Ziu Reform Possibilities

[Baron Alexandreu Davinescu]

It's simple, but still leaves party leaders in total control of who gets to be on the list, doesn't address any of Françal's concerns as to why you'd want a candidate-based voting system to begin with (link), and still leaves open the possibility of one person controlling the Cosă singlehandedly thanks to the abolition of seat limits. I'm also not a fan of returning to the 200-seat Cosă, nor do I think that new citizen seats would would "fix" the problem of in-term replacements in any way regardless of Cosă size.

Hmm.  Yeah, valid concerns.

I do think that you're going to probably have to leave party leaders in control of submitting a list, subject to their internal processes, since I don't know how else you'd do it.  But I don't think you'd have the possibility of one person controlling things, since there could be a minimum length for party lists.  But maybe still a seat limit, but just raised significantly higher for the formula?

Do you not like the new citizen seats?  They've been very popular.

EDIT: Instituting a minimum length for party lists would also bar independent candidates. Do we want that?

No, you're right.  Hm.  That's a tough nut to crack.

EDIT 2: By the way, what's your verdict on SPAV?

I'll take a look.

[Baron Alexandreu Davinescu]

So with this SPAV, would each candidate get a fifty word statement?  Like how are people supposed to know who to vote for?

[Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP]

But I don't think you'd have the possibility of one person controlling things, since there could be a minimum length for party lists.  But maybe still a seat limit, but just raised significantly higher for the formula?

Imagine the minimum length was two. Now imagine a party with two candidates winning a landslide victory, and each candidate would get half the seats of that party. What would happen if one of the two candidates would immediately resign from the Cosă, or refuse to accept the seats to begin with? From what I can tell, without seat limits, all of the party seats would now go to the other candidate, who now controls the Cosă majority by themself.

What I'm saying is that I'd like some assurance that no single candidate could ever end up with a Cosă majority on their own.

Do you not like the new citizen seats?  They've been very popular.

I'm saying that new citizen seats cannot be a means to replace and replenish Cosă members. In the current implementation, NCs only have one seat each out of 200, meaning they are always politically irrelevant and cannot replace elected Cosă members who usually have 5 to 15 times as many seats assigned on average. At the same time though, if we were to increase the number of seats held by NCs, they would introduce overly large partisan swings and create majorities contrary to the election results, which is a complete no-go.

So with this SPAV, would each candidate get a fifty word statement?  Like how are people supposed to know who to vote for?

If they want to run as independents, they could get thir own 50 world statement. Otherwise, candidates could band together and have a joint 50 word statement, or run under a certain party name or ideological affiliation to help with voter orientation. The point though is that the way ballots are tallied is unaffected by how candidates wish to portray themselves, the math is the same.

As an example: if all candidates run under certain party labels, and all voters choose candidates based only on those party labels, the result would be the same as if there had been strict party lists. SPAV is a more generalised version of party lists, and allows people to freely vote across the aisle if they so choose, without any spoiler effects or loss of proportionality.

[Baron Alexandreu Davinescu]

Imagine the minimum length was two. Now imagine a party with two candidates winning a landslide victory, and each candidate would get half the seats of that party. What would happen if one of the two candidates would immediately resign from the Cosă, or refuse to accept the seats to begin with? From what I can tell, without seat limits, all of the party seats would now go to the other candidate, who now controls the Cosă majority by themself.

What I'm saying is that I'd like some assurance that no single candidate could ever end up with a Cosă majority on their own.

That makes sense.  Maybe we still need seat limits, just higher ones?  Tweak the formula instead.

I'm saying that new citizen seats cannot be a means to replace and replenish Cosă members. In the current implementation, NCs only have one seat each out of 200, meaning they are always politically irrelevant and cannot replace elected Cosă members who usually have 5 to 15 times as many seats assigned on average. At the same time though, if we were to increase the number of seats held by NCs, they would introduce overly large partisan swings and create majorities contrary to the election results, which is a complete no-go.

No, sorry, those two aren't mean to go together.  The new citizen seats are just a way for new citizens to represent their "own" vote in the Cosa and get involved for fun, and they wouldn't be an effective method of replacing lost legislators (plus that would defeat the goal of ensuring everyone in the Cosa was elected to it).

[Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC]

The amount of copy-pasted invalid votes cast last election is genuinely concerning.

I'm less worried by the fact that there were a whole bunch of amount of copy-pasted invalid votes cast last election, than that most of those votes were for one particular party, the leader of which is doing his best to argue against reforms of that system. Those with very long memories might remember critics of a system where "I vote for whoever Ben says" was a valid vote, and King Robert I yelling at them as wanting to disenfranchise less-active or less-informed citizens. Or where the RUMP fought against the secret ballot for a very long time, and they were right (from a partisan viewpoint) to do so, because they lost their permanent absolute majority in the very first secret election.

I don't believe that AD is only raising quibbles about reforms to defend his partisan advantage out of a system where people vote for a "blank cheque" for a logo. But if the Point is: "The current system makes the Cosa unaccountable to voters" and the Counterpoint is: "yeah, but it benefits my party", I beg the Baron to realize how his opponents might react to that. It is a simple psephological fact that conservative parties benefit from low-cognitive-effort, leader-focused systems.

[Miestră Schivă, UrN-GC]

I do think that you're going to probably have to leave party leaders in control of submitting a list, subject to their internal processes

In my country - and I believe others with closed lists - there is a law saying that a party's internal processes for creating lists have to be democratic and that party members have standing to sue if their leadership is drawing up lists arbitrarily. I would support that in Talossa.

[Baron Alexandreu Davinescu]

I don't believe that AD is only raising quibbles about reforms to defend his partisan advantage out of a system where people vote for a "blank cheque" for a logo. But if the Point is: "The current system makes the Cosa unaccountable to voters" and the Counterpoint is: "yeah, but it benefits my party", I beg the Baron to realize how his opponents might react to that. It is a simple psephological fact that conservative parties benefit from low-cognitive-effort, leader-focused systems.

It is a basic tenet of democracy that the outcome of the vote should reflect the will of the people as much as possible.  And I started this conversation because I'm interested in trying to find a solution that works well for that factor as well as others: reducing the arbitrary power of party leaders, working to ensure that voters know ahead-of-time who will be representing them, and making all the current features of our system flourish.  You will have to go elsewhere to pick a fight, I'm afraid.

[Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP]

I do think that you're going to probably have to leave party leaders in control of submitting a list, subject to their internal processes, since I don't know how else you'd do it.

Aside from legislation mandating that parties follow democratic procedures and allowing legal redress if not, switching to a candidate-based voting system instead of one that strictly hinges on parties would also solve this problem. The power to set up and submit lists is much less serious if voters are free to defy those lists as they please.

[Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP]

Maybe we still need seat limits, just higher ones?  Tweak the formula instead.

The current formula for the seat limit is (10 * Cosă size) / turnout, rounded up. If we are to abolish the one-third off-lister allowance, I suppose the equivalent exchange would be to increase the seat limit by one third, i.e. (40 * Cosă size) / (3 * turnout). How much of an increase do you have in mind?

[Mic’haglh Autófil, O.Be]

I do think that you're going to probably have to leave party leaders in control of submitting a list, subject to their internal processes, since I don't know how else you'd do it.

Aside from legislation mandating that parties follow democratic procedures and allowing legal redress if not, switching to a candidate-based voting system instead of one that strictly hinges on parties would also solve this problem. The power to set up and submit lists is much less serious if voters are free to defy those lists as they please.

My two bence is that such a change would be preferable to Miestra's suggestion, as it appears to get two birds with one stone. (A phrase we do not seem to have a Tolassan equivalent for, if you'll forgive the aside.)

[Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP]

Maybe we still need seat limits, just higher ones?  Tweak the formula instead.

The current formula for the seat limit is (10 * Cosă size) / turnout, rounded up. If we are to abolish the one-third off-lister allowance, I suppose the equivalent exchange would be to increase the seat limit by one third, i.e. (40 * Cosă size) / (3 * turnout). How much of an increase do you have in mind?

Sorry for not waiting for a response, but I did some math. Under this modified formula, in a 20-seat Cosă the seat limit would be 3 at a turnout between 89 and 133, meaning you would need at least 4 MCs to hold an absolute majority. How does that sound?

[Baron Alexandreu Davinescu]

Maybe we still need seat limits, just higher ones?  Tweak the formula instead.

The current formula for the seat limit is (10 * Cosă size) / turnout, rounded up. If we are to abolish the one-third off-lister allowance, I suppose the equivalent exchange would be to increase the seat limit by one third, i.e. (40 * Cosă size) / (3 * turnout). How much of an increase do you have in mind?

Sorry for not waiting for a response, but I did some math. Under this modified formula, in a 20-seat Cosă the seat limit would be 3 at a turnout between 89 and 133, meaning you would need at least 4 MCs to hold an absolute majority. How does that sound?

That sounds pretty reasonable to me.  It doesn't seem like we should have a scenario where three people can control the legislature -- that seems too much of a concentration.  And speaking from experience, I have a hard time imagining a scenario where a party gets a majority of the vote without having even four people who could stand in the Cosa.  And keeping the seat limit, while just raising the ceiling, means that independent candidates can still stand.

It seems like this bill should also fold in an end to the new citizen seats, while we're at it.  We shouldn't have a mechanism to allow a statute to give new citizens such a huge sway, and they're already going to be impossible once the Cosa shrinks to 20.

I also saw that @Mic'haglh Autófil, O.Be had a suggested new statute to require MCs to confirm their willingness to stand, and that seems like another good thing to include.  (It doesn't seem like a big logistical hurdle -- @Sir Lüc , would this be a challenge to implement?)

And it makes sense to include some principles that must be met by internal party procedures for making their lists: timeline, openness, etc

Okay, so the provisions I'm currently planning on working out are:

• Switch to ironclad party lists
• Add in the confirmation step
• Change the formula for seat limits
• Remove the new citizen seats provision
• Replace the vacancy procedure so that seats are just redistributed to the other people on the list
• Some mechanism governing party procedures for making their lists

I feel like I'm forgetting some things, though.

[Baron Alexandreu Davinescu]

Okay, so this is legal text from myself, Miestra, and Mic'haglh.  I'm still working on it, and haven't yet tackled the party procedures thing.  I'm not sure where to stick that in the Organic Law or what the principles should quite be.

EDIT: Geez there's a lot of statutes that need to be fixed!  I think I have them all?

The Democracy Act and Amendment

Whereas the Ziu believes in further perfecting our democracy, and accordingly wishes to better establish its belief that the outcome of a vote should match the will of the voters as much as possible, and that the people should be in charge of that outcome and not party bosses, and that there is room for parties of every size,

Part I: Ironclad Party Lists

THEREFORE, the second section of Article IV of the Organic Law, which currently reads:

Based on the final results of the General Election, the Secretary of State shall calculate the apportionment of seats among the parties, hereinafter referred to as "party seats".
    1. The party seats shall total 200, or another number which may be set by law, with the provisos that any such change will not take effect until the next election following the passage of a calendar year; and that this number may never be less than twice the number of Senators minus one.
    2. Each party shall receive a percentage of party seats as equal as possible to its percentage of the popular vote, but each party shall receive a whole number of seats, and in turn, each party shall assign these seats to individuals, in accordance with law. The Secretary of State shall employ whatever mathematical formulae and calculations in the apportionment of seats as are set by law, or, in the absence of such law, as will best reflect the intentions of this Organic Law. The Uppermost Cort shall be the final judge in case of mathematical disputes.
    3. Only registered political parties may obtain party seats. Parties which win votes but are not registered may not assume their seats in the Cosa until they register. The process to register a party shall be defined by law. The Secretary of State may request from all parties a registration fee, to be set by law, to cover the cost of the election. This fee shall be uniform for all parties.

shall be amended to read:

Based on the final results of the General Election, the Secretary of State shall calculate the apportionment of seats among the parties, hereinafter referred to as "party seats".
    1. The party seats shall total 200, or another number which may be set by law, with the provisos that any such change will not take effect until the next election following the passage of a calendar year; and that this number may never be less than twice the number of Senators minus one.
    2. Each party shall receive a percentage of party seats as equal as possible to its percentage of the popular vote, but each party shall receive a whole number of seats, and in turn, the Secretary of State shall assign these seats to candidates nominated by that party. The Secretary of State shall assign seats by assigning a seat to the first person on a party's list. If the party won more than one seat, then the Secretary of State will assign a seat to the next person on their list, and so on until the end of the party's list. The Secretary of State will then return to the top of the list, and continue in the same manner until all of the party's seats have been assigned.
    3. No person shall hold more seats in the Cosă than forty times the total number of seats in the Cosă divided by three times the number of ballots cast for the Cosa in the most recent General Election, rounded up to the next integer.
    4. Any seats which cannot be assigned under the procedure described in this section may be filled by the King according to his own best judgment, or left vacant.
    5. The Secretary of State shall employ whatever mathematical formulae and calculations in the apportionment of seats as are set by law, or, in the absence of such law, as will best reflect the intentions of this Organic Law. The Uppermost Cort shall be the final judge in case of mathematical disputes.
    6. Only registered political parties may obtain party seats. Parties which win votes but are not registered may not assume their seats in the Cosa until they register. The process to register a party shall be defined by law. The Secretary of State may request from all parties a registration fee, to be set by law, to cover the cost of the election. This fee shall be uniform for all parties.

FURTHERMORE, the third section of Article IV of the Organic Law, which currently reads:

In the case of vacant party seats occurring between elections, the Secretary of State shall inform the King and the leader of whatever party held the vacant seat. The King shall appoint a replacement to each vacancy. If the seat belonged to a party with a functioning party leader, the King must appoint as a replacement whichever person shall be so designated by that party's leader. If there is no functioning party leader, or if the party leader refuses to designate a replacement, the King shall appoint the replacement according to his own best judgment.

shall be amended to read:

In the case of vacant party seats occurring between elections, the Secretary of State shall inform the King and the leader of whatever party held the vacant seat. The Secretary of State shall redistribute all of that party's seats among the remaining eligible candidates on that party's list in the same manner described in the second section, above. If no eligible candidate remains on that party's list, whether by vacation, ineligibility, or the operation of the maximum seats provision, the King may assign the seat according to his own best judgment, or leave it vacant.

FURTHERMORE, there shall be a new second subsubsection of the third subsection of the second section of Title B of El Lexhatx which shall read:

2.3.2. The Secretary of State shall confirm to their satisfaction that all citizens appearing on a party list consent to do so, prior to the printing or publication of the ballot. Only citizens so consenting shall be recognized as being on a party's list for the purposes of Lexh.B.2.3, and only said citizens will appear on the party's list as shown on the ballot.

FURTHERMORE, the first subsection of the fourth section of Title H of El Lexhatx, which currently reads

4.1. No person shall hold more seats in the Cosa than ten times the total number of seats in the Cosa divided by the number of ballots cast for the Cosa in the most recent General Election, rounded up to the next integer.
4.1.1. The total number of party seats is twenty.

shall be amended to read

4.1. The total number of party seats is twenty.

FURTHERMORE, the first subsubsubsection of the first subsubsection of the third subsection of the second section of Title B of El Lexhatx, which currently reads

2.3.1.1. The party leader may assign seats to any eligible citizen(s) they see fit, so long as the following criteria are met:
2.3.1.1.1. The party's internal procedures are followed
2.3.1.1.2. No one who was not named on the list is assigned more seats than any eligible citizen who was named on the list
2.3.1.1.3. The total number of seats awarded to those not on the list does not exceed 1/3 of all seats won by the party
2.3.1.1.4. No person occupies more than the maximum legal number of seats.

shall be deleted in its entirety.

FURTHERMORE, the third subsection of the second section of Title B of El Lexhatx, subsection 2.3.1, which currently reads

2.3.1. Before the conclusion of the first Clark, each party leader must submit to the Secretary of State a report containing the distribution of the seats won in the election.

shall be amended to read

2.3.1. Before the conclusion of the first Clark, the Secretary of State shall publish the distribution of seats among the candidates of each party, as calculated under the procedure described in Article IV of the Organic Law.

FURTHERMORE, subsection 2.3.1.2 of the third subsection of the second section of Title B of El Lexhatx, which currently reads

2.3.1.2. Any person assigned a seat as above may decline to take their seats in which case they will be reallocated according to the criteria of B.2.3.1.1.

shall be amended to read

2.3.1.2. Any person assigned a seat may decline to take their seats, in which case the Secretary of State shall redistribute that party's seats among the remaining candidates on the party's list in the manner described in the Organic Law.

FURTHERMORE, subsection 2.3.1.3 of the third subsection of the second section of Title B of El Lexhatx, which currently reads

2.3.1.3. If a party cannot assign all of their seats under the criteria of B.2.3.1.1., the additional seats are forfeited.

shall be deleted in its entirety.

Part II: Standards of the Cosa

FURTHERMORE, the fourth section of Article IV of the Organic Law, which currently reads:

1. In addition to the seats apportioned between parties after a General Election, the Secretary of State shall assign one Cosa seat to any citizen who becomes eligible to vote after the most recent Election Deadline but before the dissolution of the Cosa, upon the request of such citizen, up to a maximum number as this Organic Law might provide. Any additional seat so assigned shall cease to exist should its holder vacate or be removed from the seat and shall not be subject to the procedures for filling vacancies in the Cosa, and shall also cease to exist upon the dissolution of the Cosa.
2. The maximum number of seats that may be assigned to new citizens between general elections shall be 7.5% of the seats apportioned between parties, rounded up to a whole number of seats.

shall be amended to read

The Cosa may impeach any of its members from the Chamber with a two-thirds majority vote and with the approval of the King. Following impeachment, a replacement will be chosen according to the third section of this article, and the impeached member shall not be eligible for reassignment of seats under the terms of this article. Following a failed impeachment, the accused Member of the Cosa may not again be impeached for the same offence, pursuant to the Seventh Covenant of the Covenant of Rights and Freedoms. The former Member of the Cosa is not barred from running for office in future elections as long as the former Member of the Cosa maintains citizenship.

FURTHERMORE, the fifth section of Article IV of the Organic Law, which currently reads:

Each person holding one or more seats is a representative known as a "Member of the Cosa" (MC). MCs may not be removed from office except by a two-thirds vote by the Cosa and approval by the King. An MC vacates his seats if he fails to vote on two consecutive Clarks, or if he resigns from office or dies. The seats of any MC who is removed or vacates shall be reassigned according to Section 4, above.

shall be amended to read

Each person holding one or more seats is a representative known as a "Member of the Cosa" (MC). An MC vacates his seats if they fail to vote on two consecutive Clarks, if they resign from office, or if they die. The seats of any MC who is removed or vacates shall be re-assigned according to the third section, above.

[Breneir Tzaracomprada]

Whereas the Ziu believes in further perfecting our democracy, and accordingly wishes to better establish its belief that the outcome of a vote should match the will of the voters as much as possible, and that the people should be in charge of that outcome and not party bosses, and that there is room for parties of every size

This process and apparent result does appear to indicate the Democracy Agenda crosses party boundaries. Hopefully this will be included in the Sixth Clark BEFORE the election and not be used as a part of it.

[Marcel Eðo Pairescu Tafial, UrGP]

Sad to see the issue of candidate-based voting not further acknowledged. Personally, I'm not willing to give up on this project just yet, as I still think it's worth considering.

As for the bill draft, three things caught my attention:

1) Your new LegOrg.IV.3 would increase the seat limit not by a third, but by four, meaning that two people would suffice to control an absolute majority. The formula should say "forty times the total number of seats in the Cosă divided by three times the number of ballots cast for the Cosă in the most recent General Election, rounded up to the next integer". EDIT: Looks like this has already been taken care of.
2) Does this revision of Lexh.H.4.1 mean the time at which the 20-seat Cosă would enter into effect is reset, or would that still be in accordance to the Pseudo-Real Cosă Act (i.e., next February)?
3) An amendment to revise New Citizen seats has already been passed by this Ziu and will be on the ballot next election. How... problematic is it for two separate referenda to modify the same section of the LegOrg in contradictory ways?