The Fixed Electoral Date Amendment

[Mic’haglh Autófil, SMC EiP]

WHEREAS, the standardization of the electoral schedule is beneficial to the further development of non-political activity in Talossa, and

WHEREAS, the nationwide discussions on consensus have demonstrated a desire to fix the length of Cosă terms, and

WHEREAS, this makes modifications to confidence votes and Cosă dissolutions necessary,

BE IT RESOLVED that the following Amendments to the Organic Law are made:

• Article IV, Section 7, which currently reads:

  A newly elected Ziu shall convene on the first day of the month after its general election, to coincide with the publication of the first Clark. Its term shall be equal to seven Clarks, subject to the provisions elsewhere in this Organic Law. During its last month, the King shall issue a Writ of Dissolution ending its term. Whenever the Cosâ may be dissolved, all its members shall resign.

  shall be amended to read:

  A newly elected Ziu shall convene on the first day of the month after its general election, to coincide with the publication of the first Clark. Its term shall be equal to six Clarks, subject to the provisions elsewhere in this Organic Law. During its last month, the King shall issue a Writ of Dissolution ending its term. Whenever the Cosă may be dissolved, all its members shall resign.

• Article IV, Section 8, which currently reads as follows:

  The Seneschal may insert between any two Clarks, or after the final Clark, a "month of recess" in which no Clark is published. No more than one "month of recess" may be declared during any one term of office.

  is hereby amended to read:

  The Seneschal may insert in place of any single Clark, a "month of recess" in which no Clark is published. No more than one "month of recess" may be declared during any one term of office.

• Article IV, Section 9, which currently reads as follows:

  The Seneschal may appeal to the King to issue a Writ of Dissolution to dissolve the Cosa before its term has expired and call new elections. If the appeal is presented accompanied by the explicit support of members of the Cosa representing a majority of seats therein, the King shall dissolve the Cosa effective immediately or, should there be a Clark in progress, upon the completion of the Clark. If the appeal lacks such an explicit expression of support from a majority of the Cosa, the King shall not act on the appeal for a period of three days following its receipt, and shall then accede to the appeal but only if the Crown has not been presented during that time with a petition, supported by members of the Cosa representing more than half the seats therein, praying that the Cosa be not dissolved. A Writ, once issued, takes effect only at the end of the month in which it was issued, and may be rescinded before it has taken effect.

  is replaced in its entirety with the following:

  The King shall issue a Writ of Dissolution to dissolve the Cosă in the month of August in odd-numbered Gregorian years, and in the months of April and December in even-numbered Gregorian years. A Writ, once issued, takes effect only at the end of the month in which it was issued, and may not be rescinded before it has taken effect.

• Article VI, Section 2, which reads:

  The Seneschal shall be selected by each newly elected Cosâ. When the King is presented with a petition to appoint a Seneschal, signed by MCs who together hold a majority of seats in the Cosâ as then constituted, the person named in the petition shall be appointed by the King to be the Seneschal. Should no such petition be made by the first day of the first Clark, that Clark shall include a Ranked Choice Vote to select the Seneschal. Each party holding seats in the Cosa may nominate one candidate for this election.

  is amended to read:

  The Seneschal shall be selected by the Cosă, including a mandatory selection by each newly elected Cosă. Whenever the King is presented with a petition to appoint a Seneschal, signed by MCs who together hold a majority of seats in the Cosă as then constituted, the person named in the petition shall be appointed by the King to be the Seneschal. Should no such petition be made by the first day of the first Clark, that Clark shall include a Ranked Choice Vote to select the Seneschal. Each party holding seats in the Cosă may nominate one candidate for this election.

• Article VI, Section 3, which reads:

  The Seneschal has duties of the State. He may advise the King to dissolve the Cosâ and to appoint and remove members of the Cabinet, and such advice to the King shall not be refused. He may also declare war and write treaties with the approval of the Ziu, expedite the Ziu's consideration of legislation, and issue Prime Dictates.

  shall be amended by removal of the phrase "to dissolve the Cosâ and ".
• Article VII, Section 8, which currently reads:

  The Clark must contain, in every edition, a Vote of Confidence. Each MC may answer this question in his Clark ballot every month, either with a "yes" or a "no." If at the end of any Clark the "no" vote outnumbers the "yes" vote, the King shall dissolve the Cosa and call new elections.

  is replaced in its entirety with the following:

  Members of the Cosă may submit a Constructive Motion of No Confidence to the Clark, which shall not be subject to the normal process of legislative review. This bill is voted on by the Cosă only, and must name a specific candidate for Seneschal. Should a majority of votes cast on this bill be in support, the candidate named therein becomes Seneschal. Such a bill may not be vetoed by the King, and any Seneschal removed from office by such a bill is prohibited from becoming Seneschal again until after the passage of a general election.

Uréu q'estadra så:
Mic'haglh Autófil MC

[Mic’haglh Autófil, SMC EiP]

As a brief explanation of each change:

#1 clarifies that there are six months to a Cosă term; coupled with the two months required for an election, this produces an eight-month long cycle overall, which means three Cosăs over a span of two years.

#2 changes months of recess in that they no longer push subsequent Clarks back, becoming a simple substitution to keep elections on schedule.

#3 changes when the King may (or must, going forward) issue Writs of Dissolution.

#4 clarifies that majority petitions to name a new Seneschal may be presented at any time, while still mandating that they be performed at the start of a Cosă term.

#5 removes the Seneschal's ability to request a premature Writ of Dissolution.

#6 alters the Organic basis of how Votes of Confidence work, creating the Constructive Motion of No Confidence in its place.

There are a few changes that are also necessary to El Lexhatx to fully complete this portion of the reforms, which I do already have a draft of, but I see no sense in formally proposing those before this amendment is ratified by the people.

[Breneir Tzaracomprada]

It was expected but is still, no less, disappointing to not see annual elections in the package. Something to keep championing, I suppose. I'm glad you've gotten this far Mic'haglh. Open Society supports this legislation.

[Munditenens Tresplet]

#3 changes when the King may (or must, going forward) issue Writs of Dissolution.

#5 removes the Seneschal's ability to request a premature Writ of Dissolution.

Why?

#6 alters the Organic basis of how Votes of Confidence work, creating the Constructive Motion of No Confidence in its place.

I disagree with this fundamental change to how the Cosa has always operated. Also, what would prevent an MC from bringing a motion every single Clark, effectively functioning as the VoC?

[Mic’haglh Autófil, SMC EiP]

It was expected but is still, no less, disappointing to not see annual elections in the package. Something to keep championing, I suppose. I'm glad you've gotten this far Mic'haglh. Open Society supports this legislation.

We can keep pushing for it. Perhaps it's just because I have Thursday Night Football on at the moment, but sometimes it's better to take the three points and kick the field goal, you know?

#3 changes when the King may (or must, going forward) issue Writs of Dissolution.

#5 removes the Seneschal's ability to request a premature Writ of Dissolution.

Why?

#6 alters the Organic basis of how Votes of Confidence work, creating the Constructive Motion of No Confidence in its place.

I disagree with this fundamental change to how the Cosa has always operated. Also, what would prevent an MC from bringing a motion every single Clark, effectively functioning as the VoC?

On your first question, premature Writs of Dissolution would seem incompatible with the idea of a fixed electoral schedule, would they not?

On your second -- in addition to the current VoC model being incompatible with a fixed term length -- in those El Lex. changes I mentioned earlier, it is required that the CMoNC name a specific candidate to take over as Seneschal. Since identical (or even substantially identical) bills are prohibited from being proposed twice in the same term, the Opposition would need to propose a new candidate every month. Seems like it would be smart to not completely empty your clip of prospective candidates beforehand, no?

[Sir Lüc]

Chiming in against my own better judgement because I should really get back to work, but 1) I broadly support this bill, and 2):

Since identical (or even substantially identical) bills are prohibited from being proposed twice in the same term, the Opposition would need to propose a new candidate every month.

Technically this provision is not applicable - a CMoNC would be a motion by its own definition, not a bill.

(Incidentally, this would also mean Senses of the Ziu are not limited by H.2.1.6.1. - a nonbinding resolution is also not a bill.)

[Sir Txec dal Nordselvă, UrB]

I agree with Sir Luc that the constructive motion is exactly that, a motion, not legislation. If it isn't hoppered, the law against duplication doesn't apply. The same person could move for the same Seneschal as many times as he or she wished to under this legislation.

[Breneir Tzaracomprada]

(Incidentally, this would also mean Senses of the Ziu are not limited by H.2.1.6.1. - a nonbinding resolution is also not a bill.)

Music to my ears, these words.

[Mic’haglh Autófil, SMC EiP]

Chiming in against my own better judgement because I should really get back to work, but 1) I broadly support this bill, and 2):

Technically this provision is not applicable - a CMoNC would be a motion by its own definition, not a bill.

(Incidentally, this would also mean Senses of the Ziu are not limited by H.2.1.6.1. - a nonbinding resolution is also not a bill.)

I agree with Sir Luc that the constructive motion is exactly that, a motion, not legislation. If it isn't hoppered, the law against duplication doesn't apply. The same person could move for the same Seneschal as many times as he or she wished to under this legislation.

If that bit about skipping legislative review were removed, but then Lex.H.2.1.2 were further amended to permit these to bypass the CRL, which was really the intent to begin with, would that move it into the territory of "non-repeatable act"?

[Munditenens Tresplet]

On your first question, premature Writs of Dissolution would seem incompatible with the idea of a fixed electoral schedule, would they not?

It is absolutely compatible. We can still have a fixed election schedule of Clarks while allowing for the possibility of a premature Writ of Dissolution. It would merely shift the schedule. The only "issue" with our current election schedule is the idea that months of recess can be added rather than replace Clarks.

I think it's ridiculous to suggest that the remedy for no confidence in a government would not be to call for an immediate election, but rather just to have the current Cosa try to elect a new Seneschal. Especially when each motion requires a candidate to be selected, meaning that the Cosa that already has no confidence in the current government must somehow solidify behind another individual? So, in other words, a government which lost the confidence of its parliament gets to remain in power because that same parliament will also not agree on a midterm replacement.

And not to belabor the point, but assuming this situation arises, how bad is this government? Did the ministers resign en masse? Will Talossa's entire cabinet be led by a single individual Seneschal who doesn't possess the confidence of its parliament for several months because the King no longer possesses any power to call for early dissolution, and the Cosa no longer has the power to order it either?

By the way, I won't repeat what has been said above about a motion of no confidence technically allowing for the same Seneschal candidate to be placed on each Clark, which defeats the purpose of removing the VoC. But I would point out, nothing prohibits multiple motions from being made in the same Clark for different people. (Nor should it, because forcing a first come first serve motion would encourage the government to put up a deputy for every motion just to vote them down.) Additionally, nothing prevents a single MC (hint) who isn't afraid of stirring the pot from making several no confidence motions in the same Clark each nominating another MC to be Seneschal (because nothing requires the nominated MC to accept the nomination, which would create more issues), repeating in every single Clark, until the Clarks are nothing more than entire lists of no confidence motions each time.

And if we decide to make this motion non-repeatable if the same candidate is listed, then nothing stops the government from doing what I just said above, only all in the first Clark, thereby preventing anyone else from nominating anybody in a subsequent Clark.

Or, we could just keep the VoC.

(And I forgot, if the Cosa elects a new Seneschal with 30-60 days left in a government term, would this be enough time for the outgoing government to transition the information necessary to run the country to the new Seneschal's government? Is there a known period of delay built in like there would be with, say, a general election period?)

[Breneir Tzaracomprada]

Additionally, nothing prevents a single MC (hint) who isn't afraid of stirring the pot from making several no confidence motions in the same Clark each nominating another MC to be Seneschal (because nothing requires the nominated MC to accept the nomination, which would create more issues), repeating in every single Clark, until the Clarks are nothing more than entire lists of no confidence motions each time.

👁👄👁

[Mic’haglh Autófil, SMC EiP]

We can still have a fixed election schedule ... It would merely shift the schedule.

I think it's ridiculous to suggest that the remedy for no confidence in a government would not be to call for an immediate election, but rather just to have the current Cosa try to elect a new Seneschal. Especially when each motion requires a candidate to be selected, meaning that the Cosa that already has no confidence in the current government must somehow solidify behind another individual?

Seems to be working rather well for Norway, actually. The Storting is constitutionally required to serve its full term, but the Norwegian PM must retain the chamber's confidence.

And not to belabor the point, but assuming this situation arises, how bad is this government? Did the ministers resign en masse? Will Talossa's entire cabinet be led by a single individual Seneschal who doesn't possess the confidence of its parliament for several months because the King no longer possesses any power to call for early dissolution, and the Cosa no longer has the power to order it either?

That situation (emphasis mine) is entirely what the motion's availability avoids in the first place.

By the way, I won't repeat what has been said above about a motion of no confidence technically allowing for the same Seneschal candidate to be placed on each Clark, which defeats the purpose of removing the VoC. But I would point out, nothing prohibits multiple motions from being made in the same Clark for different people. (Nor should it, because forcing a first come first serve motion would encourage the government to put up a deputy for every motion just to vote them down.) Additionally, nothing prevents a single MC (hint) who isn't afraid of stirring the pot from making several no confidence motions in the same Clark each nominating another MC to be Seneschal (because nothing requires the nominated MC to accept the nomination, which would create more issues), repeating in every single Clark, until the Clarks are nothing more than entire lists of no confidence motions each time.

And if we decide to make this motion non-repeatable if the same candidate is listed, then nothing stops the government from doing what I just said above, only all in the first Clark, thereby preventing anyone else from nominating anybody in a subsequent Clark.

Fair enough, I will concede that the bill as originally written does produce a better outcome. I do want to touch on the part I've italicized though -- expand on these issues you foresee.

Or, we could just keep the VoC.

Sure, if a failure thereof would simply result in the Leader of the Opposition becoming Seneschal, so as to not derail the schedule.

(And I forgot, if the Cosa elects a new Seneschal with 30-60 days left in a government term, would this be enough time for the outgoing government to transition the information necessary to run the country to the new Seneschal's government? Is there a known period of delay built in like there would be with, say, a general election period?)

There is not, but I can see the wisdom in building in a transitional period.

[Munditenens Tresplet]

You assume that a government which loses the confidence of parliament would choose the leader of the opposition as Seneschal. This may not always be the case. If a Seneschal loses the support of its ministers, why would the ministers coalesce around the leader of a party that doesn't share their ideologies? And if they put up someone else in a motion, why would the opposition parties want to coalesce around someone who they still detest, just perhaps detest less?

A VoC as currently used would cut out these problems, by leaving any problems up to the people to resolve in a GE--with the leaders making their cases directly to them.

And, yes, a fixed election schedule is still possible. How many times has a VoC actually failed? How many times has the King been petitioned for a Writ of Dissolution? It is exceedingly rare, but yet, it needs to remain a possibility. And if the rare situation happens, then the "schedule" of say July elections becomes a "schedule" of March elections instead. One tiny shift owing to circumstances that are unlikely to repeat is not going to derail the entire fixed election scheme. Moreover, it's not like this is going to permanently change either, since a Ziu in a few years might decide to do something different and change the law again.

As far as requiring an MC to accept the nomination of Seneschal before a motion is submitted to a Clark, now you have to have some period of time built in for the person to respond to the nomination that they would accept it. A week? 10 days? Ok, so what if something catastrophic happened in the government inside that timeframe, now the Cosa has to wait another month before they could potentially vote on someone to replace the Seneschal?

If you want to remove the possibility of Writs of Dissolution to ensure the government can't mess with a set election schedule, fine, but I think that the VoC should be kept for those rare instances where it is necessary for the people to weigh in on a change in government.

I will concede, though, that a VoC which automatically results in the leader of the largest party in opposition becoming Seneschal (rather than this motion thing) would take away a lot of these arguments above, save for my belief that the voters should immediately weigh in.

[Breneir Tzaracomprada]

Seems to be working rather well for Norway, actually. The Storting is constitutionally required to serve its full term, but the Norwegian PM must retain the chamber's confidence.

I agree with MC Autofil's point here and am in full support of this reform. If a new proposed Seneschal, from the governing party or coalition, can garner the Ziu's confidence then it avoids another heated and unnecessary election. The procedure by which confidence is tested is something on which I am open but eliminating the failed VOC > immediate dissolution > election process (with no ability to test confidence for other proposed PMs is something I support.

[Munditenens Tresplet]

Seems to be working rather well for Norway, actually. The Storting is constitutionally required to serve its full term, but the Norwegian PM must retain the chamber's confidence.

I agree with MC Autofil's point here and am in full support of this reform. If a new proposed Seneschal, from the governing party or coalition, can garner the Ziu's confidence then it avoids another heated and unnecessary election. The procedure by which confidence is tested is something on which I am open but eliminating the failed VOC > immediate dissolution > election process (with no ability to test confidence for other proposed PMs is something I support.

You are shifting the election to the Ziu rather than the people. And given Talossa's electoral history, I would doubt that any Ziu would coalesce behind another single individual to lead them. So, once again, we're back to keeping in an unsupported government. Comparisons to real world examples are fine, except when we remember that Talossa is a very small community with very personal disagreements that extend into the political realm.