Wittenberg

Things that are already crimes under indigenous Talossan portions of El Lex A:

• "knowingly accept or hold citizenship in a blacklisted micronation" (A.9.3); "anyone holding an office mentioned in A.9.5. to provide false information about his/her micronational involvement." (A.9.7); "or the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of Interior to seek, accept, or hold citizenship in a micronation (A.9.8)
• "makes any fraudulent or dishonest claims or statements on his or her application for citizenship"; (A.16.1); "uses another person's identity or uses an identity that creates the impression of another person to post or convey messages via email or on any public forum in the Kingdom of Talossa." (A.16.2); "creates, for purposes of claiming citizenship or with the intent to deceive or mislead other Talossans, more than one identity for use in the Kingdom of Talossa, excepting name-changes that replace an earlier name previously held by the same person." (A.16.3)
• running a bogus "official Talossan" website, which is sedition or treason!!! (A.20)
• unauthorised use of "any official seal" (A.22)

In addition, certain things which are criminalised in Wisconsin are given increased penalties in Talossa, namely: "unlawful use of computerized communication systems"; "harassment"; "attempted computer crimes". But wow, that is a very small list.

What strikes me is that A.16,20,22 all seem to come under the headings of "perjury or counterfeiting", which are some of the things which I was assured we needed Wisconsin law to deal with. Harassment (at least the definition thereof) and bribery would of course need local definitions. A small list of additional offenses that need defining were suggested by a Talossan off-Witt:

Quote"treason, embezzlement, perverting the course of justice, identity theft, theft of property belonging to the state, computer hacking with intent"

To some degree these are covered above (ID theft and computer hacking), but that's somewhere to start. Perhaps in some places, if all these are in the Wisconsin code right now, we can "copy and paste" the definitions if they're simple enough.

Here are the current subject headings of Wisconsin law which are part of Talossan law. I will bold underline all those I think might possibly be not only relevant to Talossa, but possible to safely try in a Talossan court while preserving everyone's rights. Any disagreements? (I note that Wisconsin law does not seem to have a section on intellectual property - trademarks are under s. 132 of Wisconsin law, but there is nothing about copyright which I presume is a US federal matter. The point is that the Wisconsin portions of our law are currently mostly useless, or inappropriate.)

===
Fraudulent Conveyances
and Contracts.
240. Fraudulent conveyances and contracts relating to real estate.
241. Fraudulent contracts.
242. Uniform fraudulent transfer act.
243. General provisions relating to fraudulent conveyances and contracts.
244. Uniform power of attorney for finances and property.

Uniform Commercial Code.
401. Uniform commercial code — general provisions.
402. Uniform commercial code — sales.
403. Uniform commercial code — negotiable instruments.
404. Uniform commercial code — bank deposits and collections.
405. Uniform commercial code — letters of credit.
407. Uniform commercial code — documents of title.
408. Uniform commercial code — investment securities.
409. Uniform commercial code — secured transactions.
410. Uniform commercial code — funds transfers.
411. Uniform commercial code — leases.

Wisconsin Consumer Act.
421. Consumer transactions — general provisions and definitions.
422. Consumer credit transactions.
423. Consumer approval transactions and other consumer rights.
424. Consumer transactions — insurance. (PDF:
425. Consumer transactions — remedies and penalties.
426. Consumer transactions — administration.
427. Consumer transactions — debt collection.
428. First lien real estate and other mortgage loans.
429. Motor vehicle consumer leases.

Property.
700. Interests in property.
701. Trusts.
702. Powers of appointment.
703. Condominiums.
704. Landlord and tenant.
705. Multiple-party and agency accounts; nonprobate transfers at death; transfer on death security registration.
706. Conveyances of real property; recording; titles.
707. Time-share ownership.
708. Mortgages and land contracts.
709. Disclosures by owners of real estate.
710. Miscellaneous property provisions.
711. Digital property.

Criminal Code.
939. Crimes — general provisions.
940. Crimes against life and bodily security. (only a subsection of these: eg. stalking or witness intimidation)
941. Crimes against public health and safety.
942. Crimes against reputation, privacy and civil liberties.
943. Crimes against property.
944. Crimes against sexual morality.
945. Gambling.
946. Crimes against government and its administration.
947. Crimes against public peace, order and other interests.
948. Crimes against children. (I have absolutely no faith that Talossan law could deal with crimes against Dandelions safely.)
949. Awards for the victims of crimes.
950. Rights of victims and witnesses of crime.
951. Crimes against animals.

Controlled Substances.
961. Uniform controlled substances act.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 07, 2021, 06:37:17 PM
we've prosecuted and/or convicted people of violating laws such as §947.0125, §939.10, §939.30, §939.31, §946.10, §946.61, and §943.70.

Let's just look those up.

§947.0125: "Unlawful use of computerized communication systems."

§939.10: "Common law crimes abolished; common law rules preserved. " ????

§939.30 "Solicitation." (to commit a crime).

§939.31 "Conspiracy"

§946.10 "Bribery of public officers and employees."

§946.61 "Bribery of witnesses"

§943.70 "Computer crimes."

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 07, 2021, 10:18:08 PM
Here are the current subject headings of Wisconsin law which are part of Talossan law.

In addition to those, we could put crimes that we find repugnant to Talossanity but cannot try outselves (possibly still mostly using the Wisconsin definitions, like murder, manslaughter, sexual assault etc) into a separate category, and then add a proviso that Talossans who are credibly convicted of such a crime abroad are to be considered guilty of it in Talossa as well. This would get rid of mystery crimes and also allow us to react where appropriate.

I think it's important that technically it wouldn't be right to try someone again in Talossa for a crime they'd already been convicted of in another jurisdiction. The crime would still be something like "bringing Talossa into disrepute by involvement in an infamous crime", only you'd want a prescriptive list of infamous crimes.

But yeah, the distinction would have to be clear between:
1. crimes which the Talossan justice system can deal with.
2. infamous crimes which only a macro-justice system can deal with, but a credible conviction for which will incur the subordinate crime of "bringing Talossa into disrepute"

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 07, 2021, 11:09:03 PM

§939.30 "Solicitation." (to commit a crime).

§939.31 "Conspiracy"

§946.10 "Bribery of public officers and employees."

§946.61 "Bribery of witnesses"

Ha ha ha ha, I just realised all these were in People v. La Mhà, a case which a certain now-Baron considered an outrage against justice at the time :D

Anyway, the more I think about it, the more I think we can boil it down into:

1. Crimes against the Kingdom of Talossa:

- knowingly endanger the existence of the Kingdom of Talossa with the aid of non-Talossans ("treason");
- using fraud, harassment, bribery, physical or sexual violence or threats thereof to attempt to influence any election or any decision under the Organic Law of Talossa, or to remove or replace officials duly empowered by that Organic Law (inc. "sedition" and "perverting the course of justice");
- accepting anything of value (a "bribe") to do the above;
- perjury (the Wisconsin def seems to work fine);
- theft or conversion of State property, including intellectual property ("embezzlement"), including using a counterfeit of any official document to gain something of value;
- bringing Talossa into disrepute by being convicted by a credible foreign jurisdiction of a crime established at trial to have involved fraud, harassment, bribery, physical or sexual violence or threats thereof (a felony if sentenced more than 1 year in jail); *** we can take this out and debate it as a separate bill if it's still a problem
- inducing or attempting to induce any other Talossan to break the Law of Talossa (solicitation/conspiracy).

2. Crimes against other Talossans:

- fraud, harassment, physical or sexual violence or threats thereof against any citizen or "judicial person" under Talossan law;
- theft or conversion of individual property including intellectual property, private information and reputation (i.e. defamation);
- otherwise depriving an individual of the free exercise of their rights under the Organic Law

I honestly don't think we need any special laws about using computers to do any of the above. However, we might need to more precisely define the terms above, especially "harassment" and "violence".

As to existing crimes, El Lex A.16 would come under "fraud ... to influence an (immigration) decision"; A.20 and A.22 would be theft/conversion of State property. Personally I would prefer to delete A.9 altogether as a remnant of KR1's xenophobia, but that might come under "fraud" as well.

What do others think?

My solution to "felony/misdemeanour" would be to take the existing definitions of A.5 and say: "a felony is punishable by anything on this list. A serious misdemeanour is punishable by civil disability on down. A regular misdemeanour is punishable by fines on down." And delete the bit about imprisonment.

Elsewhere in El Lexh (excluding the bits that are meant to be replaced by above), we would change "class A" to "serious" and "class C" to "regular" (edited), and just delete "class I". Or we could roll the two categories of misdemeanour into each other, I don't mind.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 09, 2021, 06:42:38 PM
My solution to "felony/misdemeanour" would be to take the existing definitions of A.5 and say: "a felony is punishable by anything on this list. A serious misdemeanour is punishable by civil disability on down. A regular misdemeanour is punishable by fines on down." And delete the bit about imprisonment.

Elsewhere in El Lexh (excluding the bits that are meant to be replaced by above), we would change "class A" to "regular" and "class C" to serious, and just delete "class I". Or we could roll the two categories of misdemeanour into each other, I don't mind.

I believe in the Wisconsin code class A is the most severe class, class C is the lowest class for misdemeanours and class I is the lowest one for felonies. The point of these classes is to determine the maximum allowed punishment for a given crime, which is relevant for fines or civil disability, since that is limited to three times the maximum allowed prison sentence of a class. So if we want to replace the class system we would have to either come up with class-like maximum punishments for each new category or add maximum allowed punishments to every crime.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial on June 09, 2021, 07:25:14 PM
I believe in the Wisconsin code class A is the most severe class, class C is the lowest class for misdemeanours

Okay, that seems to be correct, I was misreading El Lexh. My point stands with the categories flipped. In my proposal, the maximum punishment for "serious" is civil disability, and the maximum for "regular" is a fine. I prefer having as few classes as possible, in fact only "felony" and "misdemeanour" if we could.

So, ummm... I wrote a thing. I would happily replace 55RZ24 with the below replacement for Sections A.1-8 of El Lexh:

Quote1.      General provisions of Talossan jurisprudence:
1.1.   Talossan courts shall interpret Organic and Statute Law through the lens of the Covenants of Rights and Freedoms, and otherwise in accordance with Talossan juridical precedent. Judges may also use precedent from other legal systems with which they are familiar to guide their decisions, though such precedent shall not be binding.
1.2.   Only crimes described in Talossan Organic and Statute Law may be prosecuted in Talossan courts.
2.      Felonies and misdemeanours. All crimes against Talossan law shall be classed as misdemeanours unless stated otherwise.
3.      Authorized punishments for all crimes classed as felonies shall be as follows:
3.1.    Banishment. Banishment may be ordered in conjunction with revocation of citizenship in any felony case. Banishment prohibits the former citizen from entering the territory of the Kingdom of Talossa. A former Talossan who has been banished may not be reinstated as a citizen.
3.2.    Revocation of citizenship. A sentence of revocation of citizenship directs the Chancery to remove the offender from the list of Talossan citizens. Simple revocation is without prejudice to a future reapplication for citizenship.
4.      Authorized punishments for all crimes classed as either felonies or serious misdemeanours shall be as follows:
4.1.   Civil disability. Civil disabilities may include any or all of the following:
4.1.1.      Bar from holding national executive office
4.1.2.      Bar from holding national judicial office
4.1.3.      Bar from holding national legislative office
4.1.4.      Bar from holding provincial office
4.1.5.      Bar from performing military service
4.1.6.      Bar from service in the Royal Civil Service
4.1.7.      Bar from posting on Wittenberg
5.      Authorized punishments for all crimes shall be as follows:
5.1.   Fines. When a fine is imposed as a component of any sentence, the court shall specify the period within which the sum must be paid, which period shall not be less than thirty days. The court may, in the interests of justice, allow the offender to pay the sum in more than one installment, according to a schedule prescribed by the court. Willful failure to pay a fine within the time provided is punishable as criminal contempt of court.
5.2.   Restitution. When imposing sentence for any crime, a court, in addition to any other penalty authorized by law, shall order the offender to make full or partial restitution to any victim of a crime considered at sentencing or, if the victim is deceased, to his or her estate, unless the court finds substantial reason not to do so and states the reason on the record. The court must specify a reasonable period of time, not less than thirty days, within which the offender must make restitution. Willful failure to make restitution within the time provided is punishable as criminal contempt of court. Court-ordered restitution shall not bar any victim from pursuing any civil remedies available at law to recover any amount or type of damages not covered by the order of restitution.
5.3.   Reprimand. In all criminal cases, a court may reprimand the offender in addition to (or in lieu of, where no minimum punishment applies) any other authorized punishment.
5.4.   In addition to any other punishment authorized by law, a court may order revocation of citizenship (as described elsewhere in this Lexhatx) upon conviction for a misdemeanour, only if the court determines, based on the offender's potential for rehabilitation and any aggravating circumstances of the offense(s), that any lesser punishment is unlikely to deter the offender from repeating his or her criminal behavior.
6.      Suspended sentences:
6.1.   A court may order the suspension of all or part of any sentence, for a period of time not to exceed two calendar years. At the end of the period of suspension ordered by the court, the suspended punishment is rescinded if the offender has not violated any condition of the suspension.
6.2.    If a court determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the offender violated any condition of his suspension during the period of the suspension, the suspension shall be revoked and the original punishment imposed. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit prosecuting an act violating a condition of suspension as a criminal offense in its own right, either in the same or a separate action as the revocation of suspension.
6.3.    Refraining from committing any further crimes is an implicit condition of every suspended sentence. Other conditions which may be imposed by the court include, but are not limited to:
6.3.1.      Injunction from requesting or accepting royal honours
6.3.2.      Injunction from violating Wittiquette
6.3.3.      The performance of a fixed amount of community service under the supervision of a public body or not-for-profit organization, as directed or approved by the court.
6.4.   Civil disabilities may be imposed in conjunction with a suspended sentence upon conviction of a felony, but where a sentence of revocation of citizenship has been suspended.
7.      Talossan Criminal Code
7.1.   Definitions.
7.1.1.      "Fraud" shall mean any act of deception carried out for the purpose of unfair, undeserved and/or unlawful gain, or the assumption of a false identity to such deceptive end.
7.1.2.      "Harassment" shall mean engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts which harass, intimidate or distress a person and which serve no legitimate purpose.
7.2.   Crimes against the Kingdom.
7.2.1.      Treason. Whoever knowingly endangers the existence of the Kingdom of Talossa, its laws, institutions and state property, by enlisting or attempting to enlist the aid of non-Talossans, commits the felony of treason.
7.2.2.      Perverting the course of justice. Whoever uses fraud, harassment, physical or sexual violence or
threats thereof to attempt to influence an active case in any Cort under the
Organic Law is guilty of the felony of perverting the course of justice.
7.2.2.1.            Perverting the course of justice shall also include fabricating or disposing of evidence, as well as suborning perjury.
7.2.3.      Sedition. Whoever uses fraud, harassment, physical or sexual violence or threats thereof to attempt to influence any election or any other decision made under the Organic Law of Talossa (outside of an active case in any Cort), or to remove or replace officials duly empowered by that Organic Law, is guilty of the felony of sedition.
7.2.4.      Contempt of court. Contempt of court is a serious misdemeanour consisting of intentional:
7.2.4.1.            Misconduct in the presence of the court which interferes with a court proceeding or with the administration of justice, or which impairs the respect due the court;
7.2.4.2.            Disobedience, resistance or obstruction of the authority, process or order of a court;
7.2.4.3.            Refusal as a witness to appear, be sworn or answer a question; or
7.2.4.4.            Refusal to produce a record, document or other object.
7.2.5.      Perjury. Whoever under oath or affirmation orally makes a false material statement which the person does not believe to be true, in any matter, cause, action or proceeding, before the Ziu, any committee of the Ziu, or court of law, is guilty of the serious misdemeanour of perjury.
7.2.6.      Crimes against state property.
7.2.6.1.             Whoever steals or diverts to their own use without authorization the monetary or physical property of the Kingdom of Talossa is guilty of a felony if the monetary value of such theft is 100 louis or above, and a serious misdemeanour otherwise.
7.2.6.2.            Whoever improperly uses the intellectual property of the Kingdom of Talossa is guilty of a serious misdemeanour if with the intention of misrepresenting the Kingdom or improperly claiming the authority of the Kingdom, and a misdemeanour otherwise.
7.2.6.3.            Whoever improperly accesses any computer or information system belonging to the Kingdom of Talossa is guilty of a serious misdemeanour if with the intention of committing any other crime, and of a misdemeanour otherwise.
7.2.6.4.            Whoever makes a counterfeit of any official document or item pertaining to the Kingdom of Talossa and uses it to gain a benefit to which they were not otherwise entitled is guilty of a serious misdemeanour.
7.2.7.      Solicitation. Whoever induces or attempts to induce any other Talossan to break the Law of Talossa is guilty of the same class of offence as that which they sought to induce.
7.2.8.      Conspiracy. Whoever agrees with any other Talossan to break the Law of Talossa is guilty of the same class of offence as that which they agreed to commit.
7.2.9.      Bribery. The felony of bribery is committed by:
7.2.9.1.            Anyone who offers any officer of the Kingdom or witness in a Court case anything of value in return for the performance of their official duties or to influence their testimony.
7.2.9.2.            Any officer of the Kingdom or witness in a Court case who accepts a bribe (as above) without revealing it as soon as may be practical to the proper authorities.
7.2.10.  Bringing Talossa into disrepute. Any Talossan citizen who has brought Talossa into disrepute, through being convicted by a credible foreign court which is deemed to abide by Talossan values, of a crime established at trial to have involved fraud, harassment, bribery, physical or sexual violence or threats thereof, commits:
7.2.10.1.        A felony if sentenced to penal servitude of more than 2 years.
7.2.10.2.        A serious misdemeanour otherwise.
7.3.   Crimes against the person
7.3.1.      Whoever commits physical or sexual violence or threats thereof against any citizen or "judicial person" under Talossan law is guilty of a felony.
7.3.2.      Whoever commits fraud or harassment against any citizen or "judicial person" under Talossan law is guilty of a serious misdemeanour. Whoever commits threats of the above is guilty of a misdemeanour.
7.3.3.      Theft and invasion of privacy.
7.3.3.1.            Whoever commits theft or misappropriation of physical or monetary property valued at 100 louis or more, or improperly publishes a Talossan citizen's private information, is guilty of a felony.
7.3.3.2.            Whoever commits theft or misappropriation of physical or monetary property valued at less than 100 louis, or of any intellectual property, or improperly accesses a Talossan citizen's private information without publication, is guilty of a serious misdemeanour.
7.3.4.      Defamation. Whoever publicly defames the reputation of a Talossan individual in such a way as to bring them into hatred, ridicule and contempt is guilty of a serious misdemeanour.
7.3.4.1.            No statement shall be considered to be defamation if it is justified by being true, or by being fair comment in the absence of malicious intent.
7.3.5.      Whoever deprives an individual of the free exercise of their rights under the Organic Law in a way not otherwise mentioned in law commits a serious misdemeanour.
8.      Public Defender: No Talossan shall be convicted of any crime under this Lexhatx unless they have had the opportunity of defending themselves in Court. The Ministry of Justice shall appoint a Public Defender who is a member of the Talossan Bar at the request of any defendant, or if the defendant is for any other reason unable to defend themselves in Court.

You would have to also replace throughout the rest of El Lexh: "Class A misdemeanour" -> "serious misdemeanour"; "Class C misdemeanour" -> regular misdemeanour; "Class I felony" -> felony.

Looks good on a first glance.

One thing that irks me is that, without the class system, there are no maximum lengths for civil disability or maximum amounts for fines now. Depending on whether we can believe Talossan judges to always be reasonable with these things, this may or may not be something that we'd need to fix.

Something else I've noticed is that the definition of perjury says "before any of the following", but then fails to specify. The full section on perjury in Wisconsin law is this: https://casetext.com/statute/wisconsin-statutes/criminal-code/chapter-946-crimes-against-government-and-its-administration/subchapter-iii-perjury-and-false-swearing/section-94631-perjury (https://casetext.com/statute/wisconsin-statutes/criminal-code/chapter-946-crimes-against-government-and-its-administration/subchapter-iii-perjury-and-false-swearing/section-94631-perjury)

Quote(1) Whoever under oath or affirmation orally makes a false material statement which the person does not believe to be true, in any matter, cause, action or proceeding, before any of the following, whether legally constituted or exercising powers as if legally constituted, is guilty of a Class H felony:
     (a) A court;
     (b) A magistrate;
     (c) A judge, referee or court commissioner;
     (d) An administrative agency or arbitrator authorized by statute to determine issues of fact;
     (e) A notary public while taking testimony for use in an action or proceeding pending in court;
     (f) An officer authorized to conduct inquests of the dead;
     (g) A grand jury;
     (h) A legislative body or committee.
(2) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that the perjured testimony was corrected or retracted.

I believe points (a) to (h) could just be added to the sentence replacing the "any of the following" part without any issues, and I don't think point (2) needs to be its own point either, but who knows.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial on June 09, 2021, 10:03:27 PM
without the class system, there are no maximum lengths for civil disability or maximum amounts for fines now.

ESB got 18 years civil disability, which was later overturned, which IMHO was ridiculous. 5 years maximum civil disability? 500 louis maximum fine (which would be half our total treasury)?

Perjury definition corrected.

Here's an easier to read formatted version: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1OfQlUZrowS4frssyea6-SLxz8Pcss5WNNxyKud82lQw/edit?usp=sharing, I'll make any further modifications to this version

I requested access to assist, if you'd like some help.

Best to contribute any suggestions for amendments in this thread, for transparency's sake.

Okay.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 09, 2021, 10:05:27 PM
5 years maximum civil disability? 500 louis maximum fine (which would be half our total treasury)?

BUMP. Any other suggestions on maximum civil disabilities and fines?

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 13, 2021, 12:50:44 AM

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 09, 2021, 10:05:27 PM
5 years maximum civil disability? 500 louis maximum fine (which would be half our total treasury)?

BUMP. Any other suggestions on maximum civil disabilities and fines?

I checked the case again, and ESB got 8 months for each count of violating the Anti-Impostor and Liar Act, and an additional 3 months for each count of violating Wis. Stat. § 947.0125. The way I understand it, a flat maximum of 5 years civil disability wouldnt have affected the sentencing since each individual punishment is well below it, and to be honest I think People v. ESB was somewhat of a special case.

EDIT:
My idea for maximum punishments would be something like this:
Felony -- 5 years of civil disability and/or ℓ500 ($750)
Severe misdemeanour -- 1 year of civil disability and/or ℓ100 ($150)
Misdemeanour -- 6 months of civil disability and/or ℓ50 ($75)

More context:

The sentencing in question, from Txec as judge after ESB pled guilty to all charges:

QuoteFor each of the 17 counts of violating 36RZ10, S:reu Kildow is sentenced to 8 months of civic disability per conviction to run consecutively beginning from today, August 11, 2014 thereby totaling 136 months wherein the defendant shall not hold any national office including Member of the Cosa, Senator, Member of the Cabinet, Seneschal or any office of the Royal Household, including subsidiary positions or any created national office for the duration of the sentence (any questions about whether an office falls under these guidelines may be revisited at the request of any party to this action.)

For each of the 15 counts of violating Wisconsin Code 947.0125, S:reu Kildow is sentenced to 90 days per conviction of civic disability, to run consecutively following the previous sentence totaling 45 months wherein the defendant shall not hold any national office including Member of the Cosa, Senator, Member of the Cabinet, Seneschal, or any office of the Royal Household, including subsidiary positions or any created national office for the duration of the sentence (any questions about whether an office falls under these guidelines may be revisited at the request of any party to this action.)

Additionally, the Court imposes of fine of $100 to be paid by the end of the calendar year 2014 to the Burgermeister of Inland Revenue. The convicted may work out whatever arrangement is necessary with the Court and the Burgermeister.

Additionally, the Court sentences S:reu Kildow to complete 500 hours of community service within five years to be supervised by the Court or its appointed agent. Arrangements for and acceptable forms of the community service shall be completed between the Court and the defendant upon conclusion of this trial.

Finally, the Court hereby revokes the citizenship of S:reu Kildow. The order of revocation is suspended under the following conditions: that S:reu Kildow fully pays his fine by 12/31/2014, that S:reu Kildow makes no attempt at creating another account for any reason, that S:reu Kildow fulfills the terms of his sentence in whole and also that no other criminal convictions occur in any Court of Talossa against S:reu Kildow. At the conclusion of his civic disability, the Court orders the revocation of citizenship to be dismissed.

Total civic disability and length of suspended sentence to equal 181 months. Once the matter of the injunction is resolved, the defendant will be released on his own recognizance.

The decision of Ian T. on appeal was very long, so I can't quote it here, and stands as precedent for Talossa since there could be no appeal.  It's a little hard to read, to be honest, and covered an enormous amount of ground (including a surprising amount of shade cast on Txec as the trial judge, suggesting that the passion of the time had made it impossible to view things coolly and that he was rude to people in his cort).  I have a lot of criticism of it which is immaterial here, but to sum up the result: all the convictions were vacated, and the Cort arrived at a weird middling decision where the time served was both sufficient to cover any possible outcome of a retrial (so therefore there should be no retrial) and also that probably the sentence should have been close to zero, since only one conviction was even conceivably with merit.  The most relevant part here is probably that the Cort decided that no one could be charged with multiple crimes based on one action, since that would require "dual sovereignty."  This might be because the origin of some of the charges were the Wisconsin laws incorporated into our own, although it's really hard to understand the reasoning.  Either way, if we're working on this stuff, adding in some basic provisions about this would probably be a good idea, ie: "A single action of a defendant may be considered to break more than one law and may be charged accordingly."  This is especially because it seems like otherwise no one could ever be punished for being convicted of a crime in another cort, which is one of the express purposes of this bill.

Quote5.4.   In addition to any other punishment authorized by law, a court may order revocation of citizenship (as described elsewhere in this Lexhatx) upon conviction for a misdemeanour, only if the court determines, based on the offender's potential for rehabilitation and any aggravating circumstances of the offense(s), that any lesser punishment is unlikely to deter the offender from repeating his or her criminal behavior.

This should be deleted, or we should be honest and just state that revocation is a possible punishment for all crimes.  Putting it this way is just misleading, I think, since it basically says, "Only serious and terrible crimes that we call felonies may lead to losing your citizenship but not really, actually anything can."

QuoteA court may order the suspension of all or part of any sentence, for a period of time not to exceed two calendar years. At the end of the period of suspension ordered by the court, the suspended punishment is rescinded if the offender has not violated any condition of the suspension.

This seems weird.   Two years is not a long time for probation, especially for serious crimes.  I'd suggest five years.

Are you open to some more work on the crimes definitions?  Since the goal is to throw out all precedent except for Talossan precedent (not a goal I agree with, but c'est la vie), then a few of these definitions become way too broad.  Some are great, but I'm looking in particular at things like fraud and harassment.

Quote7.2.10.  Bringing Talossa into disrepute. Any Talossan citizen who has brought Talossa into disrepute, through being convicted by a credible foreign court which is deemed to abide by Talossan values, of a crime established at trial to have involved fraud, harassment, bribery, physical or sexual violence or threats thereof, commits:
7.2.10.1.        A felony if sentenced to penal servitude of more than 2 years.
7.2.10.2.        A serious misdemeanour otherwise.

Quick rewrite for readability:

Quote7.2.10.  Bringing Talossa into disrepute. Any Talossan citizen who has been convicted by a credible foreign court, which has been deemed to abide by Talossan values, of a crime established at trial to have involved fraud, harassment, bribery, physical or sexual violence or threats thereof, has committed the crime of bringing Talossa into disrepute to the following degrees:
7.2.10.1.        A felony if sentenced to penal servitude of more than 2 years.
7.2.10.2.        A serious misdemeanour otherwise.

First quick read suggests the following problem: we are asking that part of the trial judgment include judging whether or not a foreign court is both credible and abides by Talossan values, but we're not defining either of those very squidgy ideas.  Definitions of these terms should be added to the definitions section.

I've noted all the above and will hopefully reply when other events are less pressing. In the meantime it would be good to hear other voices.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 13, 2021, 12:27:25 PM
adding in some basic provisions about this would probably be a good idea, ie: "A single action of a defendant may be considered to break more than one law and may be charged accordingly."

Sure, why not. (now section 1.3)

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 13, 2021, 12:35:00 PM

Quote5.4.

This should be deleted, or we should be honest and just state that revocation is a possible punishment for all crimes.  Putting it this way is just misleading, I think, since it basically says, "Only serious and terrible crimes that we call felonies may lead to losing your citizenship but not really, actually anything can."

Sure, why not - it was only there because it's in the existing law (as A.5.2.2). Should we think about something else to deal with the "habitual criminal", though?

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 13, 2021, 12:37:06 PM
Two years is not a long time for probation, especially for serious crimes.  I'd suggest five years.

Sure, why not.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 13, 2021, 12:40:18 PM
Are you open to some more work on the crimes definitions? ... Some are great, but I'm looking in particular at things like fraud and harassment.

Sure, why not; but I don't want them to become too complicated. The definition of harassment comes from Wisconsin law, whereas the definition of fraud comes from the dictionary.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 13, 2021, 12:45:05 PM

Quick rewrite {of 7.2.10} for readability:

Thanks!

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 13, 2021, 12:45:05 PM
we are asking that part of the trial judgment include judging whether or not a foreign court is both credible and abides by Talossan values, but we're not defining either of those very squidgy ideas.  Definitions of these terms should be added to the definitions section.

Hmmm. You know, I forgot that I put the term "Talossan values" in there, and I'm not sure I still like it, so happy to hear alternatives. I think honestly we have to go at this through a negative definition - i.e. it's far easier to declare that a Court is not "credible" or doesn't abide by our values than the other way around (i.e. it doesn't provide a fair trial in the way we would recognize it in Talossa, because of lack of judicial independence or serious bias against certain kinds of people.)

But honestly, very glad to hear you seem to like the direction I've gone in with this. Thanks again to Marcel for the idea. Speaking of which...

QuoteMy idea for maximum punishments would be something like this:
Felony -- 5 years of civil disability and/or ℓ500 ($750)
Severe misdemeanour -- 1 year of civil disability and/or ℓ100 ($150)
Misdemeanour -- 6 months of civil disability and/or ℓ50 ($75)

An ordinary misdemeanour doesn't carry civil disability, by definition - but apart from that, sure, why not.

Check out the updated version: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1OfQlUZrowS4frssyea6-SLxz8Pcss5WNNxyKud82lQw/edit?usp=sharing

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 14, 2021, 09:05:29 PM
Sure, why not - it was only there because it's in the existing law (as A.5.2.2). Should we think about something else to deal with the "habitual criminal", though?

I would be inclined to simply leave that up to the discretion of the sentencing judge, myself, but I don't feel strongly either way.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 14, 2021, 09:05:29 PM
Hmmm. You know, I forgot that I put the term "Talossan values" in there, and I'm not sure I still like it, so happy to hear alternatives. I think honestly we have to go at this through a negative definition - i.e. it's far easier to declare that a Court is not "credible" or doesn't abide by our values than the other way around (i.e. it doesn't provide a fair trial in the way we would recognize it in Talossa, because of lack of judicial independence or serious bias against certain kinds of people.)

Looking at the text again, I think we're going to need to put in an actual process for the "established at trial" bit, since it's very ambiguous about what that would mean.  I would suggest that the best way to accomplish this would be to create a special kind of judicial hearing.  This is something that happens in all sorts of ways in different courtrooms.  For example, many American courts that have abolished cash bail will decide whether or not to keep someone in custody based on a special "dangerousness hearing."  This would just put in place a process to resolve the standard you're setting into law.

As I see it, you're suggesting two things need to be resolved to meet this standard:

1. Was someone convicted of a crime that matches the definition of stuff we really don't like?
2. Was this conviction fair (ie, was it in a place like Auckland or a place more like Tehran)?

I think that in the vast majority of cases, the second question will be one of just checking the box.  It's not often going to be in dispute about whether or not a conviction was actually fair, especially if we are clear that the specifics of the trial really aren't the question.  We don't want people trying to argue that they had ineffective counsel, for example.  So we can probably handle these questions in that order, and the central part of the process will just be the very simple question of whether a conviction qualifies as "bribery" or whatnot.  I don't really worry about anyone getting persecuted or railroaded with such a process.

Before continuing, does all of that seem correct to you?

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 13, 2021, 12:37:06 PM

QuoteA court may order the suspension of all or part of any sentence, for a period of time not to exceed two calendar years. At the end of the period of suspension ordered by the court, the suspended punishment is rescinded if the offender has not violated any condition of the suspension.

This seems weird.   Two years is not a long time for probation, especially for serious crimes.  I'd suggest five years.

Be careful to define, within Talossan Law, the meaning of the word "probation"... I believe its meaning differs on the two sides of the Atlantic.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 14, 2021, 09:05:29 PM
....
Hmmm. You know, I forgot that I put the term "Talossan values" in there, and I'm not sure I still like it, so happy to hear alternatives. I think honestly we have to go at this through a negative definition - i.e. it's far easier to declare that a Court is not "credible" or doesn't abide by our values than the other way around (i.e. it doesn't provide a fair trial in the way we would recognize it in Talossa, because of lack of judicial independence or serious bias against certain kinds of people.)
....

My personal opinion is that Talossa should accept NO other court as binding over Talossa. That is, if a citizen is convicted in some foreign court of some offence, then it is up to a Talossan Cort in the first instance to accept or ignore that foreign ruling. "Does the alleged offence contravene Talossan Law?" is the first question, and "Has the foreign court reached its opinion in a manner that seems, to Talossa, to be just?".  Thus we, in Talossa, should decide, case by case, whether to proceed under Talossan Law and jurisdiction, and are not inevitably bound by any external judgement (except, as I try always to remind us, for offences against human rights as internationally recognised).
In most cases this will be an easy decision - for example, an offence committed in and tried in California is very likely to be accepted within Talossa with no further real questioning; but an offence allegedly committed in Iran, and tried there, requires careful - very careful - inspection by us before we proceed. I have Iranian friends whose tales should not be listened to if you are at all queasy; some of my friends are refugees here in the UK on the basis of their having spoken publicly about police brutality.

Thus, I suggest, Talossa should accept the rulings of NO foreign courts, except those upholding internationally recognised human rights.  This would mean that we have no obligation to define within our Laws the meaning of "just" and "unjust" in foreign courts, but only in our own.

Quote from: Ián Tamorán S.H. on June 15, 2021, 08:52:20 AM

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 13, 2021, 12:37:06 PM

QuoteA court may order the suspension of all or part of any sentence, for a period of time not to exceed two calendar years. At the end of the period of suspension ordered by the court, the suspended punishment is rescinded if the offender has not violated any condition of the suspension.

This seems weird.   Two years is not a long time for probation, especially for serious crimes.  I'd suggest five years.

Be careful to define, within Talossan Law, the meaning of the word "probation"... I believe its meaning differs on the two sides of the Atlantic.

The probation process is already included in the bill as devised by the Seneschal.  But I do agree, Senator Tamoran: sometimes people can come to startling conclusions about the meaning of words, and we should sharply scrutinize anything that might be ambiguous.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 15, 2021, 07:26:43 AM
As I see it, you're suggesting two things need to be resolved to meet this standard:

1. Was someone convicted of a crime that matches the definition of stuff we really don't like?
2. Was this conviction fair (ie, was it in a place like Auckland or a place more like Tehran)?

I think that in the vast majority of cases, the second question will be one of just checking the box.  It's not often going to be in dispute about whether or not a conviction was actually fair, especially if we are clear that the specifics of the trial really aren't the question.  We don't want people trying to argue that they had ineffective counsel, for example.  So we can probably handle these questions in that order, and the central part of the process will just be the very simple question of whether a conviction qualifies as "bribery" or whatnot.  I don't really worry about anyone getting persecuted or railroaded with such a process.

Before continuing, does all of that seem correct to you?

I believe that all this is correct, but I also like Ián T.'s approach. I think we have to keep in mind that we don't want a process which is so strict or so complicated that it just won't be used.

We should keep in mind the only precedent for this situation - the I. Canún situation - and whatever standard we raise, we should think: how would the I. Canún case have played out under this standard? I mean, I would like to believe that whether a foreign court ruling is credible would be a box-ticking exercise: but unless I'm very mistaken, at the time of the Canún case, certain prominent Talossans were saying that the US court ruling was not credible, based on their conservative political beliefs about how it's "too easy" to be convicted of  sexual violence these days.

I wouldn't be averse to excising 7.2.10 and debating it separately, if the rest of the bill is uncontroversial and won't attract a Royal veto.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 15, 2021, 05:09:07 PM
I believe that all this is correct, but I also like Ián T.'s approach. I think we have to keep in mind that we don't want a process which is so strict or so complicated that it just won't be used.

I have to admit that I don't really understand any differences with Ian's approach.  It seems like he's just agreeing with the current proposal in kind of an elliptical way.  Isn't the whole point of what we're doing that it's an effort to separate out credible convictions from the unjust garbage, rather than to accept them uncritically?

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 15, 2021, 05:09:07 PMWe should keep in mind the only precedent for this situation - the I. Canún situation - and whatever standard we raise, we should think: how would the I. Canún case have played out under this standard? I mean, I would like to believe that whether a foreign court ruling is credible would be a box-ticking exercise: but unless I'm very mistaken, at the time of the Canún case, certain prominent Talossans were saying that the US court ruling was not credible, based on their conservative political beliefs about how it's "too easy" to be convicted of  sexual violence these days.

I know that some people were initially hesitant to just assume that Iusti did something really wrong when they just first heard that he'd been convicted of something, but I don't think anyone opposed action after the facts became known.  I certainly think it would be really hard for anyone to try to argue that American courts weren't largely credible (despite my own liberal grumblings on the topic).

I agree, anyway, that we should be thinking of that case.  But we should also be thinking about other possible cases: the deeply unpopular jerk (or political dissident) who gets convicted of something relatively harmless.  We need to assume that someone will try to abuse the power we're giving to the people in charge, and build in reasonable safeguards.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 15, 2021, 05:09:07 PM
I wouldn't be averse to excising 7.2.10 and debating it separately, if the rest of the bill is uncontroversial and won't attract a Royal veto.

I don't know of any reason why any of this would draw a veto, since as far as I can see, none of His Majesty's objections would remain if the process and rule-of-law issues were fixed.  Obviously I can't speak for His Majesty, but everything seems on the up-and-up (even though we might want to bug Sir Cresti to take a look once we're farther along).

1. Was someone convicted of a crime that matches the definition of stuff we really don't like?
2. Was this conviction fair (ie, was it in a place like Auckland or a place more like Tehran)?

So then, the process of deciding if we should give any credibility to the court.  I don't know what we'd call it.  Maybe a crieisteac'ht - a credit-hearing?  I'm fond of a good portmanteau neologism, but not married to it.

The person in question is going to be unlikely to defend themselves, so they need state representation -- does the public defender proposal already here cover them enough?

The thing to probably do, if we think about how it will play out, is that a prosecutor would just need to bring charges that pass a hearing with a judge, who would need to decide based on a set of standards we set.

Maybe something like this:

A charge of bringing Talossa into ill-repute may only proceed to prosecution if a judge, after a full and fair hearing conducted in the presence of counsel for the accused, determines that the foreign conviction meets the following criteria:
1. The conviction is likely to qualify as the crime of bringing Talossa into ill-repute under the terms of 7.10.1,
2. The conviction took place after a full and fair hearing in a competent court of law.

Still thinking about this. Feel free to talk amongst yourselves.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 09, 2021, 10:05:27 PM

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial on June 09, 2021, 10:03:27 PM
without the class system, there are no maximum lengths for civil disability or maximum amounts for fines now.

ESB got 18 years civil disability, which was later overturned, which IMHO was ridiculous. 5 years maximum civil disability? 500 louis maximum fine (which would be half our total treasury)?

Perjury definition corrected.

Such a fine could be 'paid' by way of a contribution to any non-religious charitable organization with proof of contribution being sufficient as the 'fine' having been 'paid'. 

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 17, 2021, 08:30:03 PM
Still thinking about this. Feel free to talk amongst yourselves.

We need a durable and specific definition of 'treason'.

Quote from: GV on June 17, 2021, 11:45:21 PM

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 17, 2021, 08:30:03 PM
Still thinking about this. Feel free to talk amongst yourselves.

We need a durable and specific definition of 'treason'.

7.2.1 Whoever knowingly endangers the existence of the Kingdom of Talossa, its laws, institutions and state property, by enlisting or attempting to enlist the aid of non-Talossans, commits the felony of treason.

Quote from: GV on June 17, 2021, 11:44:49 PM

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 09, 2021, 10:05:27 PM

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial on June 09, 2021, 10:03:27 PM
without the class system, there are no maximum lengths for civil disability or maximum amounts for fines now.

ESB got 18 years civil disability, which was later overturned, which IMHO was ridiculous. 5 years maximum civil disability? 500 louis maximum fine (which would be half our total treasury)?

Perjury definition corrected.

Such a fine could be 'paid' by way of a contribution to any non-religious charitable organization with proof of contribution being sufficient as the 'fine' having been 'paid'.

Making this a general rule seems like it could lead to problems, with people deliberately donating to abhorrent causes to "stick it" to those who force them to pay a penalty.  Maybe it might make more sense to adapt it into a provision in the law which directs that BHAID issue recommendations on what part of a fine might be donated by the state and to which charities, where they deem appropriate?  Same result with more flexibility and less risk.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 15, 2021, 06:14:51 PM
The person in question is going to be unlikely to defend themselves, so they need state representation -- does the public defender proposal already here cover them enough?

That was what I wrote it specifically to do, but I value any suggestions for improvement.

Quote
A charge of bringing Talossa into ill-repute may only proceed to prosecution if a judge, after a full and fair hearing conducted in the presence of counsel for the accused, determines that the foreign conviction meets the following criteria:
1. The conviction is likely to qualify as the crime of bringing Talossa into ill-repute under the terms of 7.10.1,
2. The conviction took place after a full and fair hearing in a competent court of law.

This is, like, 90% of the actual burden of proof for the crime, so I'm not sure it makes sense to put it into a preliminary hearing before a judge? Like, you'd want to have a "double trial"? If the accused has to retain and instruct counsel, exactly how are they saved any hassle by going through this process?

There is also the problem of: why is this crime so special that it needs a "double trial"? As opposed to, I dunno, treason or harassment within Talossa?

I get your point about not wanting to open the door to political prosecutions. But any crime can be open to a political prosecution. If you were to ask Lord Hooligan, I'm sure he'd say his own prosecution (out of the aftermath of the ESB Affair) was a political hit-job. If you want to avoid political prosecutions in general, then I would suggest something like a grand jury system. One which wouldn't indict a ham sandwich like its US equivalent, though.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 19, 2021, 01:19:38 PM
Maybe it might make more sense to adapt it into a provision in the law which directs that BHAID issue recommendations on what part of a fine might be donated by the state and to which charities, where they deem appropriate?  Same result with more flexibility and less risk.

Or, much more simply:

QuoteA fine shall be payable to the Burgermeister of Internal Revenue, or to any appropriate charitable institution as the Cort may direct, and shall be considered paid upon receipt for that payment being received by the Cort.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 19, 2021, 04:49:08 PM
This is, like, 90% of the actual burden of proof for the crime, so I'm not sure it makes sense to put it into a preliminary hearing before a judge? Like, you'd want to have a "double trial"? If the accused has to retain and instruct counsel, exactly how are they saved any hassle by going through this process?

It's not a trial, but rather I hope it to be a preliminary hearing before a trial.  We don't have a grand jury system and I'm not sure it's feasible to create one, given the size of our active citizenry.  Creating a relatively low-stakes sanity check on a full-scale prosecution seems like one way to provide some degree of protection, especially since right now Talossan trial procedures tend to move without impediment from Government charges right to a full trial.

That said, maybe it makes sense to tweak the wording to lower the bar further -- rather than "likely to qualify," perhaps rework the wording to just make it clear it's a preliminary hearing?  I'll have to look at some similar examples (like maybe the SLAPP laws?  I'm out of my comfort zone at this point).

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 19, 2021, 04:49:08 PMThere is also the problem of: why is this crime so special that it needs a "double trial"? As opposed to, I dunno, treason or harassment within Talossa?

I could be persuaded that we need to reform trial procedure in its entirety and put more scrutiny on all indictments in general at the "reasonable chance" stage.  And speaking of, we should probably work up a Miranda list for Talossa: a notice that the Government is required to send to all of the accused, notifying them of their rights, the availability of a public defender, where to find relevant laws, etc.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 19, 2021, 04:49:08 PMI get your point about not wanting to open the door to political prosecutions. But any crime can be open to a political prosecution. If you were to ask Lord Hooligan, I'm sure he'd say his own prosecution (out of the aftermath of the ESB Affair) was a political hit-job.

I mean, I think that, too.  If nothing else, the treatment of the defendant was outrageous.  Charges were brought and dropped nine months later without any briefs being filed and without an apology.  The sitting judge rightfully said "[t]he Crown has undertaken a spectacular waste of this Cort's time" and that "[t]he Crown must be rather more thoughtful and careful in future cases, as it has demonstrated a disgraceful carelessness in this one."

But setting that aside as something about which we're likely to disagree, I'll note that you're right, anything can be a hit-job.  But we're talking specifically about criminalizing a conviction in a foreign court, beyond our own fact-finding and investigation.  If we're going to be ready to impose penalties on someone for something beyond their power to reasonably dispute, they need some protection.

In other words, just possessing this status will be a crime.  We're saying it is a crime to be a person who has been convicted of specific things in certain courts, and that the only burden of proof is "does this conviction exist," something that is usually just a records search away.  We have to afford people some protection and avenue to protest not only that their conviction fits the specified categories (which presumably will be what the trial is about) but also a chance to show that the conviction as a whole is unjust.  Further, we're also talking about people who may be unable to come to their own defense for some time by the very nature of the accusation (since they'll be in a prison).

I'm open to dropping the special hearing thing, but I think we should raise the bar for conviction generally, then.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 19, 2021, 09:48:38 PM
In other words, just possessing this status will be a crime.  We're saying it is a crime to be a person who has been convicted of specific things in certain courts, and that the only burden of proof is "does this conviction exist," something that is usually just a records search away.  We have to afford people some protection and avenue to protest not only that their conviction fits the specified categories (which presumably will be what the trial is about) but also a chance to show that the conviction as a whole is unjust.  Further, we're also talking about people who may be unable to come to their own defense for some time by the very nature of the accusation (since they'll be in a prison).

All right. Give me an example how your ideal system would have pursued the prosecution and trial of I. Canún  with a trial for "bringing Talossa into disrepute".

BTW, the Government in re: Hooligan was guilty of entrusting the case (after 2 resignations) to an Attorney-General who didn't know what he was doing and gave up at the least sign of a robust defence. You are still clearly quite upset about the case, but your accusations about the motives behind it are slanderous and guaranteed to start a fight that should have been over 6 years ago. I personally think Hooligan had a case to answer and I am ashamed - not that the case was brought - that it was brought so incompetently that he never actually had to answer for his deeds. I would consider it a favour, in the interests of continuing civil debate over this legislative project, if you were to delete that paragraph (and I'll delete this one).

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 19, 2021, 10:10:27 PM

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 19, 2021, 09:48:38 PM
In other words, just possessing this status will be a crime.  We're saying it is a crime to be a person who has been convicted of specific things in certain courts, and that the only burden of proof is "does this conviction exist," something that is usually just a records search away.  We have to afford people some protection and avenue to protest not only that their conviction fits the specified categories (which presumably will be what the trial is about) but also a chance to show that the conviction as a whole is unjust.  Further, we're also talking about people who may be unable to come to their own defense for some time by the very nature of the accusation (since they'll be in a prison).

All right. Give me an example how your ideal system would have pursued the prosecution and trial of I. Canún  with a trial for "bringing Talossa into disrepute".

I suppose it would have gone something like this:
1.  He'd be charged and a public defender would be appointed for him.
2.  The Government would ask for leave to prosecute him in absentia, which it would certainly get (since it's pretty easy to show that he can't be at the trial).
3. The initial hearing would be held, in which the Government would supply the US documentation and show how US courts are credible.  Hard to see how they would lose at this stage -- probably just checking the box.
4. The trial would occur, in which the Government would file a brief arguing that the conviction met the statutory definition.  Again, hard to see how they would lose.
5.  Sentencing would occur.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 19, 2021, 10:10:27 PMBTW, the Government in re: Hooligan was guilty of entrusting the case (after 2 resignations) to an Attorney-General who didn't know what he was doing and gave up at the least sign of a robust defence. You are still clearly quite upset about the case, but your accusations about the motives behind it are slanderous and guaranteed to start a fight that should have been over 6 years ago. I personally think Hooligan had a case to answer and I am ashamed - not that the case was brought - that it was brought so incompetently that he never actually had to answer for his deeds. I would consider it a favour, in the interests of continuing civil debate over this legislative project, if you were to delete that paragraph (and I'll delete this one).

You want me to delete that paragraph, even though it was almost entirely what the judge said?  I can do that, in the interests of continued progress.  I'll do that and delete all this, too, but please also remove your prior reference to the case and stop casually mentioning it in this discussion.  I'm not "upset," but blithe references to it are misplaced (unless you are indeed interested in the resulting discussion, but I do think it would put us off track).

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 19, 2021, 10:25:34 PM
1.  He'd be charged and a public defender would be appointed for him.
2.  The Government would ask for leave to prosecute him in absentia, which it would certainly get (since it's pretty easy to show that he can't be at the trial).
3. The initial hearing would be held, in which the Government would supply the US documentation and show how US courts are credible.  Hard to see how they would lose at this stage -- probably just checking the box.
4. The trial would occur, in which the Government would file a brief arguing that the conviction met the statutory definition.  Again, hard to see how they would lose.
5.  Sentencing would occur.

Okay. I don't have any objections in principle to this process; but explain to me how the two stages offer extra protection for the defendant. As opposed to a single trial where the prosecution would have to supply the documentation; show how the foreign court is credible; AND show how the crime meets the stat definition, and if it fails on any of those, the prosecution is lost.

Okay, different approach, for all felonies and serious misdemeanours we require a preliminary hearing (https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/preliminary-hearing) of some kind?

BTW, forget about that other thing I asked for, it's not worth it.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 19, 2021, 10:36:37 PM

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 19, 2021, 10:25:34 PM
1.  He'd be charged and a public defender would be appointed for him.
2.  The Government would ask for leave to prosecute him in absentia, which it would certainly get (since it's pretty easy to show that he can't be at the trial).
3. The initial hearing would be held, in which the Government would supply the US documentation and show how US courts are credible.  Hard to see how they would lose at this stage -- probably just checking the box.
4. The trial would occur, in which the Government would file a brief arguing that the conviction met the statutory definition.  Again, hard to see how they would lose.
5.  Sentencing would occur.

Okay. I don't have any objections in principle to this process; but explain to me how the two stages offer extra protection for the defendant. As opposed to a single trial where the prosecution would have to supply the documentation; show how the foreign court is credible; AND show how the crime meets the stat definition, and if it fails on any of those, the prosecution is lost.

All of that is already true, except here we're providing an extra stage at the beginning where the loss will be immediate and easy -- a sanity check on an unjust prosecution.  The "reasonable chance" stage of a trial has never involved more than cursory scrutiny, and so I think a statutory supplement to it is warranted.  Referencing that part of the OrgLaw in the statute might make as much sense, in fact -- something to explicitly say that a higher standard of scrutiny is warranted in this case.

I'm not married to this approach, by the way.  There are other solutions possible to solving this problem.  If you don't like this idea, would you be open to just specifying a higher degree of scrutiny during the normal trial process?

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 19, 2021, 10:36:37 PM
BTW, forget about that other thing I asked for, it's not worth it.

Sure, no worries.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 19, 2021, 10:36:37 PM
Okay, different approach, for all felonies and serious misdemeanours we require a preliminary hearing (https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/preliminary-hearing) of some kind?

That's the "reasonable chance" part of the trial I've been referencing: "The courts shall consent to hear no case until presented with written evidence by the Prosecution proving to a majority of court members that a reasonable chance of obtaining a conviction actually exists."  The revisions of the Still Into This Amendment stripped that protection from defendants on the constitutional level, unfortunately, but it's still in the statutes in a new formal form.

As I said before, though, it would be great to formalize it to a higher standard:

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 19, 2021, 09:48:38 PM
I could be persuaded that we need to reform trial procedure in its entirety and put more scrutiny on all indictments in general at the "reasonable chance" stage.  And speaking of, we should probably work up a Miranda list for Talossa: a notice that the Government is required to send to all of the accused, notifying them of their rights, the availability of a public defender, where to find relevant laws, etc.

The current protections and procedure are at Lex.G.6, by the way.

Quote"The courts shall consent to hear no case until presented with written evidence by the Prosecution proving to a majority of court members that a reasonable chance of obtaining a conviction actually exists."

Right, but you want something stronger than that, you want a preliminary hearing where it's not just the Prosecution presenting the evidence, but the accused/Public Defender can challenge it. Have I got that right?

So how's about this cut-and-paste job from Wisconsin Statutes 970:

Quote1. A preliminary examination is a hearing before a court for the purpose of determining if there is probable cause to believe a felony or a serious misdemeanour has been committed by the defendant.

2. The preliminary examination shall be commenced within 20 days after the receipt by a Cort of a charging instrument alleging a felony or serious misdemeanour, as described in El Lexhatx G.6.2.

3. A plea shall not be accepted in any case in which a preliminary examination is required until the defendant has been bound over following preliminary examination or waiver thereof.

4. The defendant, or their Public Defender, may cross-examine witnesses against the defendant, and may call witnesses on the defendant's own behalf who then are subject to cross-examination.

5.. If the court finds probable cause to believe that a felony or serious misdemeanour has been committed by the defendant, it shall bind the defendant over for trial.

6. If the court finds that it is probable that only a misdemeanour has been committed by the defendant, it shall amend the complaint to conform to the evidence. The action shall then proceed as though it had originated as a misdemeanour action.

7. If the court does not find probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed by the defendant, it shall order the defendant discharged forthwith.

If this isn't good enough, can you write something that is? I'm helping birth a baby in the next few days.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on June 19, 2021, 01:19:38 PM


Such a fine could be 'paid' by way of a contribution to any non-religious charitable organization with proof of contribution being sufficient as the 'fine' having been 'paid'.

Making this a general rule seems like it could lead to problems, with people deliberately donating to abhorrent causes to "stick it" to those who force them to pay a penalty.  Maybe it might make more sense to adapt it into a provision in the law which directs that BHAID issue recommendations on what part of a fine might be donated by the state and to which charities, where they deem appropriate?  Same result with more flexibility and less risk.
[/quote]

Three specific charities could be chosen in advance by Talossa for all manner of charitable-donations-by-Talossans.

One thing we must keep in mind is what Ben Madison at his best wanted Talossa to always remain as: free, fun, and fair.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on June 20, 2021, 12:06:31 AM

Quote"The courts shall consent to hear no case until presented with written evidence by the Prosecution proving to a majority of court members that a reasonable chance of obtaining a conviction actually exists."

Right, but you want something stronger than that, you want a preliminary hearing where it's not just the Prosecution presenting the evidence, but the accused/Public Defender can challenge it. Have I got that right?

So how's about this cut-and-paste job from Wisconsin Statutes 970:

Quote1. A preliminary examination is a hearing before a court for the purpose of determining if there is probable cause to believe a felony or a serious misdemeanour has been committed by the defendant.

2. The preliminary examination shall be commenced within 20 days after the receipt by a Cort of a charging instrument alleging a felony or serious misdemeanour, as described in El Lexhatx G.6.2.

3. A plea shall not be accepted in any case in which a preliminary examination is required until the defendant has been bound over following preliminary examination or waiver thereof.

4. The defendant, or their Public Defender, may cross-examine witnesses against the defendant, and may call witnesses on the defendant's own behalf who then are subject to cross-examination.

5.. If the court finds probable cause to believe that a felony or serious misdemeanour has been committed by the defendant, it shall bind the defendant over for trial.

6. If the court finds that it is probable that only a misdemeanour has been committed by the defendant, it shall amend the complaint to conform to the evidence. The action shall then proceed as though it had originated as a misdemeanour action.

7. If the court does not find probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed by the defendant, it shall order the defendant discharged forthwith.

If this isn't good enough, can you write something that is? I'm helping birth a baby in the next few days.

I think we should probably at least start with Lexh.G.6 as a base.

Quote6. Criminal Law: In the interest of providing the accused with the rights granted to them by the Ninth Covenant of Rights and Freedoms, the following rights shall be considered to be inalienable and shall be afforded to all citizens in civilian trials:

6.1. The Ministry of Justice, on behalf of the Crown, shall submit a charging instrument to the Clerk of the Cort identifying, in plain language, the charge to be brought against the accuse, and the factual allegations to be proven to support said charges. Nothing in this section shall limit the Ministry of Justice from relying on unpleaded allegations provided such does not prejudice the accused.
6.2. Upon receipt of the charging instrument, the Clerk of the Cort shall refer the matter to the appropriate tribunal of the Crown as defined by law.
6.3. The tribunal of the Crown shall test the sufficiency by making a prima facie determination that if the factual allegations contained therein were proven true beyond a reasonable doubt, then the accused would be guilty of the crime as alleged. Jeopardy shall only attach if the tribunal of the Crown accepts the charging instrument as sufficient. If the tribunal is not satisfied of such, then it shall reject the charging instrument as insufficient on its face and jeopardy shall not have attached.
6.4. The accused must be informed of the charges against him by the Crown within seven days of said charges being accepted by the Tribunal of the Crown.
6.5. Such notification must be submitted to the accused in writing, by either an electronic medium such as email, a typed letter, or by a handwritten letter. A copy of every such notice shall be archived in the Royal Archives by the Royal Archivist immediately after he receives a copy of said notice. If the notice is given in the form of a hand-written letter, the Royal Archivist shall make a copy of the letter in an electronic format, such that it may be added to the Royal Archives.
6.6. The Prosecution shall have up to 90 days from the time of notification of the accused in which to prepare its case. If a case is not prepared by the Prosecution within the allotted time, then the matter shall be dismissed, unless the Prosecution can show that such delay is through the fault of the accused.
6.7. If a case is not prepared within the 90-day limit, then the Prosecution may request up to an additional 30 days to prepare its case, which shall be granted or denied by the tribunal assigned to the case. This section takes precedence over G.1.6.
6.8. The decision shall be based on the legitimacy of reasons given by the Prosecution in the interests of justice, equity, and efficiency.
6.9. If a matter is dismissed for failure to prosecute, then final jeopardy shall attach unless the Prosecution is able to provide new evidence against the accused with which to build a case. A new case must meet the same statute of limitations for any offence.
6.7. The Prosecution may withdraw a charging instrument upon good cause shown to which jeopardy shall not attach.

For our purposes, strengthening 6.3 and 6.4 are probably best-matched to our goals.  We also probably want to put the public defender bit in here, rather than Title A, since it's more about procedure than defining crimes.  If we also define a high standard of review for the proposed A.7.2.10, then I think we're pretty much set on that whole part of the bill.  I'd be happy to draft this stuff, since you're going to have a lot on your hands.

Sorry, missed that. Fine, make a draft.

If we don't get agreement on the "preliminary hearing" thing or other matters related to 7.2.10 by end of month, I will simply Clark a version of this (https://docs.google.com/document/d/1OfQlUZrowS4frssyea6-SLxz8Pcss5WNNxyKud82lQw/edit) with 7.2.10 omitted. Replacing Wisconsin law is a much higher priority than sorting out exactly how to punish Talossans for infamous extra-Talossan crimes, though debate on that has to go on.

WHEREAS Talossan criminal law, as contained in Title A of El Lexhatx, has been "imported" from the law of the State of Wisconsin since the 31st Clark;

AND WHEREAS this has never been a satisfactory state of affairs, except for those familiar with Wisconsin law and how to look things up in it;

AND WHEREAS this provision takes part of its wording from Wisconsin statute, wherever necessary, to make sure that the transition to indigenous law will be as smooth as possible;

AND WHEREAS another bill is foreseen for this Cosa, which will relate to outstanding issues of:
a) the crime of bringing Talossa into disrepute by conviction of an infamous crime in an extra-Talossan jurisdiction;
b) questions of the procedure of criminal trials, including the possibility of preliminary hearings;


BE IT ENACTED by the King, Cosa and Senäts in Ziu assembled as follows:

PART ONE. The substantive reform.

That Title A Sections 1-8 of El Lexhatx are hereby replaced in their entirety by the below text:

Quote

1.      General provisions of Talossan jurisprudence:

1.1.   Talossan courts shall interpret Organic and Statute Law through the lens of the Covenants of Rights and Freedoms, and otherwise in accordance with Talossan juridical precedent. Judges may also use precedent from other legal systems with which they are familiar to guide their decisions, though such precedent shall not be binding.
1.2.   Only crimes described in Talossan Organic and Statute Law may be prosecuted in Talossan courts.
1.3.  A single action of a defendant may be considered to break more than one law and may be charged accordingly.

2.      Felonies and misdemeanours. All crimes against Talossan law shall be classed as misdemeanours unless stated otherwise.

3.      Authorized punishments for all crimes classed as felonies shall be as follows:

3.1.    Banishment. Banishment may be ordered in conjunction with revocation of citizenship in any felony case. Banishment prohibits the former citizen from entering the territory of the Kingdom of Talossa. A former Talossan who has been banished may not be reinstated as a citizen.
3.2.    Revocation of citizenship. A sentence of revocation of citizenship directs the Chancery to remove the offender from the list of Talossan citizens. Simple revocation is without prejudice to a future reapplication for citizenship.

4.      Authorized punishments for all crimes classed as either felonies or serious misdemeanours shall be as follows:

4.1.   Civil disability. Civil disabilities may include any or all of the following, for a maximum term of 5 calendar years for a felony or 1 calendar year for a serious misdemeanour:
4.1.1.      Bar from holding national executive office
4.1.2.      Bar from holding national judicial office
4.1.3.      Bar from holding national legislative office
4.1.4.      Bar from holding provincial office
4.1.5.      Bar from performing military service
4.1.6.      Bar from service in the Royal Civil Service
4.1.7.      Bar from posting on Wittenberg

5.      Authorized punishments for all crimes shall be as follows:

5.1.   Fines. When a fine is imposed as a component of any sentence, the court shall specify the period within which the sum must be paid, which period shall not be less than thirty days. The court may, in the interests of justice, allow the offender to pay the sum in more than one installment, according to a schedule prescribed by the court. Willful failure to pay a fine within the time provided is punishable as criminal contempt of court. The maximum fine that may be levied is ℓ500 for a felony, ℓ100 for a serious misdemeanour or ℓ50 for a misdemeanour.
5.2.   Restitution. When imposing sentence for any crime, a court, in addition to any other penalty authorized by law, shall order the offender to make full or partial restitution to any victim of a crime considered at sentencing or, if the victim is deceased, to his or her estate, unless the court finds substantial reason not to do so and states the reason on the record. The court must specify a reasonable period of time, not less than thirty days, within which the offender must make restitution. Willful failure to make restitution within the time provided is punishable as criminal contempt of court. Court-ordered restitution shall not bar any victim from pursuing any civil remedies available at law to recover any amount or type of damages not covered by the order of restitution.
5.3.   Reprimand. In all criminal cases, a court may reprimand the offender in addition to (or in lieu of, where no minimum punishment applies) any other authorized punishment.

6.      Suspended sentences:

6.1.   A court may order the suspension of all or part of any sentence, for a period of time not to exceed five calendar years. At the end of the period of suspension ordered by the court, the suspended punishment is rescinded if the offender has not violated any condition of the suspension.
6.2.    If a court determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the offender violated any condition of his suspension during the period of the suspension, the suspension shall be revoked and the original punishment imposed. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit prosecuting an act violating a condition of suspension as a criminal offense in its own right, either in the same or a separate action as the revocation of suspension.
6.3.    Refraining from committing any further crimes is an implicit condition of every suspended sentence. Other conditions which may be imposed by the court include, but are not limited to:
6.3.1.      Injunction from requesting or accepting royal honours
6.3.2.      Injunction from violating Wittiquette
6.3.3.      The performance of a fixed amount of community service under the supervision of a public body or not-for-profit organization, as directed or approved by the court.
6.4.   Civil disabilities may be imposed in conjunction with a suspended sentence upon conviction of a felony, but where a sentence of revocation of citizenship has been suspended.

7.      Talossan Criminal Code

7.1.   Definitions.
7.1.1.      "Fraud" shall mean any act of deception carried out for the purpose of unfair, undeserved and/or unlawful gain, or the assumption of a false identity to such deceptive end.
7.1.2.      "Harassment" shall mean engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts which harass, intimidate or distress a person and which serve no legitimate purpose.
7.2.   Crimes against the Kingdom.
7.2.1.      Treason. Whoever knowingly endangers the existence of the Kingdom of Talossa, its laws, institutions and state property, by enlisting or attempting to enlist the aid of non-Talossans, commits the felony of treason.
7.2.2.      Perverting the course of justice. Whoever uses fraud, harassment, physical or sexual violence or threats thereof to attempt to influence an active case in any Cort under the Organic Law is guilty of the felony of perverting the course of justice.
7.2.2.1.            Perverting the course of justice shall also include fabricating or disposing of evidence, as well as suborning perjury.
7.2.3.      Sedition. Whoever uses fraud, harassment, physical or sexual violence or threats thereof to attempt to influence any election or any other decision made under the Organic Law of Talossa (outside of an active case in any Cort), or to remove or replace officials duly empowered by that Organic Law, is guilty of the felony of sedition.
7.2.4.      Contempt of court. Contempt of court is a serious misdemeanour consisting of intentional:
7.2.4.1.            Misconduct in the presence of the court which interferes with a court proceeding or with the administration of justice, or which impairs the respect due the court;
7.2.4.2.            Disobedience, resistance or obstruction of the authority, process or order of a court;
7.2.4.3.            Refusal as a witness to appear, be sworn or answer a question; or
7.2.4.4.            Refusal to produce a record, document or other object.
7.2.5.      Perjury. Whoever under oath or affirmation orally makes a false material statement which the person does not believe to be true, in any matter, cause, action or proceeding, before the Ziu, any committee of the Ziu, or court of law, is guilty of the serious misdemeanour of perjury.
7.2.6.      Crimes against state property.
7.2.6.1.             Whoever steals or diverts to their own use without authorization the monetary or physical property of the Kingdom of Talossa is guilty of a felony if the monetary value of such theft is 100 louis or above, and a serious misdemeanour otherwise.
7.2.6.2.            Whoever improperly uses the intellectual property of the Kingdom of Talossa is guilty of a serious misdemeanour if with the intention of misrepresenting the Kingdom or improperly claiming the authority of the Kingdom, and a misdemeanour otherwise.
7.2.6.3.            Whoever improperly accesses any computer or information system belonging to the Kingdom of Talossa is guilty of a serious misdemeanour if with the intention of committing any other crime, and of a misdemeanour otherwise.
7.2.6.4.            Whoever makes a counterfeit of any official document or item pertaining to the Kingdom of Talossa and uses it to gain a benefit to which they were not otherwise entitled is guilty of a serious misdemeanour.
7.2.7.      Solicitation. Whoever induces or attempts to induce any other Talossan to break the Law of Talossa is guilty of the same class of offence as that which they sought to induce.
7.2.8.      Conspiracy. Whoever agrees with any other Talossan to break the Law of Talossa is guilty of the same class of offence as that which they agreed to commit.
7.2.9.      Bribery. The felony of bribery is committed by:
7.2.9.1.            Anyone who offers any officer of the Kingdom or witness in a Court case anything of value in return for the performance of their official duties or to influence their testimony.
7.2.9.2.            Any officer of the Kingdom or witness in a Court case who accepts a bribe (as above) without revealing it as soon as may be practical to the proper authorities.
7.3.   Crimes against the person
7.3.1.      Whoever commits physical or sexual violence or threats thereof against any citizen or "judicial person" under Talossan law is guilty of a felony.
7.3.2.      Whoever commits fraud or harassment against any citizen or "judicial person" under Talossan law is guilty of a serious misdemeanour. Whoever commits threats of the above is guilty of a misdemeanour.
7.3.3.      Theft and invasion of privacy.
7.3.3.1.            Whoever commits theft or misappropriation of physical or monetary property valued at 100 louis or more, or improperly publishes a Talossan citizen's private information, is guilty of a felony.
7.3.3.2.            Whoever commits theft or misappropriation of physical or monetary property valued at less than 100 louis, or of any intellectual property, or improperly accesses a Talossan citizen's private information without publication, is guilty of a serious misdemeanour.
7.3.4.      Defamation. Whoever publicly defames the reputation of a Talossan individual without justification in such a way as to bring them into hatred, ridicule and contempt is guilty of a serious misdemeanour.
7.3.4.1.            No statement shall be considered to be defamation if it is justified by being true, or by being fair comment in the absence of malicious intent.
7.3.5.      Whoever deprives an individual of the free exercise of their rights under the Organic Law in a way not otherwise mentioned in law commits a serious misdemeanour.

8.      Public Defender: No Talossan shall be convicted of any crime under this Lexhatx unless they have had the opportunity of defending themselves in Court. The Ministry of Justice shall appoint a Public Defender who is a member of the Talossan Bar at the request of any defendant, or if the defendant is for any other reason unable to defend themselves in Court.

PART TWO: Revisions of references to classes of misdemeanour and felony

1. El Lexhatx A.9.10. is amended to read:

Quote9.10. Commission of any of the criminal acts defined in A.9. constitutes a serious misdemeanour for a first offence, and a felony for a subsequent offence.

2. El Lexhatx A.22 is amended to read in its entirety

Quote22. The unauthorised usage of any official seal of the Crown, of the Government, or of any other official body, shall constitute a serious misdemeanour. Authorisation may be given by the Seneschal or the respective Minister, or by the head of the body concerned, or any of their duly designated proxies. (46RZ23)

    22.1. The unauthorised bearing, signing or displaying of any official seal of the Crown, of the Government, or of any other official body, shall constitute a serious misdemeanour. Authorisation to bear any seal may be granted by the Seneschal, or the respective Minister, or by the head of the body concerned.

    22.2. The use of any seal, that is attached unto a document, or a notification, or a declaration, or similar, that bears sufficient resemblance to any official seal, which is used by the creator in a document, or notification, or declaration, or similar, so as to create the impression of officiality, in order to:

        (a) obtain any personal advantages or benefits; or,
        (b) put a person or a body in disadvantage, or discredit a person or a body; or,
        (c) obtain any benefits and advantages for another person,

    shall constitute a serious misdemeanour.

        22.2.1. Whether any seal, that is used in such a manner, bears "sufficient resemblance", must, in cases of doubt, be decided by the Courts on an individual basis.

        22.2.2. The use of the Kingdom's colours ("El Bicoloreu") on any seal does not satisfy the requirements of "sufficient resemblance".

    22.3. Any subsequent unauthorised use of any seal, committed by a formerly punished convict of this act, shall constitute a felony.

3. El Lexhatx C.1.4.4. shall be amended to read as follows:

QuoteAny person who damages or causes to be damaged any Public Archive or Record in the control of a Governmental or Royal Civil Service body; or damages or causes to be damaged any Public Archive in the control of a Private body, Community and/or Individual; or removes, destroys or erases such Public record or archive otherwise than in accordance with this provision or any other law, shall be guilty of a serious misdemeanour if such damage, removal, destruction, or erasure was wilful, or guilty of a misdemeanour if such damage, removal, destruction, or erasure was reckless.