Quote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on Today at 07:59:16 AMI wouldn't put it exactly the way that Miestra did, but the basic idea is right: my party's voter base tends to be quite large, but less politically active. While more Talossans support the Progressive Alliance than any other party during elections, we have a smaller group of active citizens who are active between elections... for us, that ratio is larger than for any other party. So my question is whether or not this system would punish this voting population.
Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 17, 2026, 02:31:46 AMPROPOSED AMENDMENT TWO: REMOVING THE COPPER-FASTENING OF THE PROVINCIAL SENÄTS
Right now, amending the provincial basis of the Senäts would require a referendum win in every province, making it the least amendable of any OrgLaw provisions, including the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms. This amendment would retain a 2/3 Senäts majority needed to make such changes under the existing section XII.I.
Amend OrgLaw XII.4 as follows:QuoteProposed changes to this Organic Law that affectthe representation of a province in the Senäts, or ofthe territory or equal sovereignty of a province,shall not take effect unless approved by a majority of participating voters in that province.
Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 22, 2026, 07:32:14 PMHere is an alternative text of Amendment One, which would enable (but not mandate) an open-list system: that is, one where voters would have the option to choose specific candidates from one party list, or from more than one, depending on the details of the law. @Françal I. Lux and @Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP, is this something on which we can get cross-party consensus, and then perhaps figure out the details in the next Cosă?
The bit about the King being able to fill vacancies is there to avoid the "loophole" which is asserted to exist under the current provisions; i.e. a party can assert the right to give seats to whoever it wants if it can't fill the seats legally (making it quite easy to simply flout the law). Allowing the King to step in seems a middle ground between that and just keeping the seats vacant. It's a compromise which I'm happy to remove if it's not necessary.
PROPOSED AMENDMENT ONE: ENSURING THE ORGANICITY OF PARTY LISTS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN OPEN-LIST SYSTEM
OrgLaw IV.2 to be amended as follows:QuoteBased on the final results of the General Election, the Secretary of State shall calculate the apportionment of seats among the parties, hereinafter referred to as "party seats".
1. The party seats shall total 200, or another number which may be set by law, with the provisos that any such change will not take effect until the next election following the passage of a calendar year; and that this number may never be less than twice the number of Senators minus one.
2. Each party shall receive a percentage of party seats as equal as possible to its percentage of the popular vote, but each party shall receive a whole number of seats, and in turn, the Secretary of State shall assign these seats to candidates nominated by that party, in accordance with law. Any seats which cannot be assigned in accordance with law may be filled by the King according to his own best judgment, or left vacant.
3. The Secretary of State shall employ whatever mathematical formulae and calculations in the apportionment of seats as are set by law, or, in the absence of such law, as will best reflect the intentions of this Organic Law. The Uppermost Cort shall be the final judge in case of mathematical disputes.
4. Only registered political parties may obtain party seats. Parties which win votes but are not registered may not assume their seats in the Cosa until they register. The process to register a party shall be defined by law. The Secretary of State may request from all parties a registration fee, to be set by law, to cover the cost of the election. This fee shall be uniform for all parties.
OrgLaw IV.3 to be amended as follows:QuoteIn the case of vacant party seats occurring between elections, the Secretary of State shall inform the King and the leader of whatever party held the vacant seat. The Secretary of State shall assign the seat to another candidate of that party, in accordance with law. If this is not possible, the King may assign the seat according to his own best judgment in accordance with law, or otherwise leave the seats vacant.
Quote from: Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP on May 23, 2026, 05:52:23 AMQuote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on May 23, 2026, 01:59:48 AM(b) will this disadvantage the interests of my voter base, which is usually fairly broad but not very intense with active support, when compared to a voter base that is very intense but not as broad?
I'm not sure what this means, or how a candidates-based voting system would do anything like that.
Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 23, 2026, 04:50:42 PMBut what I really want to know is - would the good Baron agree, if this amendment were passed, that party lists as established by law would be indisputably Organic and enforceable? If not, there's not much point.
Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on May 23, 2026, 07:58:34 PMBTW, I fear the Baron might have a wrong idea that I/the URL are "out to get" the Senäts.
Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on Yesterday at 05:20:14 PMORGANIC LAW REFORM AMENDMENT THREE: EXPULSIONS
Add new OrgLaw IV.11:QuoteThe Cosa may impeach any of its members from the Chamber with a two-thirds majority vote. Following impeachment, a replacement will be chosen as otherwise provided in this Organic Law. Following a failed expulsion, the accused Member of the Cosa may not again be tried for the same offence, pursuant to the Seventh Covenant of the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms. The former Member of the Cosa is not barred from running for office in future elections as long as the former Member of the Cosa maintains citizenship.
EDITED TO ADD: You will note that this will require reform to the existing OrgLaw IV.3. Because if a party leader really has total discretion over filling vacancies, there would be nothing to stop them simply reappointing the expelled MC.
Quote from: Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC on April 30, 2026, 07:15:35 PMQuote from: Baron Alexandreu Davinescu on April 30, 2026, 05:21:11 PMI'll note that there's not clear guidance on when MZs should vote to expel one of their members.
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QuoteThe Cosa may impeach any of its members from the Chamber with a two-thirds majority vote. Following impeachment, a replacement will be chosen as otherwise provided in this Organic Law. Following a failed expulsion, the accused Member of the Cosa may not again be tried for the same offence, pursuant to the Seventh Covenant of the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms. The former Member of the Cosa is not barred from running for office in future elections as long as the former Member of the Cosa maintains citizenship.
| Pos | ± | Team | Pts Ove | Pts Today | |
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| 2nd | (=) | Els Talossaes Rexhital (REX) | 4900 | +504 | |
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| 4th | (+3) | Cézembre Caçeirs dals Mailintzarăs (BDC) | 4738 | +779 | |
| 5th | (=) | Velociposse Florencia (VFL) | 4666 | +535 | |
| 6th | (-2) | Cyclohexane (CHX) | 4637 | +352 | |
| 7th | (-1) | Team In The Wind (ITW) | 4567 | +599 | |
| 8th | (=) | Cézembre Fieschā (CFA) | 2845 | +341 |
Quote from: Mic'haglh Autófil, O.Be on May 25, 2026, 09:56:40 PMTo be clear, I have been reviewing this over the weekend here-and-there when I get a moment. I will be posting my thoughts when complete (should be mid-week, I'm just trying to do my due diligence is all).
Quote from: Breneir Tzaracomprada on May 16, 2026, 09:50:46 PM@Mic'haglh Autófil, O.Be @mximo Here is the draft which moves Florencia toward a system more in line with a blend of Fiova and Vuode. Provincial legislature includes all provincial citizens > that body appoints a two-person executive directorate. Elections and administration by a provincial SoS (Chancellor) and creates a one-person judicial review (Instrumental Conciliator).