Legal Repair Act

[Baron Alexandreu Davinescu]

"21. Administrative matters incidental to the functioning of the justice system."

What do you think this means?

It would mean that the Ziu would have the power to make laws to provide for the functioning of the justice system, such as specifying infrastructure, reporting, and procedural aspects.

Let's say this is adopted, and the Ziu set 90 days for a party to appeal to the CpI. What would happen if the party filed it on day 91?

Would it deprive the CpI of its appellate jurisdiction under VIII.2? 

Yes, I think?  We already have a lot of that.  G.3.2, for example, prohibits a judge from increasing the sentence of someone on appeal.  If someone is sentenced to a year of general civil disability for a crime, the Cort would be forbidden from increasing their sentence to two years on appeal.  This would be ensuring that such provisions -- which we have had for generations -- are firmly within the bounds of Organicity.

[Viteu]

"21. Administrative matters incidental to the functioning of the justice system."

What do you think this means?

It would mean that the Ziu would have the power to make laws to provide for the functioning of the justice system, such as specifying infrastructure, reporting, and procedural aspects.

The Ziu already has the power with the inferior corts. Why is it necessary to give the Ziu authority to control the CpI?

Let's say this is adopted, and the Ziu set 90 days for a party to appeal to the CpI. What would happen if the party filed it on day 91?

Would it deprive the CpI of its appellate jurisdiction under VIII.2? 

Yes, I think?  We already have a lot of that.  G.3.2, for example, prohibits a judge from increasing the sentence of someone on appeal.  If someone is sentenced to a year of general civil disability for a crime, the Cort would be forbidden from increasing their sentence to two years on appeal.  This would be ensuring that such provisions -- which we have had for generations -- are firmly within the bounds of Organicity.

Where in the Organic Law does it give the Ziu the authority to strip the CpI of appellate jurisdiction? The reality is that Talossan statutes rarely, if ever, get challenged in cort. A statute's longevity on the books does not make it Organic. Also, the numerous amendments to the 1997 Organic Law and the adoption of the 2017 Organic Law with subsequent amendment may impact the constitutionality of a statute.
The text of G.3.2 predates the Judiciary Amendment of 2020.

Bringing in a point from the CCX case, Org.L.VIII.2 explicitly states that the CpI has appellate jurisdiction over all inferior corts established by the Ziu.  Org.L.VIII.6 states that matters arising under the Covenants are appealable as of right to the CpI. The Twelfth Covenant expressly grants ONLY the CpI authority to revoke citizenship as punishment for a crime. The Ziu decided to statutorily define what a Tribunal of the Crown is, ostensibly stripping the power of the CpI to sit as such, and then pass legislation saying that an appellate court, in this instance the CpI, cannot enlarge a criminal punishment on appeal, without actually stating where the Ziu gets this authority, which, in effect, strips the CpI of the power to revoke citizenship as a criminal punishment.

This is literally writing a provision out of the Covenants without going to the amendment procedure outlined in Org.L.XII.

If you disagree, explain how then the CpI could ever exercise that power?  Also, maybe perhaps point to where the Ziu has authority to regulate the CpI's appellate jurisdiction.

*Edit: This is partially addressed in the Commentary on El Regeu v. CCX thread. Insofar as the Tribunal can impose the punishment of loss of citizenship to be confirmed by the CpI, I'm fine with that. Insofar as the Ziu defined for which crimes loss of citizenship can be imposed, that is strictly reserved for the CpI. Insofar as that the Ziu thinks it established or gets to set the parameters of what can constitute the Tribunal of the Crown at the exclusion of the CpI, I'm not convinced that has Organic support.

[Miestră Schivă, UrN]

Insofar as the Ziu defined for which crimes loss of citizenship can be imposed, that is strictly reserved for the CpI.

Is the argument here sincerely that the CpI can impose loss of citizenship for any crime it pleases? That's stretching the Organic text like chewing gum, based on a reading of "determined" in the Twelfth Covenant which is possible but mischievous.

[Viteu]

Insofar as the Ziu defined for which crimes loss of citizenship can be imposed, that is strictly reserved for the CpI.

Is the argument here sincerely that the CpI can impose loss of citizenship for any crime it pleases? That's stretching the Organic text like chewing gum, based on a reading of "determined" in the Twelfth Covenant which is possible but mischievous.

It is not a stretch. That is the plain and obvious meaning of the text.  If the Organic Law says that only the CpI can do the thing, and grants no other institution in Talodds authority to do the thing, then only the CpI can do the thing. 

The Organic Law has had this exact wording since at least 1999. (The third clause was added in 2013).

Obviously, this has not been an issue in the last 24 years. And it obviously has not been followed.

Nevertheless, I do actually prefer the scheme that my debate with discussion yielded – the Inferior Cort can impose it as a punishment, and it must be confirmed by the CpI. That, I think, shields the CpI from criminally punishing someone with revocation of citizenship for chewing gum.

[Üc R. Tärfă]

Nevertheless, I do actually prefer the scheme that my debate with discussion yielded – the Inferior Cort can impose it as a punishment, and it must be confirmed by the CpI. That, I think, shields the CpI from criminally punishing someone with revocation of citizenship for chewing gum.

Your debate? That was my interpretation!

You said and you are saying instead that Lexh.A is inorganic where (and in many other parts) it defines to which crimes lost of citizenship can be imposed, and that only the CpI can define that!

I explained here

[Viteu]

Nevertheless, I do actually prefer the scheme that my debate with discussion yielded – the Inferior Cort can impose it as a punishment, and it must be confirmed by the CpI. That, I think, shields the CpI from criminally punishing someone with revocation of citizenship for chewing gum.

Your debate? That was my interpretation!

You said and you are saying instead that Lexh.A is inorganic where (and in many other parts) it defines to which crimes lost of citizenship can be imposed, and that only the CpI can define that!

I explained here

And you are wrong there.