 of the Māori districts with 3% of the national list vote.

BTW, I am actively offended by the idea of depriving younger citizens of political rights. Talossa started as a child's fantasy endeavour, and it is repugnant for adults to try to eliminate kids from something they started because adults can't be trusted.

But I'm in favour of age limits for being an MC, though. An upper age limit. We can't be like the "Boomers who won't let go", I think that once you hit 40 or something you should only be able to run for a Senäts seat

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on April 30, 2026, 02:51:48 PMBTW, I am actively offended by the idea of depriving younger citizens of political rights. Talossa started as a child's fantasy endeavour, and it is repugnant for adults to try to eliminate kids from something they started because adults can't be trusted.

But I'm in favour of age limits for being an MC, though. An upper age limit. We can't be like the "Boomers who won't let go", I think that once you hit 40 or something you should only be able to run for a Senäts seat

I don't see any arguments against a lower age limit while supporting an upper age limit being logically consistent. I support both, we have recent experience that demonstrates why allowing some time for observation and maturation would be beneficial. With an eye on US Politics (I am thinking of Diane Feinstein, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, and Thomas Keane among other examples) I am sympathetic to a characterizing of the problem of gerontocratic leadership as "Boomers won't let go" though.

One of the things that makes Talossa fun and unique is the fact that new citizens can just jump on in and legislate or do practically anything they want to without worrying that someone is going to say "hey, you're too young." I would not be in favor of disallowing our younger citizens the opportunity to join the Cosa, just like I'm not really in favor of an upper age limit also. We should be encouraging people, not limiting based on an arbitrary number like age.

-Txec R

Quote from: King Txec on April 30, 2026, 03:41:25 PMWe should be encouraging people, not limiting based on an arbitrary number like age.

Of course you'd say that, Methuselah

(for legal reasons, this is a joke, Txec is pretty much my age)

Lol, that was a good one, Miestra.

I have mentioned this in responding to Ian. Serving in the Ziu is just one way of participation among many many other opportunities for involvement in politics. I have criticized it in the past but one benefit of our politics-heavy culture is the widespread opportunities for participation. Parliamentary service should call for a higher standard.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on April 30, 2026, 03:43:57 PM

Quote from: King Txec on April 30, 2026, 03:41:25 PMWe should be encouraging people, not limiting based on an arbitrary number like age.

Of course you'd say that, Methuselah

(for legal reasons, this is a joke, Txec is pretty much my age)

(https://i.ibb.co/NzJ92vm/download.png)

-Txec R

Quote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on April 30, 2026, 04:01:07 PMLol, that was a good one, Miestra.

I have mentioned this in responding to Ian. Serving in the Ziu is just one way of participation among many many other opportunities for involvement in politics. I have criticized it in the past but one benefit of our politics-heavy culture is the widespread opportunities for participation. Parliamentary service should call for a higher standard.

I agree, although not about the age thing.  It's certainly possible that we should have ethical standards.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on April 30, 2026, 04:47:32 PM

Quote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on April 30, 2026, 04:01:07 PMLol, that was a good one, Miestra.

I have mentioned this in responding to Ian. Serving in the Ziu is just one way of participation among many many other opportunities for involvement in politics. I have criticized it in the past but one benefit of our politics-heavy culture is the widespread opportunities for participation. Parliamentary service should call for a higher standard.

I agree, although not about the age thing.  It's certainly possible that we should have ethical standards.

Well at least we agree on something. I think not placing 14 year olds in positions of national leadership might be an issue of ethics as well but that's just me it seems.

I agree with Miestra that it would be unjust to say that teenagers can't participate in something a teenager created.

But maybe we should have ethics standards for the behavior of MZs.  Since we're already doing this, I'll note that there's not clear guidance on when MZs should vote to expel one of their members.  That might be a good thing to include in here.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on April 30, 2026, 05:21:11 PMI agree with Miestra that it would be unjust to say that teenagers can't participate in something a teenager created.

But maybe we should have ethics standards for the behavior of MZs.  Since we're already doing this, I'll note that there's not clear guidance on when MZs should vote to expel one of their members.  That might be a good thing to include in here.

Yes I agree that the Ziu should have a code of conduct and clear methods for expulsion as most other parliaments do. Similarly they also have reasonable minimum age requirements for service. The fact that the founder was once a teenager is not a compelling reason (edit: to me) for us not to have a higher age of eligibility.

Quote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on April 29, 2026, 06:32:22 PM

Quote from: Sir Ian Plätschisch on April 29, 2026, 04:37:23 PM

Quote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on April 26, 2026, 05:49:25 PMI know that we keep citizenship eligibility at 14 for historical reasons but we should consider a minimum age limit for being an MZ. I would suggest 18 or 21 (if this does not run afoul of the OrgLaw). If we are serious about making  structural improvements to the Ziu then it might be worth considering whether 14 or 16 is generally just too young to effectively participate in national decision-making.

ADDED: I mean no offense to our youngest citizens but wanted to broach the topic.

In my humble opinion, this would be terrible.

I totally get why we might not want to have minors here at all (even though it would be unfortunate given our founding), but assuming they are here, why would we not want them to participate in the thing most people find the most interesting? The stakes of "national decision making" are, all things considered, much to low to allow for that.

First, thanks for responding Ian.

I actually do support a higher minimum age for citizenship, I do suspect though, for some, it is a non-starter. But there are other ways for our youngest citizens to be involved...political parties could still accept them as members, etc. Honestly, the proposal comes from observing recent events as I think the actions of a few of our younger members of national politics have been motivated by immaturity. A period for participation as an observer for those between the ages of 14 and 16 or 18 would allow for some learning and maturation before entry into the nation's parliament. I do not think it is a good idea to throw 14 years (especially) into a nation's political fray as soon as they are citizens.

The argument to keep them out of Talossan politics for a bit "for their own good" is one I might be sympathetic to, but while we're doing things for our own good, I have some bad news for most of Talossa's adult politicians...

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on April 30, 2026, 05:21:11 PMI'll note that there's not clear guidance on when MZs should vote to expel one of their members. 

I heartily endorse this event or product

Another idea I proposed a while ago but never went back and fleshed out was a transition to multiple readings of bills and a moving away from the monthly schedule along with the potential for free-floating confidence votes as well. I was working on it here with the Three Readings Amendment (https://wittenberg.talossa.com/index.php?topic=4937.0) and thought there had been some expressions of support for the idea in the past.

I'm not suggesting we abandon party politics and I'm not explicitly commited to STV, but I'd like for everyone to consider shifting elections to focus more on individual candidates running for office instead of accepting them in bulk on a party list.

We should give the electorate the option to choose which candidate(s) they want to represent them while also forcing the candidates themselves to actually campaign for votes instead of relying on the party to carry them.

How is it democratic when we allow parties to curate who the candidates will be beforehand then present a list of people to the electorate as if to say these are your options, now pick. If John Smith likes MC A from Party 1 but also MC B from Party 2, why shouldn't he have the option to split his vote? What if John Smith doesn't like MC C from Party 1 because, say, they're not a very active public servant? In a party list, he has no choice but to vote for that candidate because he has no other option since Party 1 best represents his vote.

If we allow individuals to run on their own merits, then candidates would be compelled to defend their own ideas, campaign for their own success, and it'd likely discourage anyone who isn't really serious or committed to public service from running.

It's even less democratic when the party leader just picks the MCs, unrestricted by any list.

The goal of any Ziu reform should be to increase transparency in government and to give back power to the people, instead of centralising it in party bigwigs. Party lists are a simple way of ensuring transparency (even if the current laws concerning off-listers are way too lax), but still rest all power in the bigwigs as Françal rightfully pointed out.

I personally champion a form of Sequential Proportional Approval Voting as a voting system that is partyless, fair, and easy to explain and implement (feel free to ask me if you want to hear details), but any reform that furthers the principles of transparency and returning power to the people will do. Conversely, any reform idea that seeks to systematically deceive voters and trick them into helping people into power against the popular will is dead on arrival.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 01, 2026, 09:21:30 PMIt's even less democratic when the party leader just picks the MCs, unrestricted by any list.

Isn't this, in practice, the current system we have now?

What I have in mind is simple: Anybody is free to associate with whatever party they want, but running in an election would be the individual candidate's choice, no lists needed, and the onus is on them to take lead in running their own campaign.

Since we're moving to a 20-seat Cosa, I would argue that individual candidates' ideas and principles should be scrutinized more during an election and voters should have a direct say in who's representing them instead of being forced to pick lists of people.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 02, 2026, 07:32:11 PMI personally champion a form of Sequential Proportional Approval Voting as a voting system that is partyless, fair, and easy to explain and implement (feel free to ask me if you want to hear details), but any reform that furthers the principles of transparency and returning power to the people will do. Conversely, any reform idea that seeks to systematically deceive voters and trick them into helping people into power against the popular will is dead on arrival.

I'd like to hear more about this and how we would implement it in Talossa.

Quote from: Françal I. Lux on May 05, 2026, 10:58:21 AMIsn't this, in practice, the current system we have now?

At the moment, at least 2/3 of the MCs have to be on a list of candidates that the voters saw at election time and approved of. I think it should be 100%. Because party leaders have just brought people into the Cosa who have no democratic mandate at all.

Quote from: Françal I. Lux on May 05, 2026, 10:58:21 AM

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 01, 2026, 09:21:30 PMIt's even less democratic when the party leader just picks the MCs, unrestricted by any list.

Isn't this, in practice, the current system we have now?

As Miestra pointed out, this is not quite the system we have; party lists do provide restriction on who the leader may appoint to seats in the Cosa. Granted, at least one party leader seems to disagree, but that's a job for the judiciary at the moment.

QuoteSince we're moving to a 20-seat Cosa, I would argue that individual candidates' ideas and principles should be scrutinized more during an election and voters should have a direct say in who's representing them instead of being forced to pick lists of people.

This is just my two bence, but I would argue that the provincial seats in an MMP setup could satisfy this preference, no? Yes, it does still factor into a partisan distribution of seats, but hear me out:

* Talossa as a country does have a fair amount of its activity revolve around politics, regardless of what one may think of this.
* Quite a few Talossans prefer a political system that actually features, well, politics. Discussion, debate, and organization based on ideological and ethical stances, as opposed to politics-as-a-popularity contest. (Some Talossans, to be fair, clearly do not share this preference.)
* An electoral system that seeks to balance the evaluation of individual candidates and evaluation of ideological groupings would, to my eyes, function as a compromise between these two approaches to Talossan politics.
* If we have an MMP system and the party list seats are also chosen via an open-list system, that would be a massive shift towards an individualized approach to politics, but it doesn't completely abandon modern, ideology-based partisan politics, either.

Quote from: Mic'haglh Autófil, O.Be on May 06, 2026, 12:10:23 AMThis is just my two bence, but I would argue that the provincial seats in an MMP setup could satisfy this preference, no? Yes, it does still factor into a partisan distribution of seats, but hear me out:

* Talossa as a country does have a fair amount of its activity revolve around politics, regardless of what one may think of this.
* Quite a few Talossans prefer a political system that actually features, well, politics. Discussion, debate, and organization based on ideological and ethical stances, as opposed to politics-as-a-popularity contest. (Some Talossans, to be fair, clearly do not share this preference.)
* An electoral system that seeks to balance the evaluation of individual candidates and evaluation of ideological groupings would, to my eyes, function as a compromise between these two approaches to Talossan politics.
* If we have an MMP system and the party list seats are also chosen via an open-list system, that would be a massive shift towards an individualized approach to politics, but it doesn't completely abandon modern, ideology-based partisan politics, either.

Just to be clear, I'm not arguing against party politics at all, I'm just not a fan of lists in principle because, in my view, it robs the voters choice. As I stated previously, it forces voters to elect their representatives as a block and prevents them from scrutinizing individual candidates. Let's say I ideologically align with Party A, but there's one or two individuals on their party list I disagree with for whatever reason, why should I be forced to elect them into office? What if I want to split my vote because there's someone in Party B who I actually know will be a good MC despite some political disagreements we might have?

Again, with a 20-seat Cosa, I would argue it's even more important that voters get to scrutinize individual candidates and ascertain whether they'd be good, responsible and serious public servants. Having to rely on a party list prevents that from happening because the party itself can pave over whatever flaws their candidates may have. If someone running for office can't stand on their own two feet and articulate why they should be in the Cosa, or if they lack the commitment or time to truly be present and active enough, I'd argue they have no business running for office.

Quote from: Françal I. Lux on May 05, 2026, 10:59:38 AM

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 02, 2026, 07:32:11 PMI personally champion a form of Sequential Proportional Approval Voting as a voting system that is partyless, fair, and easy to explain and implement (feel free to ask me if you want to hear details), but any reform that furthers the principles of transparency and returning power to the people will do. Conversely, any reform idea that seeks to systematically deceive voters and trick them into helping people into power against the popular will is dead on arrival.

I'd like to hear more about this and how we would implement it in Talossa.

The way it works is that voters would be given a ballot with all the candidates on it, and then would be asked to vote for every candidate they approve of. There is no minimal or maximal number of approvals, and no ranking between approved candidates, every approval is worth the same. You can think of it as "building your own party list" if you like.

Ballots would then be counted in rounds, one round for each open seat. In the first round, the candidate with the most total approvals wins. Before every subsequent round, ballots are weighted: ballots who approve of one winner are worth 1/2, those that approve of two winners are worth 1/3, those that approve of three are worth 1/4 etc, and after the weighting is done you count the totals and whoever has the highest total wins that round. Repeat until all seats are filled.

This sort of voting system is proportional thanks to the ballot weighting mechanism, partyless because party affiliation doesnt matter for a candidate's victory, and much easier to implement than STV (speaking from first-hand experience); switching the database over to this kind of voting system would as far as I can tell not be super difficult, and the counting and weighting steps are very easily automatisable.

I also think the explanation is simpler than for STV (especially with regards to like, how to handle fractional overflow or what have you) but I'm biased so I'll let you be the judge of that.

Quote from: Françal I. Lux on May 06, 2026, 10:19:08 AMJust to be clear, I'm not arguing against party politics at all, I'm just not a fan of lists in principle because, in my view, it robs the voters choice. As I stated previously, it forces voters to elect their representatives as a block and prevents them from scrutinizing individual candidates. Let's say I ideologically align with Party A, but there's one or two individuals on their party list I disagree with for whatever reason, why should I be forced to elect them into office? What if I want to split my vote because there's someone in Party B who I actually know will be a good MC despite some political disagreements we might have?

Again, with a 20-seat Cosa, I would argue it's even more important that voters get to scrutinize individual candidates and ascertain whether they'd be good, responsible and serious public servants. Having to rely on a party list prevents that from happening because the party itself can pave over whatever flaws their candidates may have. If someone running for office can't stand on their own two feet and articulate why they should be in the Cosa, or if they lack the commitment or time to truly be present and active enough, I'd argue they have no business running for office.

I appreciate you going into further detail! In addition to the SPAV system Sir Marcel is a fan of, you may also be interested in panachage (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panachage), at least based on that bit I've bolded.

@Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP , could you maybe elaborate a bit on what happens in the event there are fewer than 20 candidates on the ballot? Would everyone end up getting a seat and then we cycle around to the beginning and do the whole thing again until all 20 seats are allocated? My concern there is that in such a scenario, larger parties may unduly benefit by virtue of being able to field more candidates. It becomes less about your share of the vote and more about how many names you can put on the ballot, if that makes sense. Alternatively, could we rework the system to give someone a second seat if they've earned it before everyone else has been given one?

I'm also wondering if there's an easy way to work in a "disapproval vote" into an open-list method. That may technically also fall under the panachage umbrella, now that I think about it.
- Vote for party of preference
- Give a +1/0/-1 to every candidate on said list.
- Party gets seats proportional to list vote.
- Candidates with negative totals are not granted seats.
- Everyone else receives seats in order of total score, cycling back around to "top" of party list as necessary.

Quote from: Mic'haglh Autófil, O.Be on May 08, 2026, 04:38:40 PM@Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP , could you maybe elaborate a bit on what happens in the event there are fewer than 20 candidates on the ballot?

If there are fewer candidates than seats to fill, then every candidate would get in and the rest is left empty. Needless to say, the system only works if we have enough people to actually run, and if we cant get at least 20 people to run, then maybe 20 seats is too much still...?

This, by the way, is why the Pseudo-Real Cosă is called pseudo: I was afraid that we might not have enough candidates to fill 20 seats, so the old assign post-hoc system would stay in place until a proper Real Cosă can be implemented faithfully.

I am *not* going to support any Ziu reform where we end up with uncontested elections for Cosa seats, the problem which has plagued the Senäts. Which makes me think twice about the "provincialisation" aspect of MMP.

On a tangent, the argument that we have a legislature which requires many more active and politically-keen citizens than we have has continually been batted back by the Seneschal with the response that we should just recruit more citizens. Well. The experience of the current Cosa is that there is not, in fact, a stream of people just itching to become Talossans that were being kept out by previous Governments' incompetence or malevolence. We can't immigrate our way out of inappropriate infrastructure.

Any reform which doesn't mean meaningful political competition to sit in the Cosa, combined with meaningful voter say over who precisely gets to sit in the Cosa, is IMHO not worth the effort.

It looks like we've got a critical mass of people here in favour of a candidate-based Cosa or at least an "open list" system.

Can I clarify, on this point, that this makes no sense without a much smaller Cosă than even the 20 we've already agreed on. Because a candidate-based system where candidates can get seats just by being on the ballot is undemocratic.

The problem is that under current law, the Cosă has to be at least twice the size of the Senäts, which means a 15 seat minimum. And that is too few. I would say a 9-seat Cosă would be ideal for this system. 11 seats, tops.

The system that Françal wants and Marcel also seems keen on will therefore need much deeper OrgLaw surgery than an MMP system.

That's fine if you guys want to keep discussing it here, but I think that it's perhaps too much to come to a consensus on in this Cosă. So, on the alternative, I'm going to propose a couple of OrgLaw amendments elsewhere which are necessary whether we change the voting system from 20-seat closed-party-list voting or not.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT ONE: ENSURING THE ORGANICITY OF PARTY LISTS (edit: deprecated, see below)

OrgLaw IV.2 to be amended as follows:

QuoteBased on the final results of the General Election, the Secretary of State shall calculate the apportionment of seats among the parties, hereinafter referred to as "party seats".

    1. The party seats shall total 200, or another number which may be set by law, with the provisos that any such change will not take effect until the next election following the passage of a calendar year; and that this number may never be less than twice the number of Senators minus one.
    2. Each party shall receive a percentage of party seats as equal as possible to its percentage of the popular vote, but each party shall receive a whole number of seats, and in turn, each party shall assign these seats to individuals, in accordance with law. Any seats which cannot be filled by a party in accordance with law shall be filled by the King according to his own best judgment, or left vacant.
 3. The Secretary of State shall employ whatever mathematical formulae and calculations in the apportionment of seats as are set by law, or, in the absence of such law, as will best reflect the intentions of this Organic Law. The Uppermost Cort shall be the final judge in case of mathematical disputes.
    4. Only registered political parties may obtain party seats. Parties which win votes but are not registered may not assume their seats in the Cosa until they register. The process to register a party shall be defined by law. The Secretary of State may request from all parties a registration fee, to be set by law, to cover the cost of the election. This fee shall be uniform for all parties.

OrgLaw IV.3 to be amended as follows:

QuoteIn the case of vacant party seats occurring between elections, the Secretary of State shall inform the King and the leader of whatever party held the vacant seat. The King shall appoint a replacement to each vacancy. If the seat belonged to a party with a functioning party leader, the King must appoint as a replacement whichever person shall be so designated by that party's leader under the same law that governs assignment of seats after an election. If there is no functioning party leader, or if the party leader refuses to designate a replacement, or if the seats are still vacant for any other reason the King shall appoint the replacement according to his own best judgment or otherwise leave the seats vacant.

And in whatever form we push forward Ziu reform apart from this

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TWO: REMOVING THE COPPER-FASTENING OF THE PROVINCIAL SENÄTS

Right now, amending the provincial basis of the Senäts would require a referendum win in every province, making it the least amendable of any OrgLaw provisions, including the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms. This amendment would retain a 2/3 Senäts majority needed to make such changes under the existing section XII.I.

Amend OrgLaw XII.4 as follows:

QuoteProposed changes to this Organic Law that affect the representation of a province in the Senäts, or of the territory or equal sovereignty of a province, shall not take effect unless approved by a majority of participating voters in that province.

Here is an alternative text of Amendment One, which would enable (but not mandate) an open-list system: that is, one where voters would have the option to choose specific candidates from one party list, or from more than one, depending on the details of the law. @Françal I. Lux and @Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP, is this something on which we can get cross-party consensus, and then perhaps figure out the details in the next Cosă?

The bit about the King being able to fill vacancies is there to avoid the "loophole" which is asserted to exist under the current provisions; i.e. a party can assert the right to give seats to whoever it wants if it can't fill the seats legally (making it quite easy to simply flout the law). Allowing the King to step in seems a middle ground between that and just keeping the seats vacant. It's a compromise which I'm happy to remove if it's not necessary.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT ONE: ENSURING THE ORGANICITY OF PARTY LISTS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN OPEN-LIST SYSTEM

OrgLaw IV.2 to be amended as follows:

QuoteBased on the final results of the General Election, the Secretary of State shall calculate the apportionment of seats among the parties, hereinafter referred to as "party seats".

    1. The party seats shall total 200, or another number which may be set by law, with the provisos that any such change will not take effect until the next election following the passage of a calendar year; and that this number may never be less than twice the number of Senators minus one.
    2. Each party shall receive a percentage of party seats as equal as possible to its percentage of the popular vote, but each party shall receive a whole number of seats, and in turn, the Secretary of State shall assign these seats to candidates nominated by that party, in accordance with law. Any seats which cannot be assigned in accordance with law may be filled by the King according to his own best judgment, or left vacant.
 3. The Secretary of State shall employ whatever mathematical formulae and calculations in the apportionment of seats as are set by law, or, in the absence of such law, as will best reflect the intentions of this Organic Law. The Uppermost Cort shall be the final judge in case of mathematical disputes.
    4. Only registered political parties may obtain party seats. Parties which win votes but are not registered may not assume their seats in the Cosa until they register. The process to register a party shall be defined by law. The Secretary of State may request from all parties a registration fee, to be set by law, to cover the cost of the election. This fee shall be uniform for all parties.

OrgLaw IV.3 to be amended as follows:

QuoteIn the case of vacant party seats occurring between elections, the Secretary of State shall inform the King and the leader of whatever party held the vacant seat. The Secretary of State shall assign the seat to another candidate of that party, in accordance with law. If this is not possible, the King may assign the seat according to his own best judgment in accordance with law, or otherwise leave the seats vacant.

So I'm sympathetic to the overall aim, for sure.  My main questions are (a) will this just smooth the way to getting rid of the Senats, and (b) will this disadvantage the interests of my voter base, which is usually fairly broad but not very intense with active support, when compared to a voter base that is very intense but not as broad?

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 23, 2026, 01:59:48 AM(b) will this disadvantage the interests of my voter base, which is usually fairly broad but not very intense with active support, when compared to a voter base that is very intense but not as broad?

I'm not sure what this means, or how a candidates-based voting system would do anything like that.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 23, 2026, 05:52:23 AM

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 23, 2026, 01:59:48 AM(b) will this disadvantage the interests of my voter base, which is usually fairly broad but not very intense with active support, when compared to a voter base that is very intense but not as broad?

I'm not sure what this means, or how a candidates-based voting system would do anything like that.

What the good Baron means is that his party is less able to recruit candidates before elections to put on the ballot, because his voter base is less politically active. So any electoral system where people vote for nominated candidates rather than just a party "brand"/leader would be disadvantageous to him, and a system where a party leader can assign seats at their own pleasure is the most advantageous.

But what I really want to know is - would the good Baron agree, if this amendment were passed, that party lists as established by law would be indisputably Organic and enforceable? If not, there's not much point.

And this has absolutely no relevance to the Senäts, even by the most paranoid reading.

BTW, I fear the Baron might have a wrong idea that I/the URL are "out to get" the Senäts. I do not have a principled opposition to bicameralism, though I come from a country which gets along fine without it. But I consider competitive elections much, much more important than the main feature of bicameralism (limiting the legislative power of a Cosa majority). Without competitive elections, democracy is replaced by "whoever puts their hands up", a self-selecting oligarchy. I would give up every Upper Chamber in the world to promote competitive elections. An Upper Chamber is for me a luxury that we are paying a very heavy price for.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on April 30, 2026, 07:15:35 PM

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on April 30, 2026, 05:21:11 PMI'll note that there's not clear guidance on when MZs should vote to expel one of their members.

I heartily endorse this event or product

Hey, I forgot about this one.

ORGANIC LAW REFORM AMENDMENT THREE: EXPULSIONS

Add new OrgLaw IV.11:

QuoteThe Cosa may impeach any of its members from the Chamber with a two-thirds majority vote. Following impeachment, a replacement will be chosen as otherwise provided in this Organic Law. Following a failed expulsion, the accused Member of the Cosa may not again be tried for the same offence, pursuant to the Seventh Covenant of the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms. The former Member of the Cosa is not barred from running for office in future elections as long as the former Member of the Cosa maintains citizenship.

EDITED TO ADD: You will note that this will require reform to the existing OrgLaw IV.3. Because if a party leader really has total discretion over filling vacancies, there would be nothing to stop them simply reappointing the expelled MC.

Glad you remembered. I support this one as well.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 17, 2026, 02:31:46 AMPROPOSED AMENDMENT TWO: REMOVING THE COPPER-FASTENING OF THE PROVINCIAL SENÄTS

Right now, amending the provincial basis of the Senäts would require a referendum win in every province, making it the least amendable of any OrgLaw provisions, including the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms. This amendment would retain a 2/3 Senäts majority needed to make such changes under the existing section XII.I.

Amend OrgLaw XII.4 as follows:

QuoteProposed changes to this Organic Law that affect the representation of a province in the Senäts, or of the territory or equal sovereignty of a province, shall not take effect unless approved by a majority of participating voters in that province.

While I know this is well-intentioned, I do not think that this change would have broad support.  If we do amend the provincial basis of the Senats, and our changes have broad support, I think this is a hurdle that we can overcome.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 22, 2026, 07:32:14 PMHere is an alternative text of Amendment One, which would enable (but not mandate) an open-list system: that is, one where voters would have the option to choose specific candidates from one party list, or from more than one, depending on the details of the law. @Françal I. Lux and @Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP, is this something on which we can get cross-party consensus, and then perhaps figure out the details in the next Cosă?

The bit about the King being able to fill vacancies is there to avoid the "loophole" which is asserted to exist under the current provisions; i.e. a party can assert the right to give seats to whoever it wants if it can't fill the seats legally (making it quite easy to simply flout the law). Allowing the King to step in seems a middle ground between that and just keeping the seats vacant. It's a compromise which I'm happy to remove if it's not necessary.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT ONE: ENSURING THE ORGANICITY OF PARTY LISTS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN OPEN-LIST SYSTEM

OrgLaw IV.2 to be amended as follows:

QuoteBased on the final results of the General Election, the Secretary of State shall calculate the apportionment of seats among the parties, hereinafter referred to as "party seats".

    1. The party seats shall total 200, or another number which may be set by law, with the provisos that any such change will not take effect until the next election following the passage of a calendar year; and that this number may never be less than twice the number of Senators minus one.
    2. Each party shall receive a percentage of party seats as equal as possible to its percentage of the popular vote, but each party shall receive a whole number of seats, and in turn, the Secretary of State shall assign these seats to candidates nominated by that party, in accordance with law. Any seats which cannot be assigned in accordance with law may be filled by the King according to his own best judgment, or left vacant.
 3. The Secretary of State shall employ whatever mathematical formulae and calculations in the apportionment of seats as are set by law, or, in the absence of such law, as will best reflect the intentions of this Organic Law. The Uppermost Cort shall be the final judge in case of mathematical disputes.
    4. Only registered political parties may obtain party seats. Parties which win votes but are not registered may not assume their seats in the Cosa until they register. The process to register a party shall be defined by law. The Secretary of State may request from all parties a registration fee, to be set by law, to cover the cost of the election. This fee shall be uniform for all parties.

OrgLaw IV.3 to be amended as follows:

QuoteIn the case of vacant party seats occurring between elections, the Secretary of State shall inform the King and the leader of whatever party held the vacant seat. The Secretary of State shall assign the seat to another candidate of that party, in accordance with law. If this is not possible, the King may assign the seat according to his own best judgment in accordance with law, or otherwise leave the seats vacant.

So it seems like this would just take the party leader out of it, right?  The Secretary of State would assign seats based on a consistent rule.  But many parties have a seniority system, with more seats going to established members.  That seems a pretty reasonable thing for a party to do -- could that work in this system, like by putting such a choice in statute?

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 23, 2026, 05:52:23 AM

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 23, 2026, 01:59:48 AM(b) will this disadvantage the interests of my voter base, which is usually fairly broad but not very intense with active support, when compared to a voter base that is very intense but not as broad?

I'm not sure what this means, or how a candidates-based voting system would do anything like that.

I wouldn't put it exactly the way that Miestra did, but the basic idea is right: my party's voter base tends to be quite large, but less politically active.  While more Talossans support the Progressive Alliance than any other party during elections, we have a smaller group of active citizens who are active between elections... for us, that ratio is larger than for any other party.  So my question is whether or not this system would punish this voting population.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 23, 2026, 04:50:42 PMBut what I really want to know is - would the good Baron agree, if this amendment were passed, that party lists as established by law would be indisputably Organic and enforceable? If not, there's not much point.

If the Organic Law says it, then it's set.  But that's just a question of tweaking the language to ensure that it covers the bases.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 23, 2026, 07:58:34 PMBTW, I fear the Baron might have a wrong idea that I/the URL are "out to get" the Senäts.

No, I don't fear bad faith or trickery.  But I have an ironclad responsibility to my voters and my party with regard to one of our party's clear priorities (preserving the Senats) while I know that both Tafi and yourself would support eliminating it completely.  There's nothing wrong with that perspective, but a new system that adjusts things to make that easier goes against our priorities and it's something that needs noting.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 26, 2026, 05:20:14 PMORGANIC LAW REFORM AMENDMENT THREE: EXPULSIONS

Add new OrgLaw IV.11:

QuoteThe Cosa may impeach any of its members from the Chamber with a two-thirds majority vote. Following impeachment, a replacement will be chosen as otherwise provided in this Organic Law. Following a failed expulsion, the accused Member of the Cosa may not again be tried for the same offence, pursuant to the Seventh Covenant of the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms. The former Member of the Cosa is not barred from running for office in future elections as long as the former Member of the Cosa maintains citizenship.

EDITED TO ADD: You will note that this will require reform to the existing OrgLaw IV.3. Because if a party leader really has total discretion over filling vacancies, there would be nothing to stop them simply reappointing the expelled MC.

I think we need to fix the language here so that we're not implying that this was a trial, which might trigger other protections.  But I support the basic idea here.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 27, 2026, 07:59:16 AMI wouldn't put it exactly the way that Miestra did, but the basic idea is right: my party's voter base tends to be quite large, but less politically active.  While more Talossans support the Progressive Alliance than any other party during elections, we have a smaller group of active citizens who are active between elections... for us, that ratio is larger than for any other party.  So my question is whether or not this system would punish this voting population.

These voters could simply vote for candidates that best reflect their beliefs... I still don't understand the issue at hand.

As long as the voters can choose who they want as their representatives regardless of party affiliation, I would be ok with an open list voting system as a compromise.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 27, 2026, 07:59:16 AMThe Secretary of State would assign seats based on a consistent rule.  But many parties have a seniority system, with more seats going to established members.  That seems a pretty reasonable thing for a party to do -- could that work in this system, like by putting such a choice in statute?

The rule (in statute) would be: the party list. The party puts its senior members at the top, in the case of a closed list; in the case of an "open list", the list ranking is determined by votes for individual candidates. Everyone on the list that is eligible going down gets one seat; when you run out, you go back to the top. The idea that one MC can have *multiple* times as many votes as another is something I dislike.

Quote

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 23, 2026, 04:50:42 PMBut what I really want to know is - would the good Baron agree, if this amendment were passed, that party lists as established by law would be indisputably Organic and enforceable? If not, there's not much point.

If the Organic Law says it, then it's set.  But that's just a question of tweaking the language to ensure that it covers the bases.

With respect, that's not an answer to my question. If this amendment were to pass, would you agree that the party list system as I have describe it would be organic and binding?

Quote

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 26, 2026, 05:20:14 PMORGANIC LAW REFORM AMENDMENT THREE: EXPULSIONS

I think we need to fix the language here so that we're not implying that this was a trial, which might trigger other protections.  But I support the basic idea here.

It's a copy-paste of the equivalent provision for the Senäts.

Quote from: Françal I. Lux on May 27, 2026, 04:26:48 PMAs long as the voters can choose who they want as their representatives regardless of party affiliation, I would be ok with an open list voting system as a compromise.

There are several open list systems, but some only allow you to choose candidates from your preferred party list. I suppose you could have a system where you have a "party vote" and a "candidate vote", and your candidate vote could go to someone outside your preferred party; but that might have weird effects, like, URL voters making a concerted effort to push a Prog candidate whom they liked to the top of the Prog list, over the wishes of Prog voters. Would that be okay?

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 27, 2026, 04:52:32 PMThe rule (in statute) would be: the party list. The party puts its senior members at the top, in the case of a closed list; in the case of an "open list", the list ranking is determined by votes for individual candidates. Everyone on the list that is eligible going down gets one seat; when you run out, you go back to the top. The idea that one MC can have *multiple* times as many votes as another is something I dislike.

The issue with putting that in statute is that then you can just change the statute very easily.  So we just have to be careful, I think.  But this does make sense.  Maybe in that case, we can also get rid of seat limits.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 27, 2026, 04:52:32 PMWith respect, that's not an answer to my question. If this amendment were to pass, would you agree that the party list system as I have describe it would be organic and binding?

I'm not trying to be cagey -- I will pay especial attention to make sure that the language in a bill would include making sure the whole thing is Organic.  I did with the first version of the party list bill, long ago!  I just don't feel comfortable saying that for sure until we get a full bill together.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 26, 2026, 05:20:14 PMORGANIC LAW REFORM AMENDMENT THREE: EXPULSIONS


I think we need to fix the language here so that we're not implying that this was a trial, which might trigger other protections.  But I support the basic idea here.


It's a copy-paste of the equivalent provision for the Senäts.

I believe you, but I also suspect that it could be a problem, and we should fix it.  Probably in the Senats version, too.

Quote from: Françal I. Lux on May 27, 2026, 04:26:48 PMAs long as the voters can choose who they want as their representatives regardless of party affiliation, I would be ok with an open list voting system as a compromise.

I still think the easiest way of implementing this, without any weird edge cases from trying to marry candidate votes and party votes, would be to implement a system in which party affiliation is listed on the ballot but irrelevant to the apportionment method.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 27, 2026, 05:03:15 PMMaybe in that case, we can also get rid of seat limits.

I find it disgraceful to try and trade one way of systemically deceiving voters for another, as it were. By which I mean, seat limits, same as party lists (EDIT: as long as apportionment depends on parties), ought to be non-negotiable.

I don't understand how this would be deceptive. Every single person who got seats would be one of the people named on the party list, which seems like it would be an improvement. Also, I will point out that if we don't do that, we're going to be doing exactly what I feared... in fact, we would be making the current situation even worse! Currently, party leaders are at least able to assign some seats off list. But under this proposal, that wouldn't be possible at all, right? Seats would be distributed among people on the list, and if they are holding a maximum number of seats, then that's it. The seats will be lost, presumably. That is significantly worse than the current system.

Maybe I am misunderstanding something?

All that the OrgLaw needs to say about seat allocation is that a party's seats go (as far as possible) to candidates named by that party at the election, in order of preference either named by the party or chosen by the voters. The actual mechanics should be in statute law for ease of tweaking.

This requires seat limits to make sure there is a party list. Otherwise you just get cxhn. Onemanband winning 51% of the vote and personally becoming half the Cosa. There seems to be an argument here that that would be perfectly fine if the Onemanband voters knew that's what they were getting. Again, I find the inequality between MCs repugnant, and I can handle a senior party member perhaps having 2x the seats of a junior member, but not 22x as is the current case.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 27, 2026, 05:17:44 PMMaybe I am misunderstanding something?

Well, it's simple: there is nothing stopping you from only having one person on the party list (in fact, not submitting any party list results in a one-person de facto list by default), who would then get all the seats for that party. We could end up with one person controlling a majority of the seats, and thus concentrating all the power of the Cosă into one person. I don't think we should want this.

I agree that it would be undesirable to have someone assigning themselves all the seats. On the one hand, at least voters would know about that going into the election, but it's still a problem and not a situation we want.

But I think we might need to figure out some other solution here, because I feel like my concerns are valid too!

Maybe there's a way we could require a certain number of people stand for election for a party in order for it to be on the ballot?

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 27, 2026, 05:34:35 PMBut I think we might need to figure out some other solution here, because I feel like my concerns are valid too!

Seat limits are currently determined by turnout, so an election with fewer active citizens will already result in a higher seat limit, which sounds like exactly what we would want here.

I'll be honest, I think the current system of seat limits (made slightly more generous thanks to reducing the Cosă to 20 seats) and off-listers (made slightly less generous thanks to the same Cosă reduction) already gives way too much leeway to party leaders... in fact, this might be the first time in a long while, if not ever, that a party ran into problems satisfactorily filling their seats. Can someone fact-check me on that?

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 27, 2026, 05:43:09 PMSeat limits are currently determined by turnout, so an election with fewer active citizens will already result in a higher seat limit, which sounds like exactly what we would want here.

Right, except that my party has a significant issue with this, and so will any other fast-growing party, and this proposal would make it much worse.

Under this proposal, a ton of Progressive seats would be deemed abandoned.  We had eight individuals on our list, and three had been elected to the Senats, leaving five.  Since two are incommunicado (one for reasons of health), that means that we'd hit our maximum seats immediately with sixty assigned seats, and then twenty-seven (!) would be abandoned.  Now, as we have continued to gain new people as we've gotten our feet under us, we may not have this problem in the future.  But any other fast-growing party might still be penalized -- and heck, if we achieved a majority in the next election, we'd still be in a situation where we couldn't afford anyone getting sick.

So any solution here needs to avoid making the problem worse.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 27, 2026, 06:40:46 PMfast-growing party

"Fast-growing" would mean your party is quickly gaining new members. The problem you have is the opposite: your party growth seemingly couldn't and can't keep up with its popularity at the ballot box, which I think you could've easily foreseen. Everyone on the PROG party list last election bar one is a former member of the previous highly popular conservative party, the TNC, and thus already easily recognisable to these voters.

I can't help but think that this was moreso an instance of overly shortsighted planning coupled with bad luck rather than a problem with the law that needs to be fixed, and I don't think it's prudent to soften basic democratic standards (even more than they already are in Talossa) to enable more shortsighted planning in the future.

Yes, fast-growing because our appeal at the ballot box has dramatically increased in a short period of time, faster than active Talossans have been initiated into the party and established that they are good representatives of party interests.  I have no idea what planning could have prevented this -- I suppose we could have declined to contest the Senate races that we won, since if the voters weren't able to vote for Progressive candidates then that would leave more people viable on our party list?

It seems obvious to me that we'd be making the existing problem much worse with this reform, and I don't think we should do that.  If a new party breaks onto the scene and voters endorse it in large numbers faster than it can induct new members, then they shouldn't be penalized for that.  This particular problem might not worry you, but it is a problem and any new legislation should at least avoid making it more severe.

We shouldn't soften basic democratic standards, and a pretty darn important one is that the outcome should match the vote.  When we argue that voters shouldn't get what they want, it's concerning.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 28, 2026, 09:07:54 AMYes, fast-growing because our appeal at the ballot box has dramatically increased in a short period of time, faster than active Talossans have been initiated into the party and established that they are good representatives of party interests.  I have no idea what planning could have prevented this

Simply by having more people on the list than the absolute bare minimum. These people don't even have to be a member of your party, mind you.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 28, 2026, 09:07:54 AMWe shouldn't soften basic democratic standards, and a pretty darn important one is that the outcome should match the vote.  When we argue that voters shouldn't get what they want, it's concerning.

You're presupposing that voters want to be represented by unelected, unaccountable off-list appointees, or alternatively that they want to concentrate all power into a single person. The fact that Talossa currenty even allows off-list MCs or more than one seat per MC is a grave violation of basic democratic principles, and it exists solely to make the lives of Talossan party leaders easier. I find it concerning that these generosities are not only taken for granted but considered not generous enough.

Quote from: Françal I. Lux on May 27, 2026, 04:26:48 PMAs long as the voters can choose who they want as their representatives regardless of party affiliation, I would be ok with an open list voting system as a compromise.

What do you think of something like this?

QuoteElections to the Cosă shall be conducted following the principles of personalised proportional voting.

• Voters shall be given the choice to either vote for a single party list at-large, or to distribute exactly 20 individual votes among all candidates listed on all party lists. A single candidate may be awarded up to three individual votes.
• Seats shall be apportioned among party lists according to their at-large party list votes as well as the total individual votes for their candidates using the largest remainder method. Individual candidate votes shall count as one twentieth of an at-large party list vote for the purposes of party seat apportionment. In case of a tie, the party with the higher total vote count is prefered.
• Party seats shall be apportioned among their list candidates according to their individual votes using the largest remainder method. In case of a tie, the candidate listed higher on the list is prefered.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 28, 2026, 09:15:14 AMSimply by having more people on the list than the absolute bare minimum. These people don't even have to be a member of your party, mind you.

Right, but circumstance we're discussing is a new party whose share of the vote expands faster than their personal recruitment.  It's already tight, and we're proposing making it much worse.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 28, 2026, 09:15:14 AMYou're presupposing that voters want to be represented by unelected, unaccountable off-list appointees, or alternatively that they want to concentrate all power into a single person. The fact that Talossa currenty even allows off-list MCs or more than one seat per MC is a grave violation of basic democratic principles, and it exists solely to make the lives of Talossan party leaders easier. I find it concerning that these generosities are not only taken for granted but considered not generous enough.

I'm not really presupposing that... it's been a fact in the past -- Dien is the only one who has ever run for office with no party list, I think, and he got only a few votes (presumably from people who did indeed want that!)  But this flexibility doesn't exist for convenience, it exists because power should be distributed according to the will of the people, as much as we can manage.  This is the most basic of basic democratic principles.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 28, 2026, 09:40:00 AMRight, but circumstance we're discussing is a new party whose share of the vote expands faster than their personal recruitment.  It's already tight, and we're proposing making it much worse.

Your party is not exactly "new", is my point. You should've foreseen that the same people that were highly popular before under a different label would still be popular now, and accounted for it. If the demand exceeds the supply, it is your responsibility as a party leader to keep up with the demand.

QuoteI'm not really presupposing that... it's been a fact in the past -- Dien is the only one who has ever run for office with no party list, I think, and he got only a few votes (presumably from people who did indeed want that!)

Not even remotely the same as what you've been suggesting here. Plus, I don't think "we've always done it like this" is a good enough argument to continue flaunting the basic principles of democratic conduct. Talossa, in the past, has not been a good democracy. It should be in the people's interest to improve Talossan democracy, not worsen it.

QuoteBut this flexibility doesn't exist for convenience, it exists because power should be distributed according to the will of the people, as much as we can manage.  This is the most basic of basic democratic principles.

The power to concentrate power in a few unelected appointees loyal only to the party leadership is absolutely only a convenience, and enabling this conduct any further is the exact opposite of democracy. It may be *your* will, but it's not the people's will.

I've heavily edited my previous post to fix several syntax and phrasing errors, for the record.

I certainly work on recruitment, but aside from that, the only thing I could think would be to aim lower and not contest Senats seats, lol.  Again, aiming lower is not a solution and not democratic.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 28, 2026, 09:45:21 AMIt should be in the people's interest to improve Talossan democracy, not worsen it.

Absolutely.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 28, 2026, 09:45:21 AMThe power to concentrate power in a few unelected appointees loyal only to the party leadership is absolutely only a convenience, and enabling this conduct any further is the exact opposite of democracy. It may be *your* will, but it's not the people's will.

The people's will is best and most directly expressed by their vote, and we should be careful about wise elders deciding when the people's will shouldn't count.

But again, I don't want parties to be able to invest their power in just one or two people.  That's also not a good outcome.  I'm asking for us to work to find a solution that addresses both concerns.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 28, 2026, 09:53:46 AMThe people's will is best and most directly expressed by their vote, and we should be careful about wise elders deciding when the people's will shouldn't count.

This is exactly why I oppose expanding off-list appointees or softening party list requirements any further, since it is essentially elder party leaders deciding that the directly expressed preference for a certain slate of candidates should not count as long as it's convenient for them.

But setting all that aside, what do you think of the voting system I proposed a few posts ago?

QuoteElections to the Cosă shall be conducted following the principles of personalised proportional voting.

• Voters shall be given the choice to either vote for a single party list at-large, or to distribute exactly 20 individual votes among all candidates listed on all party lists. A single candidate may be awarded up to three individual votes.
• Seats shall be apportioned among party lists according to their at-large party list votes as well as the total individual votes for their candidates using the largest remainder method. Individual candidate votes shall count as one twentieth of an at-large party list vote for the purposes of party seat apportionment. In case of a tie, the party with the higher total vote count is prefered.
• Party seats shall be apportioned among their list candidates according to their individual votes using the largest remainder method. In case of a tie, the candidate listed higher on the list is prefered.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 27, 2026, 04:54:24 PM

Quote from: Françal I. Lux on May 27, 2026, 04:26:48 PMAs long as the voters can choose who they want as their representatives regardless of party affiliation, I would be ok with an open list voting system as a compromise.

There are several open list systems, but some only allow you to choose candidates from your preferred party list. I suppose you could have a system where you have a "party vote" and a "candidate vote", and your candidate vote could go to someone outside your preferred party; but that might have weird effects, like, URL voters making a concerted effort to push a Prog candidate whom they liked to the top of the Prog list, over the wishes of Prog voters. Would that be okay?

Sorry, I was not clear on my statement. I would be in favor of an open list system as a compromise given that voters' choice dictate the order of seat apportionment on the list.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 27, 2026, 05:05:25 PM

Quote from: Françal I. Lux on May 27, 2026, 04:26:48 PMAs long as the voters can choose who they want as their representatives regardless of party affiliation, I would be ok with an open list voting system as a compromise.

I still think the easiest way of implementing this, without any weird edge cases from trying to marry candidate votes and party votes, would be to implement a system in which party affiliation is listed on the ballot but irrelevant to the apportionment method.

I would be in support of this method.

I have implemented an Approval Voting tabulator compatible with the Pseudo-Real 20 seat Cosă. Feel free to play around with it, and let me know what you think.

Link (https://xadrezo.neocities.org/tzl/talossa-spav)

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 28, 2026, 10:03:52 AM

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 28, 2026, 09:53:46 AMThe people's will is best and most directly expressed by their vote, and we should be careful about wise elders deciding when the people's will shouldn't count.

This is exactly why I oppose expanding off-list appointees or softening party list requirements any further, since it is essentially elder party leaders deciding that the directly expressed preference for a certain slate of candidates should not count as long as it's convenient for them.

Sure. And I'm saying that both things are true.  We need to find solutions that both allow for the most accurate representation of the will of the voters and which don't give party leaders absolute discretion to hand out seats.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 28, 2026, 10:03:52 AMBut setting all that aside, what do you think of the voting system I proposed a few posts ago?

QuoteElections to the Cosă shall be conducted following the principles of personalised proportional voting.

• Voters shall be given the choice to either vote for a single party list at-large, or to distribute exactly 20 individual votes among all candidates listed on all party lists. A single candidate may be awarded up to three individual votes.
• Seats shall be apportioned among party lists according to their at-large party list votes as well as the total individual votes for their candidates using the largest remainder method. Individual candidate votes shall count as one twentieth of an at-large party list vote for the purposes of party seat apportionment. In case of a tie, the party with the higher total vote count is prefered.
• Party seats shall be apportioned among their list candidates according to their individual votes using the largest remainder method. In case of a tie, the candidate listed higher on the list is prefered.

Wow, this is a little bit confusing.  Okay, so the way this works is that voters will be presented with two choices about how to have their vote counted... they can either just vote for a party with a block of 20 votes, or they can give out 20 votes to any individuals they want on any lists (up to 3 per person).

So, at a glance, I'll note that we probably want to have a maximum assignment that's a divisor of 20, since a lot of people will want to just evenly split up their vote.  I'd suggest just increasing it to 4.

Also, I suspect we're going to have a problem with the practical implementation of this.  We should expect a majority of people to do what they've always done: cast party votes.  That means that we're giving wildly disproportionate power to people who cast individual votes.  They're steering all of those party votes' distribution.  (Also, what happens if a party gets no individual votes?)

This obviously disadvantages small parties, of course.  In our past, many times new or small parties have only had one or two candidates -- practically speaking, this system would force voters to spread out their vote if they choose candidates.  I don't think that's the worse thing in the world, but it's not great.

This seems like there'd be no seat maximum?  And it says nothing about replacement seats?

Honestly, I'm not sure this proposal works for us just because we're so small.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 31, 2026, 08:28:19 AMWow, this is a little bit confusing.

Let me first say that this proposal (not my favourite but one which still acknowledges parties) is based very heavily on the system of panachage used in German local elections. Which is to say, it works and has been shown to work for decades. It's not the simplest system in the world, but then again, simplicity is often the antithesis of fairness when it comes to voting (see FPTP).

QuoteAlso, I suspect we're going to have a problem with the practical implementation of this.  We should expect a majority of people to do what they've always done: cast party votes.

Sure, most would. That's why this is an explicit option.

QuoteThat means that we're giving wildly disproportionate power to people who cast individual votes.  They're steering all of those party votes' distribution.  (Also, what happens if a party gets no individual votes?)

I don't know what you mean by "wildly disproportionate" here. People who vote for a single list accept the list and the ordering of its candidates without change. People who vote for individuals care about ordering or cross-partisan support. If a party gets no individual votes, the party seats are distributed evenly among all candidates on the list, with preference given to candidates on the top of the list.

QuoteThis obviously disadvantages small parties, of course.

How?

QuoteIn our past, many times new or small parties have only had one or two candidates -- practically speaking, this system would force voters to spread out their vote if they choose candidates.

If people prefer a small party to the exclusion of all others, then they can just vote for that small party directly, no splitting required. If they choose to split their votes, they can. I don't see where or how voters would be forced to do anything.

QuoteThis seems like there'd be no seat maximum?  And it says nothing about replacement seats?

The way seat maximums and replacement seats are handled would be unaffected, which is why I didn't mention them.

QuoteHonestly, I'm not sure this proposal works for us just because we're so small.

What does size have to do with giving voters more of a say?

Oh, I see.  I misunderstood one aspect, here.  Okay, thank you.  This is actually really intriguing.

I guess a lot of my concerns come from:

(a) We need to figure out something that addresses replacement seats, too.
(b) This is really complicated and seems prone to gamesmanship, and I'm a little concerned that we're already having a problem with RCV even years after it was introduced.

I mean, I think my preference would be to stick with something like the current system (ie what @Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC  proposed)... just take party leaders out of the equation for the most part.  Everyone submits a party list of minimum length, seats are distributed to people on the party list, and if someone leaves, then their seats are redistributed according to the same rule.  It's very simple, it's something people are used to doing, and it makes sure that everyone knows where their vote would be going specifically.  This wouldn't allow for in-term replacements, but that's what new citizen seats are for (we would need to go back to 200 if we're going to still have new citizen seats).

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 31, 2026, 08:57:21 AMThis is really complicated and seems prone to gamesmanship

I must say, it is really frustrating that any voting system more involved than "choose one and only one" is immediately dismissed as too complicated for the 71% college-educated Talossan public, when rural Germans have no issues with it whatsoever. Likewise, if the system was prone to gamesmanship, I suppose it would've already been gamed, and to my knowledge it hasn't.

I reject the insinuation that Talossans are simply not smart enough to be given a say on who actually represents them, and instead have to make due with choosing which label, colour and logo they like best.

No one's saying that people aren't smart, but you're not recognizing the facts on the ground.  Voters do have trouble with big changes to systems, and even years after we introduced RCV and despite explicit appeals from party leaders, a lot of people don't use it even when it would better represent their interests.

This is because the majority of Talossans aren't party activists or legislators or even very present on Wittenberg, and there's no forcible penetration of Talossa into their daily life.  We are a voluntary country, and nothing like inflation or postal service changes or road maintenance will force Talossa into the regular awareness of our electorate.  This isn't a criticism... it's praise, since this is a group of people who surpass most of the rest of the world in their civic duty.  Talossans have had to affirmatively choose to become Talossan in a way that few people do, and they must regularly maintain that choice through fulfilling their civic duties.  They have already reached a higher standard than most people in the world will ever meet.

I'm not saying your proposal is impossible, but I think you need to please be aware that it is complicated in an objective way, and if you want to persuade people to support it, we need to grapple with that.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 31, 2026, 09:18:41 AMNo one's saying that people aren't smart,

It may not seem like it to you, but whenever you dismiss a voting system that lets voters have more say than just selecting a logo as "complicated", it comes across as incredibly condescending, and as if you don't trust people to even have that much of a say to begin with.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 31, 2026, 09:18:41 AMThis is because the majority of Talossans aren't party activists or legislators or even very present on Wittenberg, and there's no forcible penetration of Talossa into their daily life. [...]

I don't know what your perception of the average German or the average Australian for that matter is, but we're not all party activists or legislators or even politically active either, and it still works somehow. Why might that be? Elections are voluntary in Germany, so the fact that being Talossan and participating in Talossan elections is also voluntary is not a satisfying answer, either.

Perhaps the problems run deeper than just Talossa being a voluntary association, when we have voters whose only contribution to the country is showing up every 9 months to submit a copy-pasted partially invalid public vote in the voting thread. Perhaps it would benefit the country if we made more of an effort to educate voters on the powers they have. But, I don't know.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 31, 2026, 09:31:51 AM

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 31, 2026, 09:18:41 AMNo one's saying that people aren't smart,

It may not seem like it to you, but whenever you dismiss a voting system that lets voters have more say than just selecting a logo as "complicated", it comes across as incredibly condescending, and as if you don't trust people to even have that much of a say to begin with.

Most people make their choices on the ballot based on the statements of the parties, the people listed on the ballot, and any mailers they receive.  You can sneer at that as "choosing a logo," but that's not what I said and it's not the reality.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 31, 2026, 09:31:51 AM

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 31, 2026, 09:18:41 AMThis is because the majority of Talossans aren't party activists or legislators or even very present on Wittenberg, and there's no forcible penetration of Talossa into their daily life. [...]

I don't know what your perception of the average German or the average Australian for that matter is, but we're not all party activists or legislators or even politically active either, and it still works somehow. Why might that be?

Germans are living in Germany, and there are newspapers, magazine, television, advertisements, and physical mail that call their attention to their politics.  Their daily lives do, as well.  If the roads are rough and poorly maintained, people begin to notice and complain, and if they receive poor constituent services, then their vote might change.  If inflation goes up, they often are inclined to punish the incumbent administration for the rise in the cost of living.  Daily life makes it more likely their political awareness is heightened.

I do not think you should mock people who are relatively uninvolved and just like to belong and vote.  It would be good to have people more interested and active, but the sneers and mockery is unnecessary.  It's also not going to help us actually figure out solutions.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 31, 2026, 09:46:01 AMMost people make their choices on the ballot based on the statements of the parties, the people listed on the ballot, and any mailers they receive.  You can sneer at that as "choosing a logo," but that's not what I said and it's not the reality.

But the choice they make is effectively only for a logo, since party statements and mailers are fluff, party lists are not-binding, and the current system only allows you to pick one party with no further input allowed. That is the reality, is it not?

QuoteGermans are living in Germany, and there are newspapers, magazine, television, advertisements, and physical mail that call their attention to their politics.  Their daily lives do, as well.  If the roads are rough and poorly maintained, people begin to notice and complain, and if they receive poor constituent services, then their vote might change.  If inflation goes up, they often are inclined to punish the incumbent administration for the rise in the cost of living.  Daily life makes it more likely their political awareness is heightened.

It's an accurate description of how people become politically involved, but none of this has anything to do with how people (both the politically involved and the uninvolved) manage to navigate the "complicated" voting system without any issues. That part remains unexplained.

QuoteI do not think you should mock people who are relatively uninvolved and just like to belong and vote.

It's not mocking. The amount of copy-pasted invalid votes cast last election is genuinely concerning. A sudden spike in invalid votes should concern you, as well.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 31, 2026, 09:58:39 AMBut the choice they make is effectively only for a logo, since party statements and mailers are fluff, party lists are not-binding, and the current system only allows you to pick one party with no further input allowed. That is the reality, is it not?

I disagree.  In my experience, the campaign matters a lot.  An effective campaign message and outreach effort is the difference between 10% of the vote and 40%.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 31, 2026, 09:58:39 AM

QuoteGermans are living in Germany, and there are newspapers, magazine, television, advertisements, and physical mail that call their attention to their politics.  Their daily lives do, as well.  If the roads are rough and poorly maintained, people begin to notice and complain, and if they receive poor constituent services, then their vote might change.  If inflation goes up, they often are inclined to punish the incumbent administration for the rise in the cost of living.  Daily life makes it more likely their political awareness is heightened.

It's an accurate description of how people become politically involved, but none of this has anything to do with how people (both the politically involved and the uninvolved) manage to navigate the "complicated" voting system without any issues. That part remains unexplained.

They're made aware of the voting system and how it works and think of it from time to time thanks to the consciousness raised in them by their daily lives, I would imagine.  Everyone in Germany is voting that way, after all.  The news has explainers about it, and their friends are all voting with that same method, and so on.  Talossans don't have that, usually.

But it's hard for me to speak to these specific systems.  I'm not even saying Talossans can't do it... I'm just urging caution and a lot of care!

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 31, 2026, 09:58:39 AM

QuoteI do not think you should mock people who are relatively uninvolved and just like to belong and vote.

It's not mocking. The amount of copy-pasted invalid votes cast last election is genuinely concerning. A sudden spike in invalid votes should concern you, as well.

You might think you're not mocking, but it really reads that way... especially when I'm just asking us to think about the element of complication as one factor to consider.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 31, 2026, 10:25:17 AMThey're made aware of the voting system and how it works and think of it from time to time thanks to the consciousness raised in them by their daily lives, I would imagine.  Everyone in Germany is voting that way, after all.  The news has explainers about it, and their friends are all voting with that same method, and so on.

Interestingly enough, this is not actually the case. Details on the system (including the number of votes and how and when splitting is allowed) depends on the state and county, and federal elections use a different system altogether. What they do have though are very detailed explanations of how to cast a valid ballot on the ballot itself, including the number of total votes, how vote splitting and cumulation works, how to remove candidates from lists, etc.

Perhaps a more in-depth explanation on how to cast ranked ballots would help with RCV, and likewise with other proposed systems.

Maybe, yeah.  I think Luc has done a good job with the directions, generally, but maybe they need a closer look.

What do you think of what I suggested, though?  It's dead simple, would ensure that no one gets elected unless the voters chose a list with their name on it, and eliminates a lot of party leader power.

It's simple, but still leaves party leaders in total control of who gets to be on the list, doesn't address any of Françal's concerns as to why you'd want a candidate-based voting system to begin with (link (https://wittenberg.talossa.com/index.php?topic=5220.msg42869#msg42869)), and still leaves open the possibility of one person controlling the Cosă singlehandedly thanks to the abolition of seat limits. I'm also not a fan of returning to the 200-seat Cosă, nor do I think that new citizen seats would would "fix" the problem of in-term replacements in any way regardless of Cosă size.

EDIT: Instituting a minimum length for party lists would also bar independent candidates. Do we want that?

EDIT 2: By the way, what's your verdict on SPAV (https://xadrezo.neocities.org/tzl/talossa-spav)? I can't think of simpler voter instructions than simply "choose everyone you like".

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 31, 2026, 11:00:49 AMIt's simple, but still leaves party leaders in total control of who gets to be on the list, doesn't address any of Françal's concerns as to why you'd want a candidate-based voting system to begin with (link (https://wittenberg.talossa.com/index.php?topic=5220.msg42869#msg42869)), and still leaves open the possibility of one person controlling the Cosă singlehandedly thanks to the abolition of seat limits. I'm also not a fan of returning to the 200-seat Cosă, nor do I think that new citizen seats would would "fix" the problem of in-term replacements in any way regardless of Cosă size.

Hmm.  Yeah, valid concerns.

I do think that you're going to probably have to leave party leaders in control of submitting a list, subject to their internal processes, since I don't know how else you'd do it.  But I don't think you'd have the possibility of one person controlling things, since there could be a minimum length for party lists.  But maybe still a seat limit, but just raised significantly higher for the formula?

Do you not like the new citizen seats?  They've been very popular.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 31, 2026, 11:00:49 AMEDIT: Instituting a minimum length for party lists would also bar independent candidates. Do we want that?

No, you're right.  Hm.  That's a tough nut to crack.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 31, 2026, 11:00:49 AMEDIT 2: By the way, what's your verdict on SPAV (https://xadrezo.neocities.org/tzl/talossa-spav)?

I'll take a look.

So with this SPAV, would each candidate get a fifty word statement?  Like how are people supposed to know who to vote for?

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 31, 2026, 11:08:17 AMBut I don't think you'd have the possibility of one person controlling things, since there could be a minimum length for party lists.  But maybe still a seat limit, but just raised significantly higher for the formula?

Imagine the minimum length was two. Now imagine a party with two candidates winning a landslide victory, and each candidate would get half the seats of that party. What would happen if one of the two candidates would immediately resign from the Cosă, or refuse to accept the seats to begin with? From what I can tell, without seat limits, all of the party seats would now go to the other candidate, who now controls the Cosă majority by themself.

What I'm saying is that I'd like some assurance that no single candidate could ever end up with a Cosă majority on their own.

QuoteDo you not like the new citizen seats?  They've been very popular.

I'm saying that new citizen seats cannot be a means to replace and replenish Cosă members. In the current implementation, NCs only have one seat each out of 200, meaning they are always politically irrelevant and cannot replace elected Cosă members who usually have 5 to 15 times as many seats assigned on average. At the same time though, if we were to increase the number of seats held by NCs, they would introduce overly large partisan swings and create majorities contrary to the election results, which is a complete no-go.

QuoteSo with this SPAV, would each candidate get a fifty word statement?  Like how are people supposed to know who to vote for?

If they want to run as independents, they could get thir own 50 world statement. Otherwise, candidates could band together and have a joint 50 word statement, or run under a certain party name or ideological affiliation to help with voter orientation. The point though is that the way ballots are tallied is unaffected by how candidates wish to portray themselves, the math is the same.

As an example: if all candidates run under certain party labels, and all voters choose candidates based only on those party labels, the result would be the same as if there had been strict party lists. SPAV is a more generalised version of party lists, and allows people to freely vote across the aisle if they so choose, without any spoiler effects or loss of proportionality.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 31, 2026, 11:28:34 AMImagine the minimum length was two. Now imagine a party with two candidates winning a landslide victory, and each candidate would get half the seats of that party. What would happen if one of the two candidates would immediately resign from the Cosă, or refuse to accept the seats to begin with? From what I can tell, without seat limits, all of the party seats would now go to the other candidate, who now controls the Cosă majority by themself.

What I'm saying is that I'd like some assurance that no single candidate could ever end up with a Cosă majority on their own.

That makes sense.  Maybe we still need seat limits, just higher ones?  Tweak the formula instead.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 31, 2026, 11:28:34 AMI'm saying that new citizen seats cannot be a means to replace and replenish Cosă members. In the current implementation, NCs only have one seat each out of 200, meaning they are always politically irrelevant and cannot replace elected Cosă members who usually have 5 to 15 times as many seats assigned on average. At the same time though, if we were to increase the number of seats held by NCs, they would introduce overly large partisan swings and create majorities contrary to the election results, which is a complete no-go.

No, sorry, those two aren't mean to go together.  The new citizen seats are just a way for new citizens to represent their "own" vote in the Cosa and get involved for fun, and they wouldn't be an effective method of replacing lost legislators (plus that would defeat the goal of ensuring everyone in the Cosa was elected to it).

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 31, 2026, 09:58:39 AMThe amount of copy-pasted invalid votes cast last election is genuinely concerning.

I'm less worried by the fact that there were a whole bunch of amount of copy-pasted invalid votes cast last election, than that most of those votes were for one particular party, the leader of which is doing his best to argue against reforms of that system. Those with very long memories might remember critics of a system where "I vote for whoever Ben says" was a valid vote, and King Robert I yelling at them as wanting to disenfranchise less-active or less-informed citizens. Or where the RUMP fought against the secret ballot for a very long time, and they were right (from a partisan viewpoint) to do so, because they lost their permanent absolute majority in the very first secret election.

I don't believe that AD is only raising quibbles about reforms to defend his partisan advantage out of a system where people vote for a "blank cheque" for a logo. But if the Point is: "The current system makes the Cosa unaccountable to voters" and the Counterpoint is: "yeah, but it benefits my party", I beg the Baron to realize how his opponents might react to that. It is a simple psephological fact that conservative parties benefit from low-cognitive-effort, leader-focused systems.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 31, 2026, 11:08:17 AMI do think that you're going to probably have to leave party leaders in control of submitting a list, subject to their internal processes

In my country - and I believe others with closed lists - there is a law saying that a party's internal processes for creating lists have to be democratic and that party members have standing to sue if their leadership is drawing up lists arbitrarily. I would support that in Talossa.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 31, 2026, 05:02:52 PMI don't believe that AD is only raising quibbles about reforms to defend his partisan advantage out of a system where people vote for a "blank cheque" for a logo. But if the Point is: "The current system makes the Cosa unaccountable to voters" and the Counterpoint is: "yeah, but it benefits my party", I beg the Baron to realize how his opponents might react to that. It is a simple psephological fact that conservative parties benefit from low-cognitive-effort, leader-focused systems.

It is a basic tenet of democracy that the outcome of the vote should reflect the will of the people as much as possible.  And I started this conversation because I'm interested in trying to find a solution that works well for that factor as well as others: reducing the arbitrary power of party leaders, working to ensure that voters know ahead-of-time who will be representing them, and making all the current features of our system flourish.  You will have to go elsewhere to pick a fight, I'm afraid.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 31, 2026, 11:08:17 AMI do think that you're going to probably have to leave party leaders in control of submitting a list, subject to their internal processes, since I don't know how else you'd do it.

Aside from legislation mandating that parties follow democratic procedures and allowing legal redress if not, switching to a candidate-based voting system instead of one that strictly hinges on parties would also solve this problem. The power to set up and submit lists is much less serious if voters are free to defy those lists as they please.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 31, 2026, 02:10:46 PMMaybe we still need seat limits, just higher ones?  Tweak the formula instead.

The current formula for the seat limit is (10 * Cosă size) / turnout, rounded up. If we are to abolish the one-third off-lister allowance, I suppose the equivalent exchange would be to increase the seat limit by one third, i.e. (40 * Cosă size) / (3 * turnout). How much of an increase do you have in mind?

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 31, 2026, 08:45:40 PM

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 31, 2026, 11:08:17 AMI do think that you're going to probably have to leave party leaders in control of submitting a list, subject to their internal processes, since I don't know how else you'd do it.

Aside from legislation mandating that parties follow democratic procedures and allowing legal redress if not, switching to a candidate-based voting system instead of one that strictly hinges on parties would also solve this problem. The power to set up and submit lists is much less serious if voters are free to defy those lists as they please.

My two bence is that such a change would be preferable to Miestra's suggestion, as it appears to get two birds with one stone. (A phrase we do not seem to have a Tolassan equivalent for, if you'll forgive the aside.)

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 31, 2026, 09:15:49 PM

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 31, 2026, 02:10:46 PMMaybe we still need seat limits, just higher ones?  Tweak the formula instead.

The current formula for the seat limit is (10 * Cosă size) / turnout, rounded up. If we are to abolish the one-third off-lister allowance, I suppose the equivalent exchange would be to increase the seat limit by one third, i.e. (40 * Cosă size) / (3 * turnout). How much of an increase do you have in mind?

Sorry for not waiting for a response, but I did some math. Under this modified formula, in a 20-seat Cosă the seat limit would be 3 at a turnout between 89 and 133, meaning you would need at least 4 MCs to hold an absolute majority. How does that sound?

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on June 01, 2026, 07:15:36 AM

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 31, 2026, 09:15:49 PM

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 31, 2026, 02:10:46 PMMaybe we still need seat limits, just higher ones?  Tweak the formula instead.

The current formula for the seat limit is (10 * Cosă size) / turnout, rounded up. If we are to abolish the one-third off-lister allowance, I suppose the equivalent exchange would be to increase the seat limit by one third, i.e. (40 * Cosă size) / (3 * turnout). How much of an increase do you have in mind?

Sorry for not waiting for a response, but I did some math. Under this modified formula, in a 20-seat Cosă the seat limit would be 3 at a turnout between 89 and 133, meaning you would need at least 4 MCs to hold an absolute majority. How does that sound?

That sounds pretty reasonable to me.  It doesn't seem like we should have a scenario where three people can control the legislature -- that seems too much of a concentration.  And speaking from experience, I have a hard time imagining a scenario where a party gets a majority of the vote without having even four people who could stand in the Cosa.  And keeping the seat limit, while just raising the ceiling, means that independent candidates can still stand.

It seems like this bill should also fold in an end to the new citizen seats, while we're at it.  We shouldn't have a mechanism to allow a statute to give new citizens such a huge sway, and they're already going to be impossible once the Cosa shrinks to 20.

I also saw that @Mic'haglh Autófil, O.Be had a suggested new statute to require MCs to confirm their willingness to stand, and that seems like another good thing to include.  (It doesn't seem like a big logistical hurdle -- @Sir Lüc , would this be a challenge to implement?)

And it makes sense to include some principles that must be met by internal party procedures for making their lists: timeline, openness, etc

Okay, so the provisions I'm currently planning on working out are:

• Switch to ironclad party lists
• Add in the confirmation step
• Change the formula for seat limits
• Remove the new citizen seats provision
• Replace the vacancy procedure so that seats are just redistributed to the other people on the list
• Some mechanism governing party procedures for making their lists

I feel like I'm forgetting some things, though.

Okay, so this is legal text from myself, Miestra, and Mic'haglh.  I'm still working on it, and haven't yet tackled the party procedures thing.  I'm not sure where to stick that in the Organic Law or what the principles should quite be.

EDIT: Geez there's a lot of statutes that need to be fixed!  I think I have them all?


Whereas the Ziu believes in further perfecting our democracy, and accordingly wishes to better establish its belief that the outcome of a vote should match the will of the voters as much as possible, and that the people should be in charge of that outcome and not party bosses, and that there is room for parties of every size,

---

Part I: Ironclad Party Lists

THEREFORE, the second section of Article IV of the Organic Law, which currently reads:

QuoteBased on the final results of the General Election, the Secretary of State shall calculate the apportionment of seats among the parties, hereinafter referred to as "party seats".
    1. The party seats shall total 200, or another number which may be set by law, with the provisos that any such change will not take effect until the next election following the passage of a calendar year; and that this number may never be less than twice the number of Senators minus one.
    2. Each party shall receive a percentage of party seats as equal as possible to its percentage of the popular vote, but each party shall receive a whole number of seats, and in turn, each party shall assign these seats to individuals, in accordance with law. The Secretary of State shall employ whatever mathematical formulae and calculations in the apportionment of seats as are set by law, or, in the absence of such law, as will best reflect the intentions of this Organic Law. The Uppermost Cort shall be the final judge in case of mathematical disputes.
    3. Only registered political parties may obtain party seats. Parties which win votes but are not registered may not assume their seats in the Cosa until they register. The process to register a party shall be defined by law. The Secretary of State may request from all parties a registration fee, to be set by law, to cover the cost of the election. This fee shall be uniform for all parties.

shall be amended to read:

QuoteBased on the final results of the General Election, the Secretary of State shall calculate the apportionment of seats among the parties, hereinafter referred to as "party seats".
    1. The party seats shall total 200, or another number which may be set by law, with the provisos that any such change will not take effect until the next election following the passage of a calendar year; and that this number may never be less than twice the number of Senators minus one.
    2. Each party shall receive a percentage of party seats as equal as possible to its percentage of the popular vote, but each party shall receive a whole number of seats, and in turn, the Secretary of State shall assign these seats to candidates nominated by that party. The Secretary of State shall assign seats by assigning a seat to the first person on a party's list. If the party won more than one seat, then the Secretary of State will assign a seat to the next person on their list, and so on until the end of the party's list. The Secretary of State will then return to the top of the list, and continue in the same manner until all of the party's seats have been assigned.
    3. No person shall hold more seats in the Cosă than forty times the total number of seats in the Cosă divided by three times the number of ballots cast for the Cosa in the most recent General Election, rounded up to the next integer.
    4. Any seats which cannot be assigned under the procedure described in this section may be filled by the King according to his own best judgment, or left vacant.
    5. The Secretary of State shall employ whatever mathematical formulae and calculations in the apportionment of seats as are set by law, or, in the absence of such law, as will best reflect the intentions of this Organic Law. The Uppermost Cort shall be the final judge in case of mathematical disputes.
    6. Only registered political parties may obtain party seats. Parties which win votes but are not registered may not assume their seats in the Cosa until they register. The process to register a party shall be defined by law. The Secretary of State may request from all parties a registration fee, to be set by law, to cover the cost of the election. This fee shall be uniform for all parties.

FURTHERMORE, the third section of Article IV of the Organic Law, which currently reads:

QuoteIn the case of vacant party seats occurring between elections, the Secretary of State shall inform the King and the leader of whatever party held the vacant seat. The King shall appoint a replacement to each vacancy. If the seat belonged to a party with a functioning party leader, the King must appoint as a replacement whichever person shall be so designated by that party's leader. If there is no functioning party leader, or if the party leader refuses to designate a replacement, the King shall appoint the replacement according to his own best judgment.

shall be amended to read:

QuoteIn the case of vacant party seats occurring between elections, the Secretary of State shall inform the King and the leader of whatever party held the vacant seat. The Secretary of State shall redistribute all of that party's seats among the remaining eligible candidates on that party's list in the same manner described in the second section, above. If no eligible candidate remains on that party's list, whether by vacation, ineligibility, or the operation of the maximum seats provision, the King may assign the seat according to his own best judgment, or leave it vacant.

FURTHERMORE, there shall be a new second subsubsection of the third subsection of the second section of Title B of El Lexhatx which shall read:

Quote2.3.2. The Secretary of State shall confirm to their satisfaction that all citizens appearing on a party list consent to do so, prior to the printing or publication of the ballot. Only citizens so consenting shall be recognized as being on a party's list for the purposes of Lexh.B.2.3, and only said citizens will appear on the party's list as shown on the ballot.

FURTHERMORE, the first subsection of the fourth section of Title H of El Lexhatx, which currently reads

Quote4.1. No person shall hold more seats in the Cosa than ten times the total number of seats in the Cosa divided by the number of ballots cast for the Cosa in the most recent General Election, rounded up to the next integer.
4.1.1. The total number of party seats is twenty.

shall be amended to read

Quote4.1. The total number of party seats is twenty.

FURTHERMORE, the first subsubsubsection of the first subsubsection of the third subsection of the second section of Title B of El Lexhatx, which currently reads

Quote2.3.1.1. The party leader may assign seats to any eligible citizen(s) they see fit, so long as the following criteria are met:
2.3.1.1.1. The party's internal procedures are followed
2.3.1.1.2. No one who was not named on the list is assigned more seats than any eligible citizen who was named on the list
2.3.1.1.3. The total number of seats awarded to those not on the list does not exceed 1/3 of all seats won by the party
2.3.1.1.4. No person occupies more than the maximum legal number of seats.

shall be deleted in its entirety.

FURTHERMORE, the third subsection of the second section of Title B of El Lexhatx, subsection 2.3.1, which currently reads

Quote2.3.1. Before the conclusion of the first Clark, each party leader must submit to the Secretary of State a report containing the distribution of the seats won in the election.

shall be amended to read

Quote2.3.1. Before the conclusion of the first Clark, the Secretary of State shall publish the distribution of seats among the candidates of each party, as calculated under the procedure described in Article IV of the Organic Law.

FURTHERMORE, subsection 2.3.1.2 of the third subsection of the second section of Title B of El Lexhatx, which currently reads

Quote2.3.1.2. Any person assigned a seat as above may decline to take their seats in which case they will be reallocated according to the criteria of B.2.3.1.1.

shall be amended to read

Quote2.3.1.2. Any person assigned a seat may decline to take their seats, in which case the Secretary of State shall redistribute that party's seats among the remaining candidates on the party's list in the manner described in the Organic Law.

FURTHERMORE, subsection 2.3.1.3 of the third subsection of the second section of Title B of El Lexhatx, which currently reads

Quote2.3.1.3. If a party cannot assign all of their seats under the criteria of B.2.3.1.1., the additional seats are forfeited.

shall be deleted in its entirety.

---

Part II: Standards of the Cosa

FURTHERMORE, the fourth section of Article IV of the Organic Law, which currently reads:

Quote1. In addition to the seats apportioned between parties after a General Election, the Secretary of State shall assign one Cosa seat to any citizen who becomes eligible to vote after the most recent Election Deadline but before the dissolution of the Cosa, upon the request of such citizen, up to a maximum number as this Organic Law might provide. Any additional seat so assigned shall cease to exist should its holder vacate or be removed from the seat and shall not be subject to the procedures for filling vacancies in the Cosa, and shall also cease to exist upon the dissolution of the Cosa.
2. The maximum number of seats that may be assigned to new citizens between general elections shall be 7.5% of the seats apportioned between parties, rounded up to a whole number of seats.

shall be amended to read

QuoteThe Cosa may impeach any of its members from the Chamber with a two-thirds majority vote and with the approval of the King. Following impeachment, a replacement will be chosen according to the third section of this article, and the impeached member shall not be eligible for reassignment of seats under the terms of this article. Following a failed impeachment, the accused Member of the Cosa may not again be impeached for the same offence, pursuant to the Seventh Covenant of the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms. The former Member of the Cosa is not barred from running for office in future elections as long as the former Member of the Cosa maintains citizenship.

FURTHERMORE, the fifth section of Article IV of the Organic Law, which currently reads:

QuoteEach person holding one or more seats is a representative known as a "Member of the Cosa" (MC). MCs may not be removed from office except by a two-thirds vote by the Cosa and approval by the King. An MC vacates his seats if he fails to vote on two consecutive Clarks, or if he resigns from office or dies. The seats of any MC who is removed or vacates shall be reassigned according to Section 4, above.

shall be amended to read

QuoteEach person holding one or more seats is a representative known as a "Member of the Cosa" (MC). An MC vacates his seats if they fail to vote on two consecutive Clarks, if they resign from office, or if they die. The seats of any MC who is removed or vacates shall be re-assigned according to the third section, above.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 01, 2026, 09:17:36 AMWhereas the Ziu believes in further perfecting our democracy, and accordingly wishes to better establish its belief that the outcome of a vote should match the will of the voters as much as possible, and that the people should be in charge of that outcome and not party bosses, and that there is room for parties of every size

This process and apparent result does appear to indicate the Democracy Agenda crosses party boundaries. Hopefully this will be included in the Sixth Clark BEFORE the election and not be used as a part of it.

Sad to see the issue of candidate-based voting not further acknowledged. Personally, I'm not willing to give up on this project just yet, as I still think it's worth considering.

As for the bill draft, three things caught my attention:

1) Your new LegOrg.IV.3 would increase the seat limit not by a third, but by four, meaning that two people would suffice to control an absolute majority. The formula should say "forty times the total number of seats in the Cosă divided by three times the number of ballots cast for the Cosă in the most recent General Election, rounded up to the next integer". EDIT: Looks like this has already been taken care of.
2) Does this revision of Lexh.H.4.1 mean the time at which the 20-seat Cosă would enter into effect is reset, or would that still be in accordance to the Pseudo-Real Cosă Act (i.e., next February)?
3) An amendment to revise New Citizen seats has already been passed by this Ziu and will be on the ballot next election. How... problematic is it for two separate referenda to modify the same section of the LegOrg in contradictory ways?

I'm not dead-set against the candidate-based voting, but you have to admit that this is a lot simpler and more similar to the way we've been voting for a long time.  And I think it will take a lot of work to figure out how to implement something like that in a responsible way.  We're deep into the weeds here, though, and there's a lot of things we can fix in the meantime.  I don't mean to be dismissive just because I took the bull by the horns and got some text out for review, but I'm also leery of letting us go hungry while we chew on a tough bit of gristle.  Please take my word when I say that I am definitely open to the candidate voting, still.

EDIT: I just reread what I wrote and I really twisted my metaphors to the breaking point, sorry.

1.  Yes, I have been hacking away at this and I noticed that a bit ago, and probably fixed it while you were typing.  Good eye, though!
2. There's no change being made to that aspect, so legally I don't think the timer would reset.
3. Oh, shoot, you're right.  It's not a huge problem, but it's something I'll have to account for with bifurcating text (like this section will only take effect if the referendum fails, etc).  Thank you.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 01, 2026, 07:47:16 AMI also saw that @Mic'haglh Autófil, O.Be (https://wittenberg.talossa.com/index.php?action=profile;u=288) had a suggested new statute to require MCs to confirm their willingness to stand, and that seems like another good thing to include.  (It doesn't seem like a big logistical hurdle -- @Sir Lüc (https://wittenberg.talossa.com/index.php?action=profile;u=2) , would this be a challenge to implement?)

Not too difficult on my part - there would just be some kind of active list management in the Database where party leaders can log in and add and remove candidates, and candidates can then follow some unique emailed link to consent to their placement on the list.

Some of the Database's structure was already sort of designed to enable something like that later on (more broadly, letting party leaders manage their party registrations through automatic forms rather than on a Witt thread).

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on June 01, 2026, 12:07:57 PMSad to see the issue of candidate-based voting not further acknowledged. Personally, I'm not willing to give up on this project just yet, as I still think it's worth considering.

I will also continue to advocate for a candidate-based voting system. As I've state before, I believe it would solve a lot of the issues we're having to grapple with in the current system. I am still uncomfortable with party lists on principle and would prefer political parties to be decentralized enough to let individual candidates take the lead in their own campaigns.

I also don't buy the argument that it's too hard so we shouldn't bother with it. If the right solution is a little bit more complicated than the current flawed system but actually solves a lot of the issues we all know exist, we shouldn't be afraid to implement it regardless of how it would impact us politically or ideologically because it's what's right for the nation in the long-term. It's also on us as elected officials to explain to the public thoroughly the change and why it's necessary. I believe our citizens are sophisticated enough to understand and would appreciate reforms that would actually empower them at the ballot box.

I haven't had a chance to look at the Baron's bill closely yet, but I'm not 100% convinced we need to push on to a Sixth Clark bill. I reiterate my preference for a minimal OrgLaw amendment which would (a) clarify that only candidates on the ballot get to sit in the Cosa - in exchange for the excellent compromise of a 33% increase in seat limits - and that includes filling vacancies; (b) verbiage that allows either a closed-list or open-list system, details to be worked out by statute law in the 63rd Cosa.

Quote from: Françal I. Lux on June 01, 2026, 03:57:15 PMI will also continue to advocate for a candidate-based voting system. As I've state before, I believe it would solve a lot of the issues we're having to grapple with in the current system. I am still uncomfortable with party lists on principle and would prefer political parties to be decentralized enough to let individual candidates take the lead in their own campaigns.

I also don't buy the argument that it's too hard so we shouldn't bother with it. If the right solution is a little bit more complicated than the current flawed system but actually solves a lot of the issues we all know exist, we shouldn't be afraid to implement it regardless of how it would impact us politically or ideologically because it's what's right for the nation in the long-term. It's also on us as elected officials to explain to the public thoroughly the change and why it's necessary. I believe our citizens are sophisticated enough to understand and would appreciate reforms that would actually empower them at the ballot box.

I'm a little skeptical we could get that written in the time remaining to us, but we could at least start something in terms of getting some text down.  Education is going to be key, and so will ballot design, and the language needs to be careful.  As I have found, there's a lot of places where statutes touch on this... my bill will clean up a lot of those, at least, and make way for a candidate-based system (maybe in the next term?)

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on June 01, 2026, 04:15:52 PMI haven't had a chance to look at the Baron's bill closely yet, but I'm not 100% convinced we need to push on to a Sixth Clark bill. I reiterate my preference for a minimal OrgLaw amendment which would (a) clarify that only candidates on the ballot get to sit in the Cosa - in exchange for the excellent compromise of a 33% increase in seat limits - and that includes filling vacancies; (b) verbiage that allows either a closed-list or open-list system, details to be worked out by statute law in the 63rd Cosa.

I think we have time to get this done if we keep cracking at it.

My bill is fairly minimal -- a lot of the changes are just fixing all the little bits and bobs about party leaders getting to change things.  I used your language on a lot of it, adding on a bit where problems became obvious (like to prevent another problem like we just had, with different appointment methods at different times).  I think I found all of the references to leaders getting to appoint people at will and things associated with that.

Not directly related to what's going on here right now, but since it seems like we'll be going ahead with cyclical party lists, I've added cyclical tie-breaks to my SPAV tabulator (https://xadrezo.neocities.org/tzl/talossa-spav). I have yet to hear anything about it... feel free to tell me if I should stop referencing it here.

What kind of feedback were you looking for?  Should a bunch of us try it out?

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 01, 2026, 08:40:22 PMWhat kind of feedback were you looking for?  Should a bunch of us try it out?

It's meant to illustrate how SPAV tabulation works in practice, in case my explanation of it in this thread was too abstract or anything. The example file provided is based on the most recent election, and the output is what this Cosă would've looked like under 20-seat SPAV, provided that all voters chose to vote along partisan lines.

The table shows total (weighted) vote counts per candidate (row) and round (column), and a winning candidate is highlighted in yellow.

EDIT: Then again, since it isn't really the focus of this thread right now, I might as well stop linking to it for now.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on June 01, 2026, 08:34:43 PMNot directly related to what's going on here right now, but since it seems like we'll be going ahead with cyclical party lists, I've added cyclical tie-breaks to my SPAV tabulator (https://xadrezo.neocities.org/tzl/talossa-spav). I have yet to hear anything about it... feel free to tell me if I should stop referencing it here.

I checked it out but wasn't sure how to use it, Marcel.

Quote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on June 01, 2026, 08:51:27 PM

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on June 01, 2026, 08:34:43 PMNot directly related to what's going on here right now, but since it seems like we'll be going ahead with cyclical party lists, I've added cyclical tie-breaks to my SPAV tabulator (https://xadrezo.neocities.org/tzl/talossa-spav). I have yet to hear anything about it... feel free to tell me if I should stop referencing it here.

I checked it out but wasn't sure how to use it, Marcel.

Upload a ballot file -- you can download an example file based on the December 2025 election (I just noticed it was broken, I fixed it now), enter the turnout (last election's turnout was 105), select a tie-break method, and you should be getting the results.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on June 01, 2026, 08:55:16 PM

Quote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on June 01, 2026, 08:51:27 PM

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on June 01, 2026, 08:34:43 PMNot directly related to what's going on here right now, but since it seems like we'll be going ahead with cyclical party lists, I've added cyclical tie-breaks to my SPAV tabulator (https://xadrezo.neocities.org/tzl/talossa-spav). I have yet to hear anything about it... feel free to tell me if I should stop referencing it here.

I checked it out but wasn't sure how to use it, Marcel.

Upload a ballot file -- you can download an example file based on the December 2025 election (I just noticed it was broken, I fixed it now), enter the turnout (last election's turnout was 105), select a tie-break method, and you should be getting the results.

Excellent, thanks.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on June 01, 2026, 08:34:43 PMNot directly related to what's going on here right now, but since it seems like we'll be going ahead with cyclical party lists, I've added cyclical tie-breaks to my SPAV tabulator (https://xadrezo.neocities.org/tzl/talossa-spav). I have yet to hear anything about it... feel free to tell me if I should stop referencing it here.

I've had a chance to try the simulator as well and I'm intrigued. I'll look more into this as a serious alternative to our current system. I agree with Baron Davinescu that we probably will have to wait to implement this reform until the next term, but let's keep the idea alive until then.

Okay, so if everyone's agreed that what we're looking for is a series of OrgLaw and Lexhatx amendments that:

a) will mandate that all Members of the Cosa will be candidates who stood at the election (given some relaxation of seat limits);
b) will allow either a closed-list or open-list system to be established by normal statutory law (by the 63rd Cosa onwards);

then I think we can press forward with this. But I just want to make sure we're all on the same page with this.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on June 01, 2026, 11:47:05 PMOkay, so if everyone's agreed that what we're looking for is a series of OrgLaw and Lexhatx amendments that:

a) will mandate that all Members of the Cosa will be candidates who stood at the election (given some relaxation of seat limits);
b) will allow either a closed-list or open-list system to be established by normal statutory law (by the 63rd Cosa onwards);

then I think we can press forward with this. But I just want to make sure we're all on the same page with this.

I'm on board with this -- at least at first glance, it doesn't seem like the proposed changes would prohibit a more candidate-centric electoral method, whether that's the standard open-list system you and I have been advocating, or something like Sir Marcel's SPAV method. As long as the statute in question describes how the list is to be ordered for the purposes of awarding seats under the proposed Org.IV.2.2; maybe the proposed text should clarify that this list shall be ordered as determined by law? It mentions reaching the bottom of the list, going back to the top, etc., but does not clarify if the list is simply ordered as submitted, or assembled by the results of the election, or what. Explicitly having some flexibility there will ease the adoption of a new method, I think.

Here's an updated version of the bill, incorporating Tafi's notes.  Interested also to hear from Miestra or Mic'haglh.



Whereas the Ziu believes in further perfecting our democracy, and accordingly wishes to better establish its belief that the outcome of a vote should match the will of the voters as much as possible, and that the people should be in charge of that outcome and not party bosses, and that there is room for parties of every size,

---

Part I: Ironclad Party Lists

THEREFORE, the second section of Article IV of the Organic Law, which currently reads:

QuoteBased on the final results of the General Election, the Secretary of State shall calculate the apportionment of seats among the parties, hereinafter referred to as "party seats".
    1. The party seats shall total 200, or another number which may be set by law, with the provisos that any such change will not take effect until the next election following the passage of a calendar year; and that this number may never be less than twice the number of Senators minus one.
    2. Each party shall receive a percentage of party seats as equal as possible to its percentage of the popular vote, but each party shall receive a whole number of seats, and in turn, each party shall assign these seats to individuals, in accordance with law. The Secretary of State shall employ whatever mathematical formulae and calculations in the apportionment of seats as are set by law, or, in the absence of such law, as will best reflect the intentions of this Organic Law. The Uppermost Cort shall be the final judge in case of mathematical disputes.
    3. Only registered political parties may obtain party seats. Parties which win votes but are not registered may not assume their seats in the Cosa until they register. The process to register a party shall be defined by law. The Secretary of State may request from all parties a registration fee, to be set by law, to cover the cost of the election. This fee shall be uniform for all parties.

shall be amended to read:

QuoteBased on the final results of the General Election, the Secretary of State shall calculate the apportionment of seats among the parties, hereinafter referred to as "party seats".
    1. The party seats shall total 200, or another number which may be set by law, with the provisos that any such change will not take effect until the next election following the passage of a calendar year; and that this number may never be less than twice the number of Senators minus one.
    2. Each party shall receive a percentage of party seats as equal as possible to its percentage of the popular vote, but each party shall receive a whole number of seats, and in turn, the Secretary of State shall assign these seats to a numerically-ordered list of candidates nominated by that party. The Secretary of State shall assign seats by assigning a seat to the first person on a party's list. If the party won more than one seat, then the Secretary of State will assign a seat to the next person on their list, and so on until the end of the party's list. The Secretary of State will then return to the top of the list, and continue in the same manner until all of the party's seats have been assigned.
    3. No person shall hold more seats in the Cosă than thirty times the total number of seats in the Cosă divided by two times the number of ballots cast for the Cosa in the most recent General Election, rounded up to the next integer.
    4. Any seats which cannot be assigned under the procedure described in this section may be filled by the King according to his own best judgment, or left vacant.
    5. The Secretary of State shall employ whatever mathematical formulae and calculations in the apportionment of seats as are set by law, or, in the absence of such law, as will best reflect the intentions of this Organic Law. The Uppermost Cort shall be the final judge in case of mathematical disputes.
    6. Only registered political parties may obtain party seats. Parties which win votes but are not registered may not assume their seats in the Cosa until they register. The process to register a party shall be defined by law. The Secretary of State may request from all parties a registration fee, to be set by law, to cover the cost of the election. This fee shall be uniform for all parties.

FURTHERMORE, the third section of Article IV of the Organic Law, which currently reads:

QuoteIn the case of vacant party seats occurring between elections, the Secretary of State shall inform the King and the leader of whatever party held the vacant seat. The King shall appoint a replacement to each vacancy. If the seat belonged to a party with a functioning party leader, the King must appoint as a replacement whichever person shall be so designated by that party's leader. If there is no functioning party leader, or if the party leader refuses to designate a replacement, the King shall appoint the replacement according to his own best judgment.

shall be amended to read:

QuoteIn the case of vacant party seats occurring between elections, the Secretary of State shall inform the King and the leader of whatever party held the vacant seat. The Secretary of State shall redistribute all of that party's seats among the remaining eligible candidates on that party's list in the same manner described in the second section, above. If no eligible candidate remains on that party's list, whether by vacation, ineligibility, or the operation of the maximum seats provision, the King may assign the seat according to his own best judgment, or leave it vacant.

FURTHERMORE, there shall be a new second subsubsection of the third subsection of the second section of Title B of El Lexhatx, B.2.3.2, which shall read:

Quote2.3.2. The Secretary of State shall confirm to their satisfaction that all citizens appearing on a party list consent to do so, prior to the printing or publication of the ballot. Only citizens so consenting shall be recognized as being on a party's list for the purposes of Lexh.B.2.3, and only said citizens will appear on the party's list as shown on the ballot.

FURTHERMORE, the first subsection of the fourth section of Title H of El Lexhatx, H.4.1, which currently reads

Quote4.1. No person shall hold more seats in the Cosa than ten times the total number of seats in the Cosa divided by the number of ballots cast for the Cosa in the most recent General Election, rounded up to the next integer.
4.1.1. The total number of party seats is twenty.

shall be amended to read

Quote4.1. The total number of party seats is twenty.

FURTHERMORE, the first subsubsubsection of the first subsubsection of the third subsection of the second section of Title B of El Lexhatx, B.2.3.1.1, which currently reads

Quote2.3.1.1. The party leader may assign seats to any eligible citizen(s) they see fit, so long as the following criteria are met:
2.3.1.1.1. The party's internal procedures are followed
2.3.1.1.2. No one who was not named on the list is assigned more seats than any eligible citizen who was named on the list
2.3.1.1.3. The total number of seats awarded to those not on the list does not exceed 1/3 of all seats won by the party
2.3.1.1.4. No person occupies more than the maximum legal number of seats.

shall be deleted in its entirety.

FURTHERMORE, the third subsection of the second section of Title B of El Lexhatx, B.2.3, which currently reads,

Quote2.3 The ballot must also include, for each party contesting the election, a 50-word (or less) statement of the general aims and views of the party, and a list of citizens to whom the party intends to award Cosa seats. If a party does not submit a candidate list to the Secretary of State before the election, the party leader is assigned all seats won, and seats which cannot be held by the Party Leader are forfeited.

shall be amended to read

Quote2.3 The ballot must also include, for each party contesting the election, a 50-word (or less) statement of the general aims and views of the party, and a list in numerical order of citizens to whom the party intends to award Cosa seats. If a party does not submit a candidate list to the Secretary of State before the election, the party leader is assigned all seats won, and any seats which cannot be held by the Party Leader may be filled by the King according to his own best judgment, or left vacant.

FURTHERMORE, the third subsection of the second section of Title B of El Lexhatx, B.2.3.1, which currently reads

Quote2.3.1. Before the conclusion of the first Clark, each party leader must submit to the Secretary of State a report containing the distribution of the seats won in the election.

shall be amended to read

Quote2.3.1. Before the conclusion of the first Clark, the Secretary of State shall publish the distribution of seats among the candidates of each party, as calculated under the procedure described in Article IV of the Organic Law.

FURTHERMORE, subsection 2.3.1.2 of the third subsection of the second section of Title B of El Lexhatx, B.2.3.1.2, which currently reads

Quote2.3.1.2. Any person assigned a seat as above may decline to take their seats in which case they will be reallocated according to the criteria of B.2.3.1.1.

shall be amended to read

Quote2.3.1.2. Any person assigned a seat may decline to take their seats, in which case the Secretary of State shall redistribute that party's seats among the remaining candidates on the party's list in the manner described in the Organic Law.

FURTHERMORE, subsection 2.3.1.3 of the third subsection of the second section of Title B of El Lexhatx, B.2.3.1.3, which currently reads

Quote2.3.1.3. If a party cannot assign all of their seats under the criteria of B.2.3.1.1., the additional seats are forfeited.

shall be deleted in its entirety.

---

Part II: Standards of the Cosa

FURTHERMORE, the fourth section of Article IV of the Organic Law, which currently reads:

Quote1. In addition to the seats apportioned between parties after a General Election, the Secretary of State shall assign one Cosa seat to any citizen who becomes eligible to vote after the most recent Election Deadline but before the dissolution of the Cosa, upon the request of such citizen, up to a maximum number as this Organic Law might provide. Any additional seat so assigned shall cease to exist should its holder vacate or be removed from the seat and shall not be subject to the procedures for filling vacancies in the Cosa, and shall also cease to exist upon the dissolution of the Cosa.
2. The maximum number of seats that may be assigned to new citizens between general elections shall be 7.5% of the seats apportioned between parties, rounded up to a whole number of seats.

shall be amended to read

QuoteThe Cosa may impeach any of its members from the Chamber with a two-thirds majority vote and with the approval of the King. Following impeachment, a replacement will be chosen according to the third section of this article, and the impeached member shall not be eligible for reassignment of seats under the terms of this article. Following a failed impeachment, the accused Member of the Cosa may not again be impeached for the same offence, pursuant to the Seventh Covenant of the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms. The former Member of the Cosa is not barred from running for office in future elections as long as the former Member of the Cosa maintains citizenship.

if and only if the vote for ratification of the referendum for 62RZ14 - The Broosking Swing Mitigation Amendment (Reconsideration) fails.  Should the referendum for 62RZ14 - The Broosking Swing Mitigation Amendment (Reconsideration) succeed in ratification by the people, then the new text shall be added to the end of the article as a new section, instead.

FURTHERMORE, the fifth section of Article IV of the Organic Law, which currently reads:

QuoteEach person holding one or more seats is a representative known as a "Member of the Cosa" (MC). MCs may not be removed from office except by a two-thirds vote by the Cosa and approval by the King. An MC vacates his seats if he fails to vote on two consecutive Clarks, or if he resigns from office or dies. The seats of any MC who is removed or vacates shall be reassigned according to Section 4, above.

shall be amended to read

QuoteEach person holding one or more seats is a representative known as a "Member of the Cosa" (MC). An MC vacates his seats if they fail to vote on two consecutive Clarks, if they resign from office, or if they die. The seats of any MC who is removed or vacates shall be re-assigned according to the third section, above.

This looks like good work. Only quibble here is:

Quote2. Each party shall receive a percentage of party seats as equal as possible to its percentage of the popular vote, but each party shall receive a whole number of seats, and in turn, the Secretary of State shall assign these seats to a numerically-ordered list of candidates nominated by that party. The Secretary of State shall assign seats by assigning a seat to the first person on a party's list. If the party won more than one seat, then the Secretary of State will assign a seat to the next person on their list, and so on until the end of the party's list. The Secretary of State will then return to the top of the list, and continue in the same manner until all of the party's seats have been assigned.

The party list being ranked is a pretty important detail. Consequent amendment to El Lexh 2.3 also:

Quote2.3 The ballot must also include, for each party contesting the election, a 50-word (or less) statement of the general aims and views of the party, and a list in numerical order of citizens to whom the party intends to award Cosa seats. If a party does not submit a candidate list to the Secretary of State before the election, the party leader is assigned all seats won, and seats which cannot be held by the Party Leader are forfeited.

I *think*, given this wording, it would be possible for a future Cosă to bring in an open-list system (although not a fully candidate-based system) by statute. The very simplest form would be to add an additional question to each ballot for each voter to choose one (or more) preferred candidates (either restricted to their preferred party, or otherwise), and for the Secretary of State to reorder each party's list to rank candidates in order of their personal vote. But, @Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP , do you think this would authorise SPAV to be brought in by statute as well?

Finally, is there any appetite for adding something to El Lexh 2.3.2 which states that a party's internal processes for naming their candidates must allow and reflect the democratic input of members, and members have standing to sue in default of this?

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on June 03, 2026, 01:41:03 AMThis looks like good work. Only quibble here is:

Quote2. Each party shall receive a percentage of party seats as equal as possible to its percentage of the popular vote, but each party shall receive a whole number of seats, and in turn, the Secretary of State shall assign these seats to a numerically-ordered list of candidates nominated by that party. The Secretary of State shall assign seats by assigning a seat to the first person on a party's list. If the party won more than one seat, then the Secretary of State will assign a seat to the next person on their list, and so on until the end of the party's list. The Secretary of State will then return to the top of the list, and continue in the same manner until all of the party's seats have been assigned.

The party list being ranked is a pretty important detail. Consequent amendment to El Lexh 2.3 also:

Quote2.3 The ballot must also include, for each party contesting the election, a 50-word (or less) statement of the general aims and views of the party, and a list in numerical order of citizens to whom the party intends to award Cosa seats. If a party does not submit a candidate list to the Secretary of State before the election, the party leader is assigned all seats won, and seats which cannot be held by the Party Leader are forfeited.

Thank you!  It was a lot of work, since this change touches on a lot of things.

I have made the suggested changes, as well as adding the notations for any bit of statute being changed to make it easier to read.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on June 03, 2026, 01:41:03 AMFinally, is there any appetite for adding something to El Lexh 2.3.2 which states that a party's internal processes for naming their candidates must allow and reflect the democratic input of members, and members have standing to sue in default of this?

I think that makes sense, but I just haven't had a chance to even begin to think about that.  I think it might surprisingly be one of the trickier things to do.  It's probably going to need to be an Organic change, since if we give free leave for laws that govern how parties work, then we'll need it to not be subject to easy change (since that would effectively make it a lot easier for a majority party to mess with their competition).  Maybe a specific list of standards that are necessary in party processes?

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on June 03, 2026, 01:41:03 AMBut, @Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP (https://wittenberg.talossa.com/index.php?action=profile;u=19) , do you think this would authorise SPAV to be brought in by statute as well?

It would not. The phrasings used throughout make it clear that the system has to feature voting for and assigning seats to party lists in some capacity, which SPAV (as well as STV and other candidate-based systems) lacks. I'm generally pretty skeptical of enshrining the minutia of the voting system into the Organic Law directly, rather than deferring these details to statute.

I thought about leaving more of it to statute, but the problem with a difficult compromise bill like this one is that we're each going to have parts that aren't our ideal, and it's important to put them out of reach of statute for it to be credible.

We also do big bills like this very regularly -- the OrgLaw just isn't that hard to modify if there's a real consensus behind the change.

If you're worried about having the seat limit or whatever reverted immediately, don't be. I'm more so concerned that every small modification to the voting system itself would only take effect on the election after the next one, which would make "bug-fixing" it more problematic.

Speaking of bug fixes...!

It has come to my attention that the formula that I suggested for an increased seat limit was incorrect. To fully compensate the abolition of off-seat appointments, the increase has to be 50% instead of 33%, so the formula should be 30 * Cosă size / (2 * turnout), and I recommend that you change it in the draft amendment accordingly.

EDIT: This corrected formula works best with the 200-seat Cosă, but with a 20-seat Cosă, the previous uncorrected formula would be better because of some rounding shenanigans. Alternatively, we could change the way the seat limit is rounded from always rounding up to rounding normally with a lower bound.

...now, imagine if we had only found this mistake in a few months, then it would've taken us a whole Cosă term and referendum to correct this error simply because it was enshrined in the Organic Law. I really think it should be part of the statute instead.

It seems like this formula would just lead to a super-low cap?  3*20/2*100 is 3*20/200 is 60/200 is 0.3, right?  I feel like I must be missing something about the math here.

Right, I meant 30 * Cosă size / (2 * turnout). Basically, scaling up the current cap by 3/2 instead of 4/3 as previously proposed.

As mentioned before, scaling it by 3/2 is better for a 200-seat Cosă, while 4/3 is better for a 20-seat Cosă, all else being equal.

Okay, whew!  You're better at math than me, I think, so you made me really nervous there that I'd just forgotten my order of operations or something!

Okay, the change sounds good to me.  I'll make it: "3. No person shall hold more seats in the Cosă than thirty times the total number of seats in the Cosă divided by two times the number of ballots cast for the Cosa in the most recent General Election, rounded up to the next integer."

One note is that this sort of thing could be really pivotal in how the entire election or legislature works, which is why we don't want it in statute.  We don't want a simple majority to be able to alter the system in their favor in the future, especially since this is a compromise approach that's not anyone's ideal.  This isn't specific to anyone -- I don't think you or Miestra are engaged in nefarious plotting to double-cross a good-faith compromise, since neither of you are that kind of person -- but it's just a generally good principle of legislating.

Maybe there is more of this that could go in statute, though... is that generally something you'd prefer that I should try to figure out?

I would prefer that, yeah.

Also, if majorities needed to make changes are what's worrying you, maybe you could still defer it to statute with an added proviso for a higher bar for change or something, assuming that's allowed.

You can't really make a statutory provision that's especially difficult to change.  Any future Ziu will have equal power to this Ziu, and we can't "tie their hands."  I think the principle is called legislative sovereignty.

It occurred to me that we could make a provision of the OrgLaw saying "any change to statute that affects so-and-so must be agreed upon by a supermajority of the Cosa" or something like that.  But we've never done that before, and the immediate problem that presents is that it might make it really easy to impose new laws about that topic by just looping in something about that provision and then really hard to change them once they exist.  Plus it creates a new category of law, which makes me nervous after we spent so much trouble on going to a single legal code.

That said, I bet a lot of this can be put into statute or made so that statute can guide it or something.  I'll take a look.

The Organic Law already imposes a special condition on statutory changes to the Cosă size and that seems to work well enough (i.e., resizing the Cosă via statute takes at least a year, resizing the Cosă via amendment takes one term like normal). What I was suggesting wouldn't be too different from that in my opinion.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 04, 2026, 06:24:39 AMOkay, the change sounds good to me.  I'll make it: "3. No person shall hold more seats in the Cosă than thirty times the total number of seats in the Cosă divided by two times the number of ballots cast for the Cosa in the most recent General Election, rounded up to the next integer."

Under this formula, the seat limit in a 20-seat Cosă is 4 if turnout dips below 100, which as far as I could tell is the normal case. This has to do with how the limit strictly rounds up. Perhaps the following would future-proof things somewhat:

Quote"3. No person shall hold more seats in the Cosă than thirty times the total number of seats in the Cosă divided by two times the number of ballots cast for the Cosa in the most recent General Election, rounded up to the next non-zero integer."

There's a time limit before such changes come into effect, which is already significant and which I'm not 100% happy about.  We worked really hard to get dozens and dozens of laws assembled into one legal code, and it took months, and it turned our laws from something impenetrable that only a few people knew their way around into something that was actually useful to people.  And it's still legalese, but it's relatively simple.

If we start making special categories of provisions inside of it... well, I'm a little nervous about where that can lead.  Regular Talossans (sometimes MLLs, sometimes not) still sometimes say to me that they don't understand how to read our laws very well.  "Make the laws simpler" is an explicit goal for my party, and there's a bill we'll be putting on the Sixth Clark which has some wording changes for just that purpose.  I'm uncomfortable making them less simple at the same time.

We can do a lot with "as guided by statute" and putting what we can into statute, so let me take a crack at this.

Can I concentrate minds here. We are very close to being able to get something onto the Sixth Clark. We only seem to have a few, frankly mathematical, stumbling blocks to go, and I suggest we push through them. Let's give the CRL plenty of time to nitpick the final draft.

My stepmother's services are in a couple of days. Right now I'm helping my dad as much as I can. After that, on Thursday I'm headed home and I will take on the standards for political parties which is I think the last real stumbling block.