For the record, I have okayed this approach, based on multiple precedents that dictate that a bill's 10-day Hopper timer runs down from the initial draft, if the submitted version is still germane. Most recently, 62RZ26 was moved to the CRL the same day the final draft was posted, and the Advisory Opinion Removal bill was moved 8 days after the final version.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on Yesterday at 09:14:10 PMI'm not sure your tweaked #1 will work, since the Tuischac'h automatically leaves office at the end of the Cosa because the Cosa has been dissolved and there are no more MCs.  The Tuischac'h is the head of the Cosa, after all.  We'd need to write special provisions allowing that the Cosa continues even after its dissolution, but only in the person of the Tuischac'h, but also that they can't exercise any of the powers of the Cosa in their own person except for the ones specifically for their office.

I am aware, and I was consciously suggesting we enact exactly those provisions. The rationale being that we have given the Túischac'h some additional powers, beyond their core mission of moderating debate, that we also accept will go in abeyance for two months. How would you apply Lexh.C.2.1 and Lexh.C.3.1 during those two months?

(For the record - I would personally go even beyond that, and stipulate that outgoing MCs may also exercise some powers after dissolution, such as the power to petition for a prospective citizen's application to require a Ziu vote.)

But of course, it would be much simpler (but not equivalent, because this still means almost two months without a Túischac'h to wield those additional powers) to add a seniority provision similar to what is already used in the Senäts.

Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on Yesterday at 09:14:10 PMThe Tuischac'h is the head of the Cosa, after all.  We'd need to write special provisions allowing that the Cosa continues even after its dissolution, but only in the person of the Tuischac'h, but also that they can't exercise any of the powers of the Cosa in their own person except for the ones specifically for their office.

+1 on this.
I also think some reform of the Electoral Commission is needed independent of the Tuischac'h issue.
We also need to move beyond the CRL framework. I still support first reading, second reading, etc.

I'm not sure your tweaked #1 will work, since the Tuischac'h automatically leaves office at the end of the Cosa because the Cosa has been dissolved and there are no more MCs.  The Tuischac'h is the head of the Cosa, after all.  We'd need to write special provisions allowing that the Cosa continues even after its dissolution, but only in the person of the Tuischac'h, but also that they can't exercise any of the powers of the Cosa in their own person except for the ones specifically for their office.

I do agree that #3 is not a good idea... too easily manipulated.  That would essentially just be according any new Government the opportunity to extend their authority an additional month, since a majority can delay the election at will.

I think the solution might be simpler: rely on seniority when there is no elected Tuischac'h.  Whichever MC has been in office the longest should be accorded the privileges of Tuischac'h until one is elected.  In this case, I'm almost certain that would be Miestra, and (if she's conflicted out) MPF second.

Hello Mr. Secretary, I would like to Clark the following bills:

Sense of the Ziu: In Support of Decoloniality
Sense of the Ziu: When Agents Go Rogue
Sense of the Ziu: Climate Consequences

I wonder if we could use my okonomiyaki recipe as a Talaviachi recipe? If not, I think we should adopt musubi as a cultural food.

This bill has been rewritten as a Sense of the Ziu, because there does not seem to be any time for the CRL to get a proper look at it before the deadline for the First Clark; but there should be something worth discussing and voting for on on the First Clark. Depending on feedback, a new version may be submitted to the CRL in October.

Hello, yes. Please to be Clarking Sense of the Ziu: No More Loyalty Parades.

WHEREAS Organic Law V.4 guarantees Talossans the right to vote publicly rather than in a secret ballot;

AND WHEREAS public voting which is announced during the election has various negative effects, such as encouraging "copy-paste" voting and a "bandwagon" effect, both of which put parties whose voters prefer the secret ballot at a disadvantage, thus discriminating against them under Organic Law V.4;

AND WHEREAS the existing database already enables votes to be made public after the election, which removes these negative effects;

BE IT RESOLVED THAT IT IS THE SENSE OF THE ZIU that "public" votes should only be revealed after the election, so that they cannot be copy-pasted, and that they should not have an outsized effect on the election; and that the Chancery should report to the Ziu on options to make this effective.

I would strongly caution against 3, but would welcome 2 and would suggest 1 be tweaked so that the outgoing Túischac'h be allowed to perform every statutory function after Dissolution until a new incumbent is in place (so CRL, Chancery oversight and so on).