Quote from: Üc R. Tärfă on May 15, 2023, 06:34:47 PMConsidering that the defendant plead guilty in the Swansea Crown Court, I'd say that it is a fair and reasonable assumption that the defendant would amdit to the Talossan crime of having been convicted by the Swansea Crown Court, that it is a credible court, and that the sentence involved the crime he plead guilty to.

Nobody gets to enter that plea on his behalf. The public defender is essentially doing the prosecutor's job for him.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 15, 2023, 06:18:26 PMThe point of the defence attorney is to defend a defendent, no matter how cut-and-dry the case may seem. Giving the defence the power to plead guilty, either directly or indirectly (like nolo contendere), without asking the defendent about it first seems to go directly against this purpose.

Also I don't see much of a point to the nolo contendere plea anyway. If a defence attorney is no contact with the defendent and has to make assumptions, the most reasonable assumption is that the defendent would not admit to anything. Am I misunderstanding anything?

Exactly right.

Don't be daft.

Quote from: Üc R. Tärfă on May 15, 2023, 05:30:46 PM

Quote from: Viteu on May 15, 2023, 05:11:26 PMThe reality is that you're suggesting it's okay to plead guilty on behalf of a defendant who did not consent to that plea, and impose criminal liability on that defendant, simply because you do not like the nature of the crime?
Seriously?!? Are these your values? Are these to be Talossa's values? Because this should disturb you more than merely looking at history, and it shocks me to my core that I'm the only one bothered by this.

The reality is that this would not have gotten up to the CpI had I not raised concerns, and it still might not if the GC accepts the guilty plea, denies my motion, and there is no party in the case to appeal.  It might not set binding precedent without an appeal, but it sets persuasive authority that this is an appropriate way to handle future criminal matters. 

What I am suggesting is that the public defender represent her client and not work as an organ of the state to provide no actual defense. I'm saying that CCX is NOT GETTING A FAIR TRIAL. The fact that you and others are ostensibly okay with is just... wow.

I find this all morally reprehensible and disgusting.

I'm just saying that this crime uniquely Talossan is peculiar, because the question is not if the defendant did or didn't do something, did or didn't act, did or didn't not commit it. I'm just saying that maybe given this particular nature it shouldn't be treated exactly like any other criminal trial and that maybe we should consider it. The defendant has been convicted. Was the conviction given by a credible court?

It's not really that unique. We cannot set aside civil liberties and the right to a fair trial simply because we don't like the crime.

Quote from: Üc R. Tärfă on May 15, 2023, 05:00:40 PMI'd like to point out the specific nature of the crime in question: «been convicted by a credible foreign court, which has been deemed to abide by Talossan values, of a crime established at trial to have involved fraud, harassment, bribery, physical or sexual violence or threats thereof,».

It's clearly evident that the defendant has been convicted by a foreign court. That is not debatable. The question is if the the foreign court is credible, abide by Talossan value, and if the sentence involved one of those crimes listed. (Moreover, as far as we know, the defendant plead guilty in the foreign court).

I am not arguing against that. If the defendant does not show up for trial in Talossa for the charge of bringing Talossa into disrepute, all of that can be presented as evidence, if permissible, in a trial in absentia.  But we simply cannot flush civil liberties simply because we don't like what the defendant did.

Quote from: Üc R. Tärfă on May 15, 2023, 05:00:40 PMThe nolo contendere was, I believe, in the spirit of not contending the fact that the Swansea Crown Court is a credible foreign court, abides by Talossan value, and the sentence involved one of those crime. (I don't want to engage ont he existence of that or not because, as I already said, I'm not familiar with common law and this necessity to discover how common law works or worked in the US in the last 300 years disturbs me.) Are you suggesting that the defensor really needs to argue that the Swansea Crown Court is not credible, doesn't abide by Talossan value, that the sentence doesn't involve one of those crimes, or that the defendant wasn't sentenced at all by such Court? Why the Court can't accept the specific nature of this crime and accept a nolo contendere for this specific case? Thais won't be a stare decisis, and if the CpI will be asked by a part in this trial to review the sentence, it will be able - without you - to determine if - lacking a specific statute - this will be considered acceptable - or not - in relation to this specific crime as a stare decisis.

You're arguing the merits of what the defendant did; I'm pointing out that regardless of the merits, Talossan law does not provide for a plea of nolo contendere.  You may be uncomfortable looking at 300 years of Anglo-American common law, but the reality is that Anglo-American common law for over 300 years did not recognize a common-law right to nolo contendere.  But fine. The reality is that you're suggesting it's okay to plead guilty on behalf of a defendant who did not consent to that plea, and impose criminal liability on that defendant, simply because you do not like the nature of the crime?
Seriously?!? Are these your values? Are these to be Talossa's values? Because this should disturb you more than merely looking at history, and it shocks me to my core that I'm the only one bothered by this.

The reality is that this would not have gotten up to the CpI had I not raised concerns, and it still might not if the GC accepts the guilty plea, denies my motion, and there is no party in the case to appeal.  It might not set binding precedent without an appeal, but it sets persuasive authority that this is an appropriate way to handle future criminal matters. 

What I am suggesting is that the public defender represent her client and not work as an organ of the state to provide no actual defense. I'm saying that CCX is NOT GETTING A FAIR TRIAL. The fact that you and others are ostensibly okay with is just... wow.

I find this all morally reprehensible and disgusting.

To your last point about the rules, tven if the Hearing Rules and Procedure have authority, they still do not provide for a plea of nolo contendere.

For too long Members of the Ziu have taken a laissez faire approach to the provisions of the Organic Law.  We have allowed this culture of enacting legislation for whatever the Ziu thinks is appropriate without virtually any consideration of the actual text of the Organic Law.   The Ziu acts like Talossa is a system of parliamentary sovereignty without a co-equal branch.  This is simply not the case. 

Therefore, I am announcing the Organic Law Party.  The primary goal of the Organic Law Party is to restore the Ziu to its proper place and Members of the Ziu when they steamroll over the Organic Law.  The Organic Law Party will fiercely and relentlessly defend the Organic Law and ensure that every transgression by a state institution is publicly known.

If you value civil liberties, constitutional order, and the rule of law, join the Organic Law Party.

On issues related to the monarchy, the Organic Law Party will be agnostic and defer to the individual members to vote and advocate their conscience. 

Quote from: Üc R. Tärfă on May 15, 2023, 04:48:16 PMI was under the impression that lacking a specific statutory law the Court was able to determine if something is available/acceptable or not...

That's not how the common law works.  The CpI can recognize something at common law, but in the context of a plea of nolo contendere, I laid out that this is not a common-law right; it's a statutory right.  I am reposting my initial message (unedited) sent in-chambers and available in the screenshot.

And I must once more point out that even if you disagree with my position on nolo contendere, the reality is that setting a precedent where a defense attorney can plead guilty or accept criminal liability on behalf of their client without the client's consent is patently unethical, unacceptable, and, frankly, disgusting.

Quote from: Viteu on May 10, 2023, 09:10:10 PMYour Honor Nordselvă and Counsel:

I want to commend you all on the handling of His Majesty The King v Cauvesc Carlüs Xheraltescu.  While it is great that we rarely have criminal matters to adjudicate in Talossa, the downside is that we do not have fleshed out criminal procedure when they do arise.  I think you all did a fantastic job with what you have in front of you.

I am writing, however, to express certain misgivings that I have about the plea bargain, how certain things proceeded, and the precedent it might set.  What I will do is outline my concerns and offer a solution.  The reason that I am writing you is because I do not see how this matter could make its way to the CpI.  I hope that you can divorce whatever feelings that you may have towards me and carefully consider the merits of my position. 

Also, should this matter somehow come up on appeal, I will recuse myself in light of this correspondence. 

First, neither the Organic Law nor el Lexhatx provide for a plea of nolo contendere (i.e. no contest).  The Hearing Rules and Procedure, to the extent that have any authority, only provide for a plea of (1) guilty as charged; (2) guilty of a lesser charge or charges; or (3) not guilty as charge, and not a plea of nolo contendere. 

Nolo contendere is not a right, it is a statutory privilege.  It has its origins in English common law going back to Henry VIII but has been absent from that jurisdiction for centuries—the last reported criminal matter appears to have been from 1702. 

In the United States, US federal criminal law provides for a plea of nolo contendere under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rule 11.  These rules are promulgated by the United States Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority under the Rules Enabling Act, which means it is akin to administrative law not common law.  Among the states, only a handful of states permit pleas of nolo contendere/no contest and do so exclusively by statute with significant restrictions.  As stated, it is a statutory privilege and not a right.  Nor does it find itself rooted in US common law.

One such state that permits a plea of no contest is Wisconsin under Wis. Stat. § 971.08, which requires that the court address the defendant personally to determine if the plea of guilty or no contest is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the potential punishment if convicted, among other things.

Hear me out on this next point.  I am of the mind that Talossan common law split from Wisconsin common law no later than the adoption of the 1997 Organic Law (I use this date because I have not seen any Organic Law antedating the 1997 Organic Law, and it does not change the analysis).  This make sense to me because the it is well-established in the US that it split with English common law in 1789 with the adoption of the (second) US Constitution.  What this means is that that the US inherited English common law as it existed in 1789, and any developments or changes in England thereafter were not binding in the US (although many developments were persuasive and each jurisdiction borrowed from the other). 

Following that line of thinking, nolo contendere had already vanished from English common law by 1789 and, therefore, was not inherited into US common law, as to not pass into Wisconsin common law, and therefore did not pass into Talossan common law.  For me, this tracks with the 1997 Organic Law's judicial directive to issue orders and injunctions relying upon "generally accepted principles on Anglo-American law." 

If this approach does not sit right with you for whatever reason, I was unable to identify a single instance of another common-law jurisdiction permitting a plea of nolo contendere based on the common law or that did not derive directly from modern US law as the US system of plea-bargaining spread to other jurisdictions. It is important to note that up until the 1970s, plea bargaining was a uniquely US-based phenomenon. Most of the jurisdictions that have adopted it base it on the US. 

In any event, Uganda and Kenya in the last few years introduced plea bargaining into their criminal justice systems and nolo contendere with it. The Judiciary of India expressed contempt for nolo contendere until adoption of plea bargaining in 2005.  This was all done by statute. 

Of the remaining common-law jurisdictions, I did not find any indication that nolo contendere is permitted.  In fact, the few references I saw from law blogs or articles from those jurisdictions were discussing the US judicial system.  Hence, I am confident when I saw that Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Burma, Nepal, Belize, Guyana, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Papua New Guiana do not permit a plea of nolo contendere. 

(For the sake of transparency, the Philippines, which has a mixed system of common law, civil law, and Islamic law, statutorily permits a plea of nolo contendere.  To the extent that I omitted a common-law jurisdiction, this is unintentional.  Because nolo contendere originated in 15th century English common law, I did not look into civil law jurisdictions as such did not seem particularly relevant to the analysis.)

The point that I am belaboring is that there is no common-law right to nolo contendere.  It is entirely statutory.  And because Talossan law does not provide for nolo contendere, is not available in Talossan corts. 

I think it would be a grievous error to set a precedent that Talossan corts can impose criminal liability based on a plea that does not exist in our law. 

The next thing I want to stress is that pleading nolo contendere is functionally similar pleading guilty in that the defendant accepts the conviction of the crime except that it means that the criminal case cannot be used against the defendant in a civil trial.  In essence, a guilty plea is an admission of the charges obviating any defense in a civil trial; nolo contendere means no guilt is admitted but the court will determine the punishment. 

I know there is good intent behind the plea bargain, but the idea that an attorney can enter a plea on behalf of their client that will impose criminal liability without the client's consent strikes as a dangerous proposition to set.  I would say that even if you disagree with me regarding Talossan law and nolo contendere, I hope you will see my point on entering a plea on a defendant's behalf that will result in criminal liability. 

I strongly urge you all to take a moment to consider what this means.  I understand why this may have seemed like a fair idea, but I encourage you to ponder whether proceeding in this fashion is good for our justice system. 

One last point, this is not an issue of double jeopardy.  Double jeopardy does not apply in instances of separate sovereigns (i.e. England and Talossa). 

If I have persuaded you, this is my proposal: the Public Defender moves to set aside the plea on the grounds of mistake of law (I see no reason why this could not be a joint motion with the Prosecutor).  If the General Cort grant the motion, the Public Defender must enter a plea of not guilty unless she obtains defendant's consent to enter a plea of guilty.  I know this means trial,

Because this correspondence means that I must recuse myself from all aspects of this matter with respect to the CpI, I am happy to help in any way that I can. 

Kind regards,

V

I am going to keep commenting.

Miestra presented absolutely no argument as to how or why a plea of nolo contendere is available under Talossan law.

And I must adamantly criticize and continue to raise the alarm of an attorney pleading guilty without their client's consent. I do intend to file an ethics complaint with the National Talossa Bar.

This is literally steamrolling over civil liberties because the public defender thinks a trial is a waste of time, which sets the precedent that all criminal trials are a waste of time.

I am sharing correspondence that I had with the general cort, prosecutor, and public defender about certain concerns and misgivings I have about the Cort accepting a plea that Talossan law does not recognize, and accepting a plea that will impose criminal liability without the consent of the defendant.

My reasons for doing this by private correspondence, or "in chambers" if you will, are stated therein.

Screenshot 1

Screenshot 2

Also stated therein is that I will recuse myself from this matter should it get to the CpI. 

Quote from: Üc R. Tärfă on April 28, 2023, 08:10:44 PM

Quote from: Viteu on April 28, 2023, 07:50:39 PMNevertheless, I do actually prefer the scheme that my debate with discussion yielded – the Inferior Cort can impose it as a punishment, and it must be confirmed by the CpI. That, I think, shields the CpI from criminally punishing someone with revocation of citizenship for chewing gum.

Your debate? That was my interpretation!

You said and you are saying instead that Lexh.A is inorganic where (and in many other parts) it defines to which crimes lost of citizenship can be imposed, and that only the CpI can define that!

I explained here

And you are wrong there.

Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN on April 28, 2023, 06:17:53 PM

Quote from: Viteu on April 28, 2023, 01:17:52 PMInsofar as the Ziu defined for which crimes loss of citizenship can be imposed, that is strictly reserved for the CpI.

Is the argument here sincerely that the CpI can impose loss of citizenship for any crime it pleases? That's stretching the Organic text like chewing gum, based on a reading of "determined" in the Twelfth Covenant which is possible but mischievous.

It is not a stretch. That is the plain and obvious meaning of the text.  If the Organic Law says that only the CpI can do the thing, and grants no other institution in Talodds authority to do the thing, then only the CpI can do the thing. 

The Organic Law has had this exact wording since at least 1999. (The third clause was added in 2013).

Obviously, this has not been an issue in the last 24 years. And it obviously has not been followed.

Nevertheless, I do actually prefer the scheme that my debate with discussion yielded – the Inferior Cort can impose it as a punishment, and it must be confirmed by the CpI. That, I think, shields the CpI from criminally punishing someone with revocation of citizenship for chewing gum.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on April 28, 2023, 10:50:01 AM

Quote from: Viteu on April 28, 2023, 10:22:52 AM"21. Administrative matters incidental to the functioning of the justice system."

What do you think this means?

It would mean that the Ziu would have the power to make laws to provide for the functioning of the justice system, such as specifying infrastructure, reporting, and procedural aspects.

The Ziu already has the power with the inferior corts. Why is it necessary to give the Ziu authority to control the CpI?

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on April 28, 2023, 10:50:01 AM

Quote from: Viteu on April 28, 2023, 10:22:52 AMLet's say this is adopted, and the Ziu set 90 days for a party to appeal to the CpI. What would happen if the party filed it on day 91?

Would it deprive the CpI of its appellate jurisdiction under VIII.2? 

Yes, I think?  We already have a lot of that.  G.3.2, for example, prohibits a judge from increasing the sentence of someone on appeal.  If someone is sentenced to a year of general civil disability for a crime, the Cort would be forbidden from increasing their sentence to two years on appeal.  This would be ensuring that such provisions -- which we have had for generations -- are firmly within the bounds of Organicity.

Where in the Organic Law does it give the Ziu the authority to strip the CpI of appellate jurisdiction? The reality is that Talossan statutes rarely, if ever, get challenged in cort. A statute's longevity on the books does not make it Organic. Also, the numerous amendments to the 1997 Organic Law and the adoption of the 2017 Organic Law with subsequent amendment may impact the constitutionality of a statute.
The text of G.3.2 predates the Judiciary Amendment of 2020.

Bringing in a point from the CCX case, Org.L.VIII.2 explicitly states that the CpI has appellate jurisdiction over all inferior corts established by the Ziu.  Org.L.VIII.6 states that matters arising under the Covenants are appealable as of right to the CpI. The Twelfth Covenant expressly grants ONLY the CpI authority to revoke citizenship as punishment for a crime. The Ziu decided to statutorily define what a Tribunal of the Crown is, ostensibly stripping the power of the CpI to sit as such, and then pass legislation saying that an appellate court, in this instance the CpI, cannot enlarge a criminal punishment on appeal, without actually stating where the Ziu gets this authority, which, in effect, strips the CpI of the power to revoke citizenship as a criminal punishment.

This is literally writing a provision out of the Covenants without going to the amendment procedure outlined in Org.L.XII.

If you disagree, explain how then the CpI could ever exercise that power?  Also, maybe perhaps point to where the Ziu has authority to regulate the CpI's appellate jurisdiction.

*Edit: This is partially addressed in the Commentary on El Regeu v. CCX thread. Insofar as the Tribunal can impose the punishment of loss of citizenship to be confirmed by the CpI, I'm fine with that. Insofar as the Ziu defined for which crimes loss of citizenship can be imposed, that is strictly reserved for the CpI. Insofar as that the Ziu thinks it established or gets to set the parameters of what can constitute the Tribunal of the Crown at the exclusion of the CpI, I'm not convinced that has Organic support.

Quote from: Üc R. Tärfă on April 28, 2023, 10:26:09 AM

Quote from: Viteu on April 28, 2023, 09:03:21 AM*I deleted my prior response because i'm on my phone and confused threads.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on April 28, 2023, 08:41:29 AM

Quote from: Viteu on April 28, 2023, 08:25:34 AMBut there is jurisprudence constante.

Which isn't binding, so it's nowhere near as important.

But to say precedent has no relevance in civil is nonsense.

Quote

QuoteI WILL SCREAM THIS FOR THE PEOPLE IN THE BACK--IF YOUR LEGISLATURE CAN ABOLISH YOUR HIGHEST COURT AT THE WHIM OF A SIMPLE MAJORITY, YOU DO NOT HAVE AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY.

Well I don't know how the UK handles this, but in countries with constitutions the highest court is usually outlined in the constitution, so abolishing it takes more than a simple majority.

The UK Supreme Court was literally created statute.

I'm not british, neither Marcel, so why you said "Your legisalture"?

Do you speak English? Are you aware of the generic you?

Quote from: Üc R. Tärfă on April 28, 2023, 10:26:09 AMMine can't, neither Marcel's. We do have indipendent judiciary, we do have separations of powers, our judicial system doesn't work like the american one, our judges doesn't "make" laws or crimes or doesn't "rule" on how the judicial system works (that's up to the legislature).

Again, whether judges can or cannot "make laws" IS NOT RELEVANT.

It amazes me how much Talossans not from the US lecture and admonish Talossans from the US about not knowing how other counties' judicial systems work WHEN THEY THEMSELVES KNOW ABSOLUTELY NOTHING ABOUT THE US JUDICIAL SYSTEM.

You people act like the US has absolutely no statutory law and every court is making up new law in every case every minute of every day.

You really do not seem to get it.  But because you're so insistent on constantly bringing up or referencing common law where it is completely irrelevant, I'll break it down for you.

"Common law, also known as case law, is a body of unwritten laws based on legal precedents established by the courts."

"Statutes generally have priority, or take precedence, over case law (judicial decisions)." In other words, the Legislature override the common law by enacting a statute.

"In general, common law is used to fill in gaps when no statutory law applies to a specific situation."

US federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.

There is no US federal general common law.

US federal courts cannot create a US federal common law in areas traditionally reserved for state courts. 


US federal common law "exists in two instances: where a federal rule of decision is 'necessary to protect uniquely federal interests' and where 'Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law.'"

US federal judges do not make criminal law, and there has been no US federal common law for crimes since 1812.  Only Congress can enact US federal criminal law. 

US federal court decisions interpreting, inter alia, statutes, regulations, or procedure, or filling in statutory gaps, form the basis for US federal common law. 

What remains of the common law can be found in state civil law, also known as statutory law.  For instance, the tort of negligence originated in common law (although many states have codified it into statute).  The concept of legal causation with respect to negligence was developed by case law.  Generally speaking, while state courts can recognize a new cause of action at common law (as opposed to one created by statute), it is rarely done today.  Most of the common law in the US concerns statutory interpretation in specific context.

For example, the most recent common law I dealt with was a decision from a state Supreme Court interpreting an appraisal statute for the purpose of deciding whether appraisal court proceeding adjudicates wrongdoing.

Another example—what US lawyers will look for is a case in which a court has addressed the same law and the same or analogous facts to say, "this is how the court should or must decide."  When I litigated, I found a case where I literally wrote in my brief, "One can simply replace the names of the parties in that matter with those in this one, and the facts are not compromised." The decision I cited was from the appellate court that reviewed orders to the trial court I was in. This made it binding.  In this context, lawyering in the common law system is 90% arguing by analogy or distinguishing cases.

This is it. That is all. It's not glamours. It's not hard to find. It's not difficult. It's not the courts taking on the role of the legislature.

AND NONE OF THIS HAS ANY RELEVANCE TO WHETHER THE ORGANIC LAW GRANTS THE ZIU AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE CpI.

Now, if you REALLLLLY want to get into the weeds, the biggest difference between our systems is not the common law-civil law distinction, which tend produce the same results/decisions, it's the adversarial system v. the inquisitorial system. Like, you treat your judges like investigators and attorneys like assistants.

Really, Talossa does not have this massively developed common law. There's maybe 20 cases, some of which may not even be binding given Organic and statutory changes. So why exactly do you keep using this as an excuse for not understanding our judicial system?

Quote from: Üc R. Tärfă on April 28, 2023, 10:26:09 AM

Quote

QuoteI don't know how that's relevant to the topic though. The legislature still has the (exclusive!) power to change civil and criminal procedure codes as it sees fit, just like with all other laws.

Unless the constitution grants the Legislature the exclusive right to do so.

Quote from: Viteu on April 28, 2023, 09:11:47 AM

Quote from: Üc R. Tärfă on April 28, 2023, 08:58:26 AMI agree 100% with Marcel.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on April 28, 2023, 08:41:29 AM

QuoteAlso, the separation of powers is rooted in civil law. I don't know why you lot cannot grasp that the civil law-common law question is just an excuse to not bothering to read the Org Law or understand it.

Separation of powers doesn't mean that the courts are above the law, or that the legislature mustn't make laws legislating court procedures. Again how is this relevant?

The fact that we don't read the Organic Law through the lenses of the US Constitution doesn't mean that we don't read the Organic Law. The world is not composed only of the US and the UK: Supremacy of Parliament in the UK constitution is not the only alternative to the US Constitution.

Org.L.VIII.1 was lifted from US Const. art. III § 1.

So?

QuoteOrg.L.VIII.2 is a truncated version of US Const. art. III § 2.

So?

Don't be glib. The fact that we lifted provisions out of another constitutional document is important to interpretation. But at least I bother to look at the Organic Law and provide the basis for my position.  All you're doing is granting the Ziu extra-Organic authority based on nothing. 

Quote from: Üc R. Tärfă on April 28, 2023, 10:26:09 AM

QuoteAgain, I prefer reading it through the lens of the Australian constitution because that is its closest analogue. We look to other countries with similar constitution and systems to interpret the org law. I've relied on several other countries (e.g. Australia, Pakistan, India) to interpret the Org Law in cort filings in Talossa.

Either point to the provisions in the Org Law that support your argument, or stop making up new powers for the Ziu. Because absent such provisions, your argument is anathema to civil law systems.

I'm not sure what you mean by "your argument is anathema to civil law systems". I'd say that your argument just proved what I said in this thread.

No, it didn't. Your argeement with Marcel that separation of powers doesn't mean that the legislature musn't make laws legsilating court procedures WHEN THE LEGISLATURE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO DO SO is an anathema to civil law and separation of powers.

YOU STILL HAVE NOT POINTED TO ANY ORGANIC PROVISION TO SUPPORT YOUR ARGUMENT.

"21. Administrative matters incidental to the functioning of the justice system."

What do you think this means?

Let's say this is adopted, and the Ziu set 90 days for a party to appeal to the CpI. What would happen if the party filed it on day 91?

Would it deprive the CpI of its appellate jurisdiction under VIII.2? 

Quote from: Üc R. Tärfă on April 28, 2023, 08:58:26 AMI agree 100% with Marcel.

Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on April 28, 2023, 08:41:29 AM

QuoteAlso, the separation of powers is rooted in civil law. I don't know why you lot cannot grasp that the civil law-common law question is just an excuse to not bothering to read the Org Law or understand it.

Separation of powers doesn't mean that the courts are above the law, or that the legislature mustn't make laws legislating court procedures. Again how is this relevant?

The fact that we don't read the Organic Law through the lenses of the US Constitution doesn't mean that we don't read the Organic Law. The world is not composed only of the US and the UK: Supremacy of Parliament in the UK constitution is not the only alternative to the US Constitution.

Org.L.VIII.1 was lifted from US Const. art. III § 1.

Org.L.VIII.2 is a truncated version of US Const. art. III § 2.

The UK and US frameworks are relevant for reasons already discussed.

Again, I prefer reading it through the lens of the Australian constitution because that is its closest analogue. We look to other countries with similar constitution and systems to interpret the org law. I've relied on several other countries (e.g. Australia, Pakistan, India) to interpret the Org Law in cort filings in Talossa.

Either point to the provisions in the Org Law that support your argument, or stop making up new powers for the Ziu. Because absent such provisions, your argument is anathema to civil law systems.