Upper House of Review Amendment

[Mic’haglh Autófil, O.Be]

I note that this bill would make the first sentence of the modified clause a lie.  "The Senäts shall have equal powers with the Cosa in respect of all proposed laws" will no longer be true.  There will only be two categories of bills for which the Senäts will be equal to the Cosa.  That might be something you want to fix.

Under your interpretation, the first sentence of the modified clause is already a lie -- the clause goes on to describe a class of bills in which the Senäts is already unequal to the Cosă. I'm interested in hearing what others think about the wording, though.

Can you explain to me why having an upper house that has the authority to reject bills or send them back down is a bad thing? I can perhaps understand the ability of the Cosa to override but do we need to strip them of power in order to accomplish the same purpose?

I thought this was still a good question that didn't actually quite get answered.  The explanation went into the nature of the change in detail, but without saying why it was desirable.  Why would we want to do this?

There are a few reasons:
- One, it does not allow truly vital legislation to be hung up forever on the Senäts. Since, of course, bills addressing a given issue can only be considered once per term, this allows the Senäts to effectively kick the can down the road on any issue they wish to obstruct the government on.
- The more overarching, "philosophical" reason is that Talossa is not a federal nation. I know we've compared our constitutional structure to Australia before -- and in fact I believe @Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC has stated that similarities are intentional -- but the reality is that we are more like Spain than Australia: a unitary state, divided into provinces that may legislate on certain areas on their own. A "strong" upper house (or at least one as strong as the Senäts) is incompatible with the concept of responsible government in a unitary state. To return to the Australian comparison, they are federal in nature, and this juxtaposition between responsible government and federalism precipitated what is likely their most dire constitutional crisis:

As in most Westminster system parliaments, Australia's government is ordinarily formed by the party enjoying the confidence of the lower house of parliament, the House of Representatives. Australia's Parliament also has a powerful upper house, the Senate, which must pass any bill initiated by the House of Representatives if it is to become law. The composition of the Senate, in which each state has an equal number of senators regardless of that state's population, was originally designed to attract the Australian colonies into one Federation. Some at the time of Federation saw the contradiction in the Constitution between responsible government, in which the executive owes its existence to the legislature or one dominant house of the legislature, and, federations with the houses of bicameral legislatures operating independently and possibly deadlocking. Certain delegates predicted that either responsible government would result in the federation becoming a unitary state or federalism would result in an executive closer to federal theory. For instance, delegate Winthrop Hackett stated at the 1891 Convention that as a result of the combination of a strong Senate with responsible government, "there will be one of two alternatives—either responsible government will kill federation, or federation in the form in which we shall, I hope, be prepared to accept it, will kill responsible government".

A few things I would ask sceptics to keep in mind:
- A "house of sober second thought" is the usual role for the upper house in parliamentary legislatures (House of Lords, Canadian Senate, the German and Austrian Bundesrats, the House of Councillors in Japan, etc.)
- This change will also likely lead to a "de-politicization" of Senäts elections, which is healthy if we're trying to make Talossa a more tolerable place for people to spend their time.
- I know you personally have expressed several points of opposition to unicameralism before, chief among those being a safeguard on excessive Organic amendments. Please note that the requirement of the Senäts' consent is not affected in cases of Organic amendment.

[Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC]

I know we've compared our constitutional structure to Australia before -- and in fact I believe @Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC has stated that similarities are intentional

The main force in writing the 1997 Organic Law was E. Gallagher, who was (and still is) an Australian lawyer, and that's why large sections look just like the Australian constitution.

I would also point out that, in being able to vote down the Budget and thus collapse a Government, Australia's Senate is stupidly overpowered by global Upper House standards - almost as much so as the US Senate, where the less democratic House is *more* powerful because that's what passed for cutting-edge political thought in 1787.

The underlying theme of this bill is that Talossa is *not* a federal country, the provinces post-date the Kingdom, and thus the more democratically elected House should have final say.

[Baron Alexandreu Davinescu]

I note that this bill would make the first sentence of the modified clause a lie.  "The Senäts shall have equal powers with the Cosa in respect of all proposed laws" will no longer be true.  There will only be two categories of bills for which the Senäts will be equal to the Cosa.  That might be something you want to fix.

Under your interpretation, the first sentence of the modified clause is already a lie -- the clause goes on to describe a class of bills in which the Senäts is already unequal to the Cosă. I'm interested in hearing what others think about the wording, though.

Those are exceptions to the general principle of equality, but now we'd be moving to a new principle where the Senäts is subordinate to the Cosa.  I think it could cause problems if we simultaneously say that two entities are equal in power, but also one of them is subordinate to the other when it comes to their core function.  It makes more sense to be honest about the new arrangement, especially when we think about corts interpreting this down the road.

Could you give an example of legislation that's truly vital that we've been unable to pass thanks to the Senäts?

There are a few reasons:
- One, it does not allow truly vital legislation to be hung up forever on the Senäts. Since, of course, bills addressing a given issue can only be considered once per term, this allows the Senäts to effectively kick the can down the road on any issue they wish to obstruct the government on.

An identical bill can't be attempted in the same term, but a given issue can be considered every single Clark.  Indeed, that'd be good procedure: if your bill on an important issue fails, compromise enough to get a different version passed the next month -- or campaign on it and get sufficient power to pass it.

If half the country's provincial representatives don't want to pass something, then it probably shouldn't pass until it's in a form they can tolerate, or until an election has shown the will of the electorate.

- The more overarching, "philosophical" reason is that Talossa is not a federal nation. I know we've compared our constitutional structure to Australia before -- and in fact I believe @Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC has stated that similarities are intentional -- but the reality is that we are more like Spain than Australia: a unitary state, divided into provinces that may legislate on certain areas on their own. A "strong" upper house (or at least one as strong as the Senäts) is incompatible with the concept of responsible government in a unitary state.

I don't find the aesthetic argument very persuasive.  We shouldn't change something that serves an important purpose just so we can mimic other countries, unless there's good practical reasoning to do so.

- This change will also likely lead to a "de-politicization" of Senäts elections, which is healthy if we're trying to make Talossa a more tolerable place for people to spend their time.

Why would it do this?

- I know you personally have expressed several points of opposition to unicameralism before, chief among those being a safeguard on excessive Organic amendments. Please note that the requirement of the Senäts' consent is not affected in cases of Organic amendment.

This is an important point... subordinating the Senäts to the Cosa does seem like a prelude to getting rid of the Senäts itself.

[Mic’haglh Autófil, O.Be]

Could you give an example of legislation that's truly vital that we've been unable to pass thanks to the Senäts?

Admittedly, since the Government usually controls the Senäts, it usually does not come up.

I suppose then that as we live in unusual times, we will see if something does.

If half the country's provincial representatives don't want to pass something, then it probably shouldn't pass until it's in a form they can tolerate, or until an election has shown the will of the electorate.

A point the Seneschal may come to regret making.

I don't find the aesthetic argument very persuasive.  We shouldn't change something that serves an important purpose just so we can mimic other countries, unless there's good practical reasoning to do so.

I know you don't, this was an argument addressed to the open-minded.

Why would it do this?

Because it removes the Senate from the "political" side of the legislative process, much the same way as most other upper houses -- even elected ones -- are not seen as being as politically-charged as their lower partners.

This is an important point... subordinating the Senäts to the Cosa does seem like a prelude to getting rid of the Senäts itself.

This amendment would make it no easier to abolish the Senäts than it is right now. Compared to unicameralism, this amendment is by far the moderate position.

[Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC]

Could you give an example of legislation that's truly vital that we've been unable to pass thanks to the Senäts?

The most recent example was the Public Process Act Mark 1!

A few years ago, a Free Democrat Senäts majority simply refused to pass *any* TNC government legislation for a time. Regardless of the wisdom of that political tactic*, there was no talk at the time of needing to get the majority of provincial representatives onside. The talk at the time was that this was an illegitimate use of power. Are we to infer that the Senäts' power to thwart the Cosa's will is good only when the Baron considers it for good ends?

I am familiar with the "any attempt to moderate the Senäts is step 1 to abolition, and must be opposed" rhetoric, from when it was "any attempt to moderate Royal powers is step 1 to Republicanism, and must be opposed". But cxhn. Autófil's argument that the best way to depoliticize the Senäts, to make it more of a non-partisan chamber of sober second thought, is to clearly give final say to the more democratic/more political chamber of the Ziu.

(* For the historical record, I warned party leadership of the time not to start a fight unless they were prepared to finish it.)

[King Txec]

I may not be grasping the entirety of the proposal here, but I fail to see how the Senate is less democratic than the Cosa, as senators are actually elected by the people, whereas MC's are on a party list but don't actually run for election in their own right. Perhaps if we want to fix an imbalance, MC's should run for their seats instead.

Is the intent of MC Autofil to eventually convert the Senate into more of a UK style House of Lords? Why is our current setup a problem?

-Txec R

[Baron Alexandreu Davinescu]

Could you give an example of legislation that's truly vital that we've been unable to pass thanks to the Senäts?

The most recent example was the Public Process Act Mark 1!

I think that's a great example to bring up, yes.  It didn't pass, and then it featured as a huge election issue, and now a revised version (a better version!) just passed unanimously.

I don't think it would have particularly been better if the Cosa could have just forced it through anyway.

A few years ago, a Free Democrat Senäts majority simply refused to pass *any* TNC government legislation for a time. Regardless of the wisdom of that political tactic*, there was no talk at the time of needing to get the majority of provincial representatives onside. The talk at the time was that this was an illegitimate use of power. Are we to infer that the Senäts' power to thwart the Cosa's will is good only when the Baron considers it for good ends?

I'd be very surprised if you could find that I demanded a reduction of Senäts power at the time.  Sometimes a principle is a good thing, even if it doesn't benefit your agenda at the moment.