The "Reform" Plan

[Breneir Tzaracomprada]

The former is effectively what we're on now. Are you ok with making that a fixed schedule? Because if so then we at least have a starting point to work from.

@Mic'haglh Autófil, SMC EiP Would you be willing to elaborate on this? We would have a fixed schedule but still have elections every eight months or so?

I am still of the opinion that more time is needed between elections. If that extra space creates a multitude of fantasy leagues then so the better for the additional Talossanity.

[Mic’haglh Autófil, SMC EiP]

Okay, I guess I see what you're getting at.  So you're envisioning a situation where the Government collapses in such a way that they can't pick a new leader, and so the king decides who will be the next Seneschal until the election?

Correct -- these changes are intended to work in concert with each other, as I had thought out the pros and cons of my proposal pretty thoroughly. This may come as a surprise, but I'm not just sitting over here, throwing stuff at the wall to see what sticks. :P

The former is effectively what we're on now. Are you ok with making that a fixed schedule? Because if so then we at least have a starting point to work from.

@Mic'haglh Autófil, SMC EiP Would you be willing to elaborate on this? We would have a fixed schedule but still have elections every eight months or so?

I am still of the opinion that more time is needed between elections. If that extra space creates a multitude of fantasy leagues then so the better for the additional Talossanity.

Correct, if we are to simply fix the current election schedule (which is what I believe to be the Baron's preference), that would be equivalent to removing the dissolution of the Cosa on a failed VoC.

Obviously, from my original proposal, you and I are aligned on this, but this is the whole point of the process, building consensus.

I would be interested in hearing more from other MZs who have yet to express much of an opinion. @Dame Litz Cjantscheir, UrN and @Sir Lüc come to mind, though the latter will likely be a bit more taciturn given his potential to become SoS in the near future. S:reu Tafial weighed in a bit, though only on the Cosa apportionment method. Senators are of course also important in the process here.

[Baron Alexandreu Davinescu]

Okay, I guess I see what you're getting at.  So you're envisioning a situation where the Government collapses in such a way that they can't pick a new leader, and so the king decides who will be the next Seneschal until the election?

Correct -- these changes are intended to work in concert with each other, as I had thought out the pros and cons of my proposal pretty thoroughly. This may come as a surprise, but I'm not just sitting over here, throwing stuff at the wall to see what sticks. :P

That wasn't my implication.  I'm over here just literally trying to imagine a scenario where it might be a good thing for the king to pick the leader of the Government, since -- to be frank -- you spend very little time on the why of these proposals.

Okay, so currently the Seneschal is the person who can put together a majority.  Is there some reason to think that the king's pick would be able to put together a majority, under this proposal?  Or would the king's pick need special immunity to the end of the term?  Ordinarily, I'd assume that eliminating the king's only point of leverage against the legislature would weaken his ability to spur them into supporting his pick.  Walk me through this and why this change would be not only a good thing, but better than the current system.

[Breneir Tzaracomprada]

Obviously, from my original proposal, you and I are aligned on this, but this is the whole point of the process, building consensus.

I would be interested in hearing more from other MZs who have yet to express much of an opinion. @Dame Litz Cjantscheir, UrN and @Sir Lüc come to mind, though the latter will likely be a bit more taciturn given his potential to become SoS in the near future. S:reu Tafial weighed in a bit, though only on the Cosa apportionment method. Senators are of course also important in the process here.

Well, it is something of a relief, to not be alone on an issue. I join your call for others to chime in. I would note that my entry on annual elections in the Hopper is inspired by a previous proposal by the FreeDems senator @mpf so I assume he would vote for it.

[Mic’haglh Autófil, SMC EiP]

Okay, so currently the Seneschal is the person who can put together a majority.  Is there some reason to think that the king's pick would be able to put together a majority, under this proposal?  Or would the king's pick need special immunity to the end of the term?  Ordinarily, I'd assume that eliminating the king's only point of leverage against the legislature would weaken his ability to spur them into supporting his pick.  Walk me through this and why this change would be not only a good thing, but better than the current system.

As noted in the original proposal, MCs voting Non are asked to nominate a replacement Seneschal, which would certainly help a great deal towards forming a new majority. Of course, it is certainly possible that even if the VoC fails, not everyone will nominate the same replacement, and that is where the discretion becomes important. The King will be able to review the nominations and work out a successor in conjunction with the party leaders in the Cosa. Maybe everyone who votes Non votes for their own party's leader as a matter of simple partisanship, but ultimately in discussions with the Crown, arrive at one of the leaders overall. Maybe someone misses a VoC due to some emergency, but is able to return, and the incumbent Government is actually able to continue overall. In both of these examples, under our current system, the entire Cosa dissolves and then we spend a whole two months on an early election, which, if you agree that a fixed system is preferable, would be time we agree is better spent on running the country.

[Baron Alexandreu Davinescu]

As noted in the original proposal, MCs voting Non are asked to nominate a replacement Seneschal, which would certainly help a great deal towards forming a new majority. Of course, it is certainly possible that even if the VoC fails, not everyone will nominate the same replacement, and that is where the discretion becomes important. The King will be able to review the nominations and work out a successor in conjunction with the party leaders in the Cosa. Maybe everyone who votes Non votes for their own party's leader as a matter of simple partisanship, but ultimately in discussions with the Crown, arrive at one of the leaders overall. Maybe someone misses a VoC due to some emergency, but is able to return, and the incumbent Government is actually able to continue overall. In both of these examples, under our current system, the entire Cosa dissolves and then we spend a whole two months on an early election, which, if you agree that a fixed system is preferable, would be time we agree is better spent on running the country.

Okay, I can see the edge case where (a) the Government falls, (b) there's no successor who can themselves convince people to support them, and (c) the king is persuasive enough to convince the Cosa to support someone anyway.  That seems very unlikely to me.  Under your proposals, would this circumstance be more common than I might expect, or would you agree with me that this is an unlikely scenario?

I am not sure that I agree that it'd be better to have the monarch arrange a fill-in rather than call a new election if the Government fails a Vote of Confidence.  There might be some scenarios where that's hypothetically preferable, but isn't it more likely that the Government just had precarious support?

I guess it seems to me like a lot of this is planning for marginal circumstances out of convenience's sake, and not enough thought has been given to the long-term robustness of the arrangement.  I mean, for example, absent a royal veto of some kind, the monarchy will be eliminated as soon as it's slightly inconvenient to a future strong Government.  It seems like this plan is just pointing towards fairly quick abnegation of itself.

[Miestră Schivă, UrN]

All right, on the fixed schedule issue: I'm coming down as against it, solely on the basis that being able to declare a month of recess has been invaluable in the past. For example, if a Government hasn't got their act together to get a budget on the Second Clark, as it were.

But I am partial to the idea that the VoC needs to be reformed. It has operated as desired only once in all of Talossan history, if I remember right: the 46th Cosa, where one Government MC forgot to vote on the 5th Clark and so we had an election one month early.

But my preferred alternatives would be ones which work well globally:

a) a "constructive VoC" which takes the form of a regular Cosa-only bill naming a specific candidate for Seneschal. This would follow the current rule whereby you can't submit the same bill multiple times, thus preventing the same person trying to bring down the government every month. Should it fail, we're at status quo.

b) the ability of the King to dissolve the Cosa early or to declare a month of recess at the request of the Seneschal, or upon the Government losing the Budget bill but only if the King agrees that it's necessary and proper for good government.

[Mic’haglh Autófil, SMC EiP]

Okay, I can see the edge case where (a) the Government falls, (b) there's no successor who can themselves convince people to support them, and (c) the king is persuasive enough to convince the Cosa to support someone anyway.  That seems very unlikely to me.  Under your proposals, would this circumstance be more common than I might expect, or would you agree with me that this is an unlikely scenario?

Yes and no; keep in mind this reform does not distinguish between "failed votes of confidence" and "any other time we need a new Seneschal". It's just less likely to present an issue in the aftermath of a regularly-scheduled election (though, of course, as the 59th Cosa shows, not that much less likely).

I am not sure that I agree that it'd be better to have the monarch arrange a fill-in rather than call a new election if the Government fails a Vote of Confidence.  There might be some scenarios where that's hypothetically preferable, but isn't it more likely that the Government just had precarious support?

Would you not agree that "precarious support" is preferable to endless electioneering?

I guess it seems to me like a lot of this is planning for marginal circumstances out of convenience's sake, and not enough thought has been given to the long-term robustness of the arrangement.  I mean, for example, absent a royal veto of some kind, the monarchy will be eliminated as soon as it's slightly inconvenient to a future strong Government.  It seems like this plan is just pointing towards fairly quick abnegation of itself.

That would of course require the amendment be put to referendum; even without a royal veto, the Cosa would not suddenly be able to amend the Organic Law at whim. Nowhere have I suggested we should do away with referenda.

All right, on the fixed schedule issue: I'm coming down as against it, solely on the basis that being able to declare a month of recess has been invaluable in the past. For example, if a Government hasn't got their act together to get a budget on the Second Clark, as it were.

My proposal keeps the Month of Recess. Declaring such simply eliminates the last Clark of the Cosa term, pushing every remaining Clark of the term back a month instead.

a "constructive VoC" which takes the form of a regular Cosa-only bill naming a specific candidate for Seneschal. This would follow the current rule whereby you can't submit the same bill multiple times, thus preventing the same person trying to bring down the government every month. Should it fail, we're at status quo.

Now this idea I actually think could dovetail in well. Instead of the regularly-scheduled VoC, make it a specific bill to prevent overuse/abuse?

[Miestră Schivă, UrN]

All right, on the fixed schedule issue: I'm coming down as against it, solely on the basis that being able to declare a month of recess has been invaluable in the past. For example, if a Government hasn't got their act together to get a budget on the Second Clark, as it were.

My proposal keeps the Month of Recess. Declaring such simply eliminates the last Clark of the Cosa term, pushing every remaining Clark of the term back a month instead.

Cool, in favor of that. But again, removing the possibility of an early dissolution means a possible situation where the Government has lost the confidence of the majority, but the majority can't agree on a new candidate, thus meaning nothing can happen until the next election.

a "constructive VoC" which takes the form of a regular Cosa-only bill naming a specific candidate for Seneschal. This would follow the current rule whereby you can't submit the same bill multiple times, thus preventing the same person trying to bring down the government every month. Should it fail, we're at status quo.

Now this idea I actually think could dovetail in well. Instead of the regularly-scheduled VoC, make it a specific bill to prevent overuse/abuse?

Precisely.

Now, the reason I'm amenable to the "power swap" idea is that right now, there's not a mechanism for replacing the Seneschal should they quit/"vanish" and there's not a Distain for whatever reason. It might be good at least to let the King nominate an acting Seneschal until the Cosa gets its act together. There is also a weird ambiguity in the existing OrgLaw VI.2 which could be argued by troublemakers to forbid choosing a new Seneschal outside newly elected Cosas. I think we should fix that one way or the other.

[Mic’haglh Autófil, SMC EiP]

All right, on the fixed schedule issue: I'm coming down as against it, solely on the basis that being able to declare a month of recess has been invaluable in the past. For example, if a Government hasn't got their act together to get a budget on the Second Clark, as it were.

My proposal keeps the Month of Recess. Declaring such simply eliminates the last Clark of the Cosa term, pushing every remaining Clark of the term back a month instead.

Cool, in favor of that. But again, removing the possibility of an early dissolution means a possible situation where the Government has lost the confidence of the majority, but the majority can't agree on a new candidate, thus meaning nothing can happen until the next election.

[...]

Now, the reason I'm amenable to the "power swap" idea is that right now, there's not a mechanism for replacing the Seneschal should they quit/"vanish" and there's not a Distain for whatever reason. It might be good at least to let the King nominate an acting Seneschal until the Cosa gets its act together. There is also a weird ambiguity in the existing OrgLaw VI.2 which could be argued by troublemakers to forbid choosing a new Seneschal outside newly elected Cosas. I think we should fix that one way or the other.

I don't see any reason why these two can't be joined together. Frankly, closing the loopholes you've mentioned -- including making the royal nomination that of an "acting Seneschal" -- would cover "a possible situation where the Government has lost the confidence of the majority, but the majority can't agree on a new candidate", would it not?

[Miestră Schivă, UrN]

absent a royal veto of some kind, the monarchy will be eliminated as soon as it's slightly inconvenient to a future strong Governmen

Going to riff on this a little, although it's a bit of a side issue.

What this shows is a lack of confidence in the Monarchy being able to build long-term democratic legitimacy in Talossa. I mean, the UK has no written constitution, there is nothing to stop Parliament taking the King's head off (as they did in 1649) or replacing him (as they did in 1688). But they don't because the elites and the broad masses don't see any reason to do so. (Also precisely because His Maj never uses his own paper veto, though it is said that the monarchy lobbies strongly behind the scenes if a particular provision annoys them.)

But I suppose the idea of a monarchy which needs a veto to, er, defend its own existence (circular logic if ever I've heard of) goes along with the idea that, if a majority is allowed to make changes, we'll end up in a situation where we have a revolution every 8 months or so and Talossa will look like the aftermath of the 30 Years War or something. The central point is: a lack of faith in majority rule. And, for that matter, a lack of faith that the putative King Txec I will be able to win over enough Republicans that he wouldn't have to throw a thumb on the scales to keep his job! In Britain, for all I mock King Big Ears and his family, if Charlie got a bill from the Commons and the Lords force-retiring him, I'm sure he wouldn't say "nuh-uh, you'll have to fight me for it".

The problem is - as is shown by the inflexibility of the US constitution - if you deprive majorities of the ability to make changes (Senate filibuster, a fortiori the complexity of Constitutional Amendments), people will just do "end runs" around the democratic system if it reaches a dead end (viz. the current centrality of SCOTUS decisions). Another thing that I think we can learn from US politics is that, the more nothing can be done with the democratic system, the greater the incentive for politicians to strike fire-breathing radical poses, even murderous demagoguery, because they won't be called to deliver on their promises even if the win.

I'll say again: aside from an entrenched Organic Law and Covenant of Rights and Freedoms, in Talossa elections should have consequences more weighty than who gets to run the social media accounts.

[Baron Alexandreu Davinescu]

absent a royal veto of some kind, the monarchy will be eliminated as soon as it's slightly inconvenient to a future strong Governmen

Going to riff on this a little, although it's a bit of a side issue.

What this shows is a lack of confidence in the Monarchy being able to build long-term democratic legitimacy in Talossa.

No, quite the opposite, actually... it's short-term actions that worry me.  The monarchy already has to consistently maintain long-term democratic legitimacy, since two successive simple majorities would be enough to eliminate it, or one determined supermajority.

Your interpretation doesn't make any sense.

But I suppose the idea of a monarchy which needs a veto to, er, defend its own existence (circular logic if ever I've heard of) goes along with the idea that, if a majority is allowed to make changes, we'll end up in a situation where we have a revolution every 8 months or so and Talossa will look like the aftermath of the 30 Years War or something. The central point is: a lack of faith in majority rule.

This is phrased in kind of the most pejorative way possible, but yeah... that's the basic idea.  We don't have parliamentary sovereignty in the broadest sense, and that limits the amount of change that any single Government can enact.

As we have already seen, you and I have fairly different views on this.  I think these limits are good, since otherwise our remarkably fragile institutions would be mostly smashed-up at this point.  It's entirely possible for a Government to do permanent damage to Talossa, especially since we have few physical anchors.  My town would continue existing no matter how badly it was governed, and if it was governed badly enough then outside forces or its own citizens would act to correct it.  Talossa just... doesn't have that.  A bad Government could break the country and destroy it forever.  This is not hyperbole.  It's obvious fact.  And so the only sane way to design a system needs to limit the ability of a Government to enact its will.

So yeah... I like Talossa, and I would like it to survive.  I think we should act on the basis of at least a Civics 101 level of knowledge in that regard.

The problem is - as is shown by the inflexibility of the US constitution - if you deprive majorities of the ability to make changes (Senate filibuster, a fortiori the complexity of Constitutional Amendments), people will just do "end runs" around the democratic system if it reaches a dead end (viz. the current centrality of SCOTUS decisions).

As before, we're talking about a spectrum.  The choice isn't "maximum veto points" or "no checks" -- there's a pretty broad range in between.  It's obviously not too hard to do things in Talossa, because laws are rearranged all the time and to a wide degree.

Another thing that I think we can learn from US politics is that, the more nothing can be done with the
democratic system, the greater the incentive for politicians to strike fire-breathing radical poses, even murderous demagoguery, because they won't be called to deliver on their promises even if the win.

This does not seem to be happening.

[Baron Alexandreu Davinescu]

But my preferred alternatives would be ones which work well globally:

a) a "constructive VoC" which takes the form of a regular Cosa-only bill naming a specific candidate for Seneschal. This would follow the current rule whereby you can't submit the same bill multiple times, thus preventing the same person trying to bring down the government every month. Should it fail, we're at status quo.

b) the ability of the King to dissolve the Cosa early or to declare a month of recess at the request of the Seneschal, or upon the Government losing the Budget bill but only if the King agrees that it's necessary and proper for good government.

These seem like reasonable options and this might be a fruitful discussion to have, regardless of these proposals.

[Baron Alexandreu Davinescu]

Okay, I can see the edge case where (a) the Government falls, (b) there's no successor who can themselves convince people to support them, and (c) the king is persuasive enough to convince the Cosa to support someone anyway.  That seems very unlikely to me.  Under your proposals, would this circumstance be more common than I might expect, or would you agree with me that this is an unlikely scenario?

Yes and no; keep in mind this reform does not distinguish between "failed votes of confidence" and "any other time we need a new Seneschal". It's just less likely to present an issue in the aftermath of a regularly-scheduled election (though, of course, as the 59th Cosa shows, not that much less likely).

Clearly, the king should only be exercising this power when there's some doubt about who has a majority, so I assume that he wouldn't be allowed to reject someone with a letter of majority, right?  So it should still only apply for failed VoCs... which are, I assure you, exceedingly rare.

You do seem to be planning just for this fairly unusual edge case.

I am not sure that I agree that it'd be better to have the monarch arrange a fill-in rather than call a new election if the Government fails a Vote of Confidence.  There might be some scenarios where that's hypothetically preferable, but isn't it more likely that the Government just had precarious support?

Would you not agree that "precarious support" is preferable to endless electioneering?

I'm not sure I buy this false binary.  If a Government can't maintain a confidence vote, then probably another election is going to usually be a correct move.  And there has never been a time when a Government lost a confidence vote and then the next election had a similar outcome... the election has solved the issue.

And again, I don't understand the logic of justifying this system by pointing to these weird edge cases.

I guess it seems to me like a lot of this is planning for marginal circumstances out of convenience's sake, and not enough thought has been given to the long-term robustness of the arrangement.  I mean, for example, absent a royal veto of some kind, the monarchy will be eliminated as soon as it's slightly inconvenient to a future strong Government.  It seems like this plan is just pointing towards fairly quick abnegation of itself.

That would of course require the amendment be put to referendum; even without a royal veto, the Cosa would not suddenly be able to amend the Organic Law at whim. Nowhere have I suggested we should do away with referenda.

Name the last rejected referendum.

[Miestră Schivă, UrN]

But my preferred alternatives would be ones which work well globally:

a) a "constructive VoC" which takes the form of a regular Cosa-only bill naming a specific candidate for Seneschal. This would follow the current rule whereby you can't submit the same bill multiple times, thus preventing the same person trying to bring down the government every month. Should it fail, we're at status quo.

b) the ability of the King to dissolve the Cosa early or to declare a month of recess at the request of the Seneschal, or upon the Government losing the Budget bill but only if the King agrees that it's necessary and proper for good government.

These seem like reasonable options and this might be a fruitful discussion to have, regardless of these proposals.

While doing research for this, I realised that according to OrgLaw VI.3, the King has no discretion to refuse a Seneschal's request for an early dissolution - a power which has never been used, but which I'm not in favour of because it *does* allow a government to give a unilateral finger to the legislature. Even the near-powerless President of Ireland has the right to refuse a dissolution if he thinks an alternative government can be formed.