Esteemed colleagues,

I would like to remind you that this Cosă has yet to elect a Túischac'h. We need a Túischac'h for this term's State Opening.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on September 24, 2026, 08:08:59 AMThis is incredibly interesting stuff.  There's a lot of possibilities here.  Would the IAP maybe want any help setting up a page with their past papers and more information?  I'd love to assist getting that set up so even more people can read about these analyses and maybe think about how we can change our legislature.

Thank you for your generous offer. I'm not sure if we necessarily need a separate page as of now since there's not a lot of analysis to congregate, but maybe some time in the future.

I just hope that posting this on Witt would be visible enough for now.

Quote from: Françal I. Lux on September 24, 2026, 07:39:26 PMI'm gonna take it you're not a fan of STV lol

Nah, she is, but those are still relevant questions that need answering.

Quote from: Françal I. Lux on September 24, 2026, 07:39:26 PMWhat I am advocating for is a candidate-oriented election system where those running are encouraged, even pressed, to speak for themselves about the issues instead of having the party as a fall back.

That is my goal as well, and I hope we can get there sooner rather than later.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on September 24, 2026, 04:24:13 PMand here's the big one; how does that work with our current compromise where candidates can get multiple seats?

Yeah, out of the four systems I outlined, all except STV can be easily modified to allow for more than one seat per MC. Since I assume we're gonna be stuck with this quirk for quite a while longer, extending STV in a similar fashion would need to be prioritised.

Quote from: Mic'haglh Autófil, O.Be on September 22, 2026, 10:37:23 PM

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on September 22, 2026, 08:23:54 PMWith MMP for instance, there would be 8 single-winner constituencies, so we would need at least 16 candidates (2 per) to make all of these races competitive, ideally more than that. With the way things look currently, I really can't see this happen.

I think this is related to the question you asked me elsewhere, but -- would it be feasible to use MMP with fewer constituencies? So if you had Miestra's four constituencies, each of which elect one or two members (for, say, six MCs total) with the remainder of seats apportioned in line with the party-list vote.

It would be more feasible, in the sense that we would now only need 12 candidates in total in a worst case, but at that point the MM part of MMP would be in question, in my opinion, and you may as well not bother with it.

Quote from: Françal I. Lux on September 22, 2026, 08:03:38 PMHow committed are we to nation-wide, at-large elections for the Cosa?

It's just an idea but have we seriously considered creating provincial constituencies based on population and elect MCs through the provinces? I understand this would drastically reorient how elections are run and won, but it would inject much needed activity in our provinces and with a smaller electorate, candidates can be better vetted by the people they're asking for votes.

Two of the methods I listed at the top of this thread require constituencies (MMP by necessity, STV for feasibility), and the main issue I have with province-based constituencies boils down to lack of competitiveness. With MMP for instance, there would be 8 single-winner constituencies, so we would need at least 16 candidates (2 per) to make all of these races competitive, ideally more than that. With the way things look currently, I really can't see this happen.

I also highly doubt that local elections would revitalise the provinces, considering that Senate elections have been local since the beginning and it has accomplished nothing. If anything, moving the Senate away from provincial representation might actually be the way to go, but that's a separate issue that I may or may not write another post about.

During the last Cosă term, there has been growing cross-party support for the adoption of a voting system, which would enable voters a direct choice for their MCs, rather than leaving that choice to party functionaries who are in control of candidate lists, while preserving the current proportional allocation of seats. Such systems have become known as Personalised Proportional Representation in Talossa, or PPR for short. There have been multiple proposals for implementing PPR, each coming with advantages and disadvantages, which I want to showcase here.

1. Mixed-member Proportional (MMP)

MMP is the voting system in use in Germany and New Zealand, though there are differences in implementation.  At its most basic, voters under MMP have two votes: one for a local representative for their constituency, and one for a nation-wide party list. Voters are free to "split their vote", i.e. they can vote for a local represenative from one party and for a party list of another. The total number seats that a party receives are determined by the party list vote, and then those seats are "filled up" first by constituency winners, and the rest by party list members.

There have been proposals to implement MMP since 2014, most commonly in form of 8 constituency seats (one per province), with the remaining 12 for list candidates. Due to voters' ability to split their votes and the possibility of strongly localised support for parties, it is possible that a party may end up with more constituency winners than total seats. These are called "overhang seats". In New Zealand, overhang seats are added to Parliament without compensation, meaning that parliament size increases and proportionality is damaged. As of September 2026, New Zealand Parliament has 120 regular seats and 3 overhangs. In Germany, in the case of theoretical overhang seats, candidates enter the Cosă by the margin at which they won, meaning that overhang seats won by the narrowest margins are ignored. Parliament size thus stays proportional and at its canonical size, but some constituencies are left without a local representative ("orphaned"). As of September 2026, 23 out of 299 constituencies (7.7%) are orphaned, mainly in urban areas.

1.1. Advantages

MMP has been used in Germany since 1949, and in New Zealand since 1996, so it is a system that has been proven to work for high-stakes elections long term. The introduction of a constituency vote gives voters a direct choice as to who would represent each province without caveats and without strict adherence to any one party.

1.2. Disadvantages

MMP would require a drawing up of constituencies for the purposes of Cosă elections. While it seems straightforward enough to make every province their own constituency, considering the stark differences in province populations, doing so could disproportionately favour smaller provinces at the expense of bigger ones.

The stark differences in province activity is another hurdle to implementing MMP. It is not unimaginable that at least some constituencies would have candidates running unopposed, which in a sense is undemocratic, and it would also hurt the proportionality of the final results.

2. Open-list Proportional ("Kosovo system")

Open-list Proportional voting is used in dozens of countries worldwide on various levels of government (including in Kosovo, hence the colloquial Talossan name), and is perhaps the method most similar to what is already in use currently. At its most basic, voters vote for a party list, and then for a single candidate on that list that they like the most. Voters cannot split their vote. Seats are distributed by party vote, and assigned to party list members by the number of candidate votes they received. Ties are broken by party list order.

2.1. Advantages

The "Kosovo system" is by far the easiest to implement, as it is the closest to the pre-existing closed-list proportional system. The ability to pick the order in which list candidats enter the Cosă makes sure that only candidates that are popular with the electorate become MCs, rather than candidates who are most loyal to their party and thus would be listed at the top of their party list.

2.2. Disadvantages

While voters may reorder party lists by voting for their preferred candidate within one such list, they ultimately still have to choose between pre-packaged slates of candiates and may only choose one such slate, which means the actual extent of personalisation is limited. For example, voters who prefer some candiates of one slate and some of another slate have no means of expressing this preference.

3. Single Transferable Vote (STV)

STV is a voting system used for elections to the Irish Dáil and the Australian Senate, and makes use of ranked ballots. Voters rank candidates from highest to lowest preference, with 1 being the highest rank. In the tabulation, candidates with the lowest number of 1st rank preferences are eliminated, and their votes are then distributed to their next highest preference if any. Candidates who have reached the quota (the number of votes needed to guarantee a seat) are elected, and votes exceeding the quota are likewise redistributed to their next highest preference. This continues until all seats are filled, or failing that, if the number of non-eliminated candidates is the same as the number of seats left open.

While it is technically possible for all seats to be elected at once using nation-wide STV, this would make voting and tabulation exceedingly difficult. In practice, countries using STV are divided into constituencies, which then each elect a small number of representatives, usually between 3 and 7.

3.1. Advantages

STV has been in use in Ireland since 1922, and in Australia since 1949, which, like with MMP before, proves that it has been proven to work high-stakes elections long term. STV lets voters make a direct statement on which candidates they prefer most, and enables them to freely vote for candidates they like across party boundaries.

3.2. Disadvantages

Again like with MMP, the necessity of constituencies is potentially questionable. Additionally, if each province was its own constituency, they would each only elect 2 to 3 MCs. Such small constituencies are known to result in problematic, unproportional results, so to guarantee proportionality, constituencies would need to cover at least two provinces and elect between 5 and 6 MCs. As such, the exact form of STV constituencies would need to be deliberted and determined beforehand, and potentially changed as populations change per province.

The use of ranked ballots has produced some controversy in the past, so before STV can be enacted, one would have to make sure that voters are well enough informed as to how they work.

4. Sequential Proportional Approval Voting (SPAV)

SPAV is a form of Approval Voting, modified to allow for proportional representation. Voters are given the choice of approve or disapprove any number of candidates on the ballot. All approvals are worth the same. In tabulation, the candidate with the highest number of approvals is elected, and all ballots that approved of this winning candidate are multiplied by some weight in  subsequent rounds (e.g., ballots with 1 winner are worth 1/2, ballots with 2 winners are worth 3, ballots with 3 winners are worth 1/4, etc). This continues until all seats are filled.

4.1. Advantages

SPAV, like STV, allows voters to directly express which candidates they like and which they dislike, and gives voters the ability to "compose their own party lists", since all candidates they approve of would function as one list in the tabulation. The fact that choices are limited to "approve" and "disapprove", rather than having to rank candidates in order, should make this system easier to understand for voters.

4.2. Disadvantages

SPAV is not used for any high-stakes election (it was last used in Sweden from 1909 until 1921), making this system the least thoroughly tested and thus the most "experimental" of the four presented here. Though there has been a lot of research into proportional approval voting methods in academic literature, nations may be wary of implementing such a system without knowing beforehand that it would be effective.

5. Conclusion

PPR is not one system, but a diverse set of methods that all aim to achieve the same goal through very different means. It should then not surprise anyone, that among those who have campaigned in the past for the adoption of PPR for Cosă elections, each person has their own personal favourite (MMP is historically preferred among reformers, the "Kosovo system" is prefered by S:reu Autófil, STV is preferred by M:çă Schivă, and SPAV is my personal favourite). By writing this overview of where we stand right now, my hope is to encourage a national debate on the merits of each system, so that we can decide collectively which path to take as a nation.

Though strictly speaking a distinct and separate issue, the topic of voting reform has historically been combined and conflated with the topic of Senäts reform or abolition. I may write a separate post on one particular way of preserving the Senäts at a later time.

Quote from: Sir Lüc on September 21, 2026, 04:43:47 AMOne cosponsor needed before I can send over the Oath.

Perventüră en michéu.

Esteemed colleagues,

I'd like to open nominations for this term's Túischac'h, persuant to Lexh.H.4.4:

Quote4.4. The Cosă shall elect the Túischac'h as follows.
    4.4.1. Should the position of Túischac'h be vacant and a majority of Cosă seats be filled, any Member of the Cosă may either nominate one eligible person for the office of Túischac'h, or second such a nomination made by another Member of the Cosă.
    4.4.2. Members of the Cosă may not nominate or second multiple different nominees.
    4.4.3. Should the Secretary of State determine that an eligible person has been nominated and seconded by members currently representing an absolute majority of seats in the Cosă, the Secretary of State shall declare the person to be duly elected as Túischac'h, to serve until the Dissolution of the current Cosă.
    4.4.4. Upon receipt of a petition declaring the Office of Túischac'h vacant from members of the Cosă representing an absolute majority the Secretary of State shall declare a vacancy in the Office of Túischac'h.
    4.4.5. The Túischac'h shall have full powers to suspend an MC from Cosa debates for Contempt of the Cosa. For a first offense, this shall have a maximum term of 1 day, for a second and subsequent offenses, this shall have a maximum of seven (7) days.

QuoteAs a reminder, the maximum number of seats that can be held by a single MC is 37 (30 * 200 / (2 * 82)).

Should the cap not be 30, since the calcuation includes PRESENT votes?

Quote from: Tric'hard Lenxheir on August 29, 2026, 12:07:03 PM

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on August 29, 2026, 10:46:52 AM

Quote from: Glüc on August 29, 2026, 04:30:39 AMIt might be actually good for Talossa to have both of them in government for a term. If Miestra and AD formed a party together I'd vote for that I think.

<soapbox>If this isn't an argument against party-based voting and in favour of direct candidate-based voting, I don't know what is.</soapbox>

The party based voting is actually an individual based vote. Everyone knows who basically runs each party and they are voting for that person to lead his/her party in the direction they feel is correct.

What I mean is, in the current system there is no option to vote for both AD and Miestra if you like them both. You are given a limited set of choices instead, and forced to choose between those and only those. It stifles cross-partisan dialog and supports hackery.

Quote from: Glüc on August 29, 2026, 04:30:39 AMIt might be actually good for Talossa to have both of them in government for a term. If Miestra and AD formed a party together I'd vote for that I think.

<soapbox>If this isn't an argument against party-based voting and in favour of direct candidate-based voting, I don't know what is.</soapbox>

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on August 17, 2026, 04:18:58 PMThere are certainly some changes that could be made to our system of law, but there's already a requirement that an accused individual be informed within seven days of a charging instrument being accepted.  I think it would be a bad idea to require public disclosure, since it's very possible some proceedings might be sealed for the sake of victims.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but arent trials all public on Witt? What difference would making indictments public make then? If a case does end up being sealed, just seal the indictment with it.

QuoteIt would be wiser to put in a decision point in that regard, instead.  The person who really needs to know is the accused, and it's not otherwise always in the public interest to require publication of unproven charges and information about criminal activity.  Prompt the judge to decide, with a direction to default to public proceedings.

For one, all charges start off as unproven before they come before a judge, right? Isn't that how trials work? For two, regardless of one's stance on making indictments public in general, since we are talking about potential election interference, I'd say it is absolutely in the public interest in this case.

QuoteI'd suggest another concern is that it doesn't seem possible to collect affidavits or sworn testimony without first beginning cort proceedings, which is why charges were filed.

How would public indictments stop one from collecting affidavits and sworn testimony?

Quote from: Tric'hard Lenxheir on August 17, 2026, 09:26:21 AMDidn't really want to know who voted just a running total like you see on tv in the United States

You don't have that in the US either, what you see during Election Night are the numbers coming in as they count all the ballots after the polls are closed.

Hm... concerning.

I've been showing the mail-in ballot around my groups of friends and they've all loved it so far. Great work as always, Lüc!

Yeah... even though me and AD have basically agreed that the next Cosă will have 200 seats, I still don't agree that enshrining a smaller Cosă in the OrgLaw would be subject to the same timetable (or any timetable) as statutory changes such as the Pseudo-Real Cosă Act, and I suspect there is no real way of clearing this up before the election.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on August 04, 2026, 07:42:08 PMI think there's no barrier to these things being expected to come into effect immediately upon ratification:

• Seat limit change

I think that these requirements require a process that cannot be expected to have occurred (ranked lists) or which have a timer running, and so they will happen with the 64th Cosa:

• Baseline 20 seats
• Ordered list
• Redistribution via ordered list
• Consent to be on a list required

The seat limit change is related to the abolition of off-listers, so as long as off-listers are abolished for the 63rd Cosă onwards, I believe this timeline should be fine.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on August 04, 2026, 05:27:14 PMThe Ziu affirmed a change, yes.  But it also affirmed the requirement that a change to the size of the Ziu would happen after the clock ran.

Where? If you agree with my interpretation that baseline changes are immediate and only statutory changes are subject to delays (you called my interpretation to that effect "spot-on" half an hour ago), then the effect would be immediate. When and where did the Ziu agree that this particular baseline change to Org.IV.2.1 would only enter into effect during or after February?

QuoteI don't think there's anything to hold up anything like the ironclad Cosa lists, which will come into effect immediately after the referendum is passed (so everyone should prepare for that now!)

That's an interesting point, actually. Miestră believes that ironclad lists cannot come into effect immediately because electoral lists under the current pre-referendum system are not the same form as the ironclad post-referendum system, i.e. they're not numerically ordered. In her view, the Cosă constitutes under the old rules as soon as the election results are published, but before any amendments enter into effect.

If this isn't a reason for all of us to come to an agreement as to when and how the amendment enters into effect and what ramifications it would have, I don't know what is.

But even if the amendment's changes enter into effect immediately rather than next year, would that mean the 63rd Cosă would have 20 seats? And what about the other changes to the Cosă's composition such as seat limits and iron-clad party lists, would they come into effect with the 63rd Cosă or the 64th? We've actually been debating this on the URL Discord and it seems the only thing we could agree on is that this stuff is confusing lol. I believe there is a lot of potential for confusion and grave misunderstandings here that we would be better avoiding at all costs, so it'd be practical to collectively agree on some sort of "timeline of events" beforehand.