Compromise on the Compromise Act and Amendment

[Sir Ian Plätschisch]

I have edited the bill to reflect my comments above.

Come hell or high water this bill will be Clarked in December, so please comment now if you so desire.

[Sir Ian Plätschisch]

Well, I suppose this once more becomes a live issue.

My position is that it must never be more complicated or difficult to get rid of the King through this Convocation procedure than it would to simply delete OrgLaw II.3 through the regular amendment mechanism. That is, a 3/4 majority in the Cosa, 5 Senators, and a simple majority in referendum. Because otherwise, what's the point? The current OrgLaw II.4 will never be invoked because it's harder - requiring a successful case in the CpI and a 2/3 referendum victory.

That is to say, I now support this measure in principle - i.e. as a thing we should do right now - but the thing is that if a King starts acting the goat in the midst of a seven year "term", a sufficiently riled-up legislature will just delete this new OrgLaw II.3 and choose a new King / declare a Republic, making this reform otiose.

I should also point out that this proposal has a similar problem to 55RZ21, in that it instantly puts John W. out of a job, so he's more likely to veto it.

Can I recommend the following amendment:

1) that this amendment replace OrgLaw II.4, rather than OrgLaw II.3;
2) add a provision that 2/3 of the Cosa and 2/3 of the Senäts will be authorised to call one of these convocations at any time, with the same rules (inc. six-month cooling-off period).

I forgot about this comment until you just brought it up again in the CRL. My response is that I like having a (very difficult) way to remove the King immediately, in case something extreme happens that warrants it.

[Viteu]

(plus there should definitely be some rules to establish what happens if no candidate gets 2/3rd of the vote anyway).

Then the UC continues as a Council of Regency until the Convocation gets its act together. Like what happens with papal elections. A pity we can't actually lock them up and put them on bread-and-water.

I will note that this would create a temptation for members of the CpI (as members of the convocation) to deliberately vote against every candidate for king in order to retain their power as a Council of Regency. Granted, they (we) likely wouldn't have enough votes to do that on their (our) own, but if support for a candidate among the other members wasn't near-unanimous, it could happen.

(A lot of my comment got deleted--cellphonesammirite?!?--so I deleted the incomplete post. Here are my revised 2¢.)

This presumes that all members of the CpI are active.  It also presupposes that all four Judges will work in some implicit or explicit conspiracy to remain in power.  Of course, the CpI is subject to political checks through Org.VIII.5, which enables the Ziu to remove a sitting Judge through the appropriate Notice of Reprimand sanctioning them for acting "in a manner that offends the Ziu in the Judge's official and individual capacity" (emphasis).   

Assuming, arguendo, that the Ziu got whiff of the grand conspiracy to retain power, any member of the Ziu can clark a Notice of Reprimand with removal as the sanction, and with 2/3 Cosa and majority Senate support--removed from the CpI and, ex officio, the Regency.  This standard is inarguably and objectively lower than what is necessary to remove the King--satisfying the threshold of obtaining a judgment from a competent medical authority that the King is incapable of exercising his duties* or a conviction from the CpI for "violation of the Organic Law, treason, bribery, nonfeasance endangering the safety, order or good government of the kingdom or other high crimes[.]"  Then there is Ziu support and an immediate referendum. 

Next, I'm unsure if I could serve as an elector in the Convocation in my own right.  "Any Talossan shall who has been a citizen for at least seven years of when the Convocation is called shall be eligible to be a member of the Convocation[.]" Is that an aggregate seven years or consecutive seven years? Asking for a conspirator friend. 

So, at minimum, you maybe get two or three electors from the CpI.  I do not know if SJ Cjantscheir or PJ Edwards have the time, so then it would fall to me, and I have no doubt PJ Perþonest will claim his right.  But in the off chance that all four Judges are involved, again, the chances of a conspiracy are simply so low and, even so, easily checked by the Ziu.  I think we can recognize the CpI concern is a it of a false cause. 

My thoughts on other points:

(1) I agree with Miestra that this should replace Org.II.4 and, accordingly, strike "Whenever the is no king, the CpI shall serve as Council of Regency"  as redundant (it would remain in Org.II.3).

(2) I agree with Miestra that Ziu should be to call an early Convocation, and I like that the threshold for early convocation is slightly higher and has a cooling off period.  It's a good balance.  Without it, a King could go completely unhinged in year 4 without recourse for three years, which we all know is a very long time in Talossa. 

(3) OMG STOP USING CpI. This it the first time the CpI is even mentioned in the Org Law.  Use "Uppermost Cort" to make it consistent with the other sections, or use Cort pü Inalt and change "Uppermost Cort" in the other sections.  But "CpI" is not defined or even found in the Org Law.

(4) Elector sounds better than member.

(5) If there really is concern about the CpI sabotaging the Convocation to stay in power, I would add something akin to this:

"A sitting Judge simultaneously serving in the Council of Regency and the Convocation shall enjoy the rights and privileges of their peers but shall be disqualified from casting a vote for King in the Convocation."

Purpose: If a CpI Judge really wants to vote, they have to resign the Cort, ergo the Regency, to do so.

(6) I'm also of the mind that overly complex rules and procedures will be problematic.  I'd wager such would also doom the Compromise on the Compromise to failure given that so many people have thoughts.  But there ought to be some parameters for setting how the Convocation conducts business and vote counting (especially in light of the secret ballot) as well as restricting the Ziu's influence.

Here are some draft provisions to consider:

"The Convocation may, as it deems necessary, adopt a rule, procedure, or protocol to conduct operation provided a majority of Electors supports any such rule, procedure, or protocol, or change thereto.  Any rule, procedure, or protocol adopted by a Convocation will not a subsequent Convocation." 

Purpose: This enables a Convocation to set its bylaws and prevents imputation of the bylaws of one to another.

"Before any vote for King is cast, the Conclave shall choose an Elector to serve as Herald in a manner it deems appropriate.  Within 96 hours of a vote for King ending, the Herald, the Secretary of State, and the Council of Regency shall, separately and independently of the other, count such votes, and the Herald, the Secretary of State, and the Council of Regency shall, separately and independently of the other, report one result to the Convocation.   After 96 hours, the vote for King is verified based on the vote count of the majority of timely reported results."

Purpose: Someone has to count votes within a reasonable time, but we cannot be at the mercy of never ending deadlines.  I felt four days was a good time to count votes and report it to the Convocation.  I used the EC as a blueprint and figured the SoS and Council of Regency were good bodies to report a vote count.  But I felt that Convocation should also have someone counting votes, hence the "Herald." Regarding the Council of Regency, this presumes no. 5 in my suggestions is adopted, so the CoR cannot vote anyway.  To ensure there it's not four against two, I tried to make it so the CoR get to report a single result (i.e. the CoR will speak with one voice, not four).  In any event, only a report received within 96 hours may be counted, and each of the three counts must be separate and independent.  Meaning, they are completely independent.  The counter will have verified the vote came from a properly sat Elector and then just mark their vote.  The report should be the total number of votes for a candidate. Presumably the numbers will be the same.   

"The Ziu may enact legislation to impose civil and criminal sanctions upon any person guilty of dispensing to another an Elector's vote absent the express permission of that Elector or absent law providing such.  The Ziu may also enact legislation for the investigation of any suspected malfeasance referred to it by the Convocation, and, if warranted, the enforcement of a violation of any law resulting such investigation may reveal."

Purpose: The integrity of the Convocation and the vote must be protected, but within reason.  The Organic Law should not have criminal conduct. The Ziu should have very limited influence on the Convocation, but the Convocation should not be able to control the Ziu.  So I figured a balance.  In reverse order: The Convocation can refer a suspected malfeasance, whatever that means, to the Ziu.  But the Ziu must have already enacted legislation agreeing to that referral.  This is to cover concerns that really are connected and inseparable from the Convocation, and neither the Ziu nor Convocation can force how the other acts.  The Ziu can enact broad legislation that accepts all referrals for investigation, or it can limit it to specific conduct. The Convocation can select which conduct to investigate, but doesn't have the authority to investigate itself.  Of course, the Organic right to due process and the Organic protection against ex post facto laws means that the Ziu's acceptance and potential liability must exist at the time of the suspected conduct.  Finally, because of the CpI's involvement in the CoR, I wanted to leave open how such conduct might be prosecuted (i.e. a special court, maybe the Common Cort  only, etc.). 

There is an exemption--If the Ziu enacts a law imposing some type of liability on someone who reveals the contents of an Elector's vote, it does not need the Convocation to grant authority for an investigation and possible legal action to follow.  The conduct is actually not tied into the Convocation per se because a Herald or SoS or person on the CoR from a Convocation 10 years ago does not get to decide that the vote is no longer secret.  And also, I felt it necessary to protect the secrecy of the vote. 

Just my 2¢. (I started writing this in response to the concern about the CpI, and then I just kept going.)

---

*Because I'm in a whimsical mood (and I want to stress how the present threshold to commence removing the King is implausible), let's talk about competent medial authority.   I doubt anyone would ever find a competent medical authority to conclude the King is unfit to perform his duties--not because they do not exist, but because I doubt any competent medical authority would entertain such a request.  The exchange would go something like this:  "Hi, we're from the Kingdom of Talossa. We claim part of U.S. territory as an independent country. What's that you say? No, The U.S. hasn't noticed, although it's likely we're simply seen as a mischievous internet club making grandiose claims of sovereignty. But moving along, we need you to assess the medical competence of our King.  What's that? No, really just something about his ability to perform his Organic duties.  No, organic duties doesn't mean like ... natural duties. It means his constitutional duties.  Gross.  Stop asking so many questions.  But yeah, you down? I'm sorry could you repeat that word? Hip-pah? Oh one P... so hip-ah? What's a *bunny ears* hip-ah violation?" 

In other words, this is superfluous, and the only plausible threshold is the CpI conviction, which even then, good luck getting all of the Judges to be active.   

[Sir Ian Plätschisch]

(1) I agree with Miestra that this should replace Org.II.4 and, accordingly, strike "Whenever the is no king, the CpI shall serve as Council of Regency"  as redundant (it would remain in Org.II.3). 2) I agree with Miestra that Ziu should be to call an early Convocation, and I like that the threshold for early convocation is slightly higher and has a cooling off period.  It's a good balance.  Without it, a King could go completely unhinged in year 4 without recourse for three years, which we all know is a very long time in Talossa. 

​I have added a provision that the Ziu can call a convocation at any time following the same procedure as amending the Organic Law. I have also deleted Org II.4.

(3) OMG STOP USING CpI. This it the first time the CpI is even mentioned in the Org Law.  Use "Uppermost Cort" to make it consistent with the other sections, or use Cort pü Inalt and change "Uppermost Cort" in the other sections.  But "CpI" is not defined or even found in the Org Law.

(4) Elector sounds better than member.

Changed.

(5) If there really is concern about the CpI sabotaging the Convocation to stay in power, I would add something akin to this:

"A sitting Judge simultaneously serving in the Council of Regency and the Convocation shall enjoy the rights and privileges of their peers but shall be disqualified from casting a vote for King in the Convocation."

Purpose: If a CpI Judge really wants to vote, they have to resign the Cort, ergo the Regency, to do so.

I'm not really concerned about this

(6) I'm also of the mind that overly complex rules and procedures will be problematic.  I'd wager such would also doom the Compromise on the Compromise to failure given that so many people have thoughts.  But there ought to be some parameters for setting how the Convocation conducts business and vote counting (especially in light of the secret ballot) as well as restricting the Ziu's influence.

Here are some draft provisions to consider:

"The Convocation may, as it deems necessary, adopt a rule, procedure, or protocol to conduct operation provided a majority of Electors supports any such rule, procedure, or protocol, or change thereto.  Any rule, procedure, or protocol adopted by a Convocation will not a subsequent Convocation." 

Purpose: This enables a Convocation to set its bylaws and prevents imputation of the bylaws of one to another.

"Before any vote for King is cast, the Conclave shall choose an Elector to serve as Herald in a manner it deems appropriate.  Within 96 hours of a vote for King ending, the Herald, the Secretary of State, and the Council of Regency shall, separately and independently of the other, count such votes, and the Herald, the Secretary of State, and the Council of Regency shall, separately and independently of the other, report one result to the Convocation.   After 96 hours, the vote for King is verified based on the vote count of the majority of timely reported results."

Purpose: Someone has to count votes within a reasonable time, but we cannot be at the mercy of never ending deadlines.  I felt four days was a good time to count votes and report it to the Convocation.  I used the EC as a blueprint and figured the SoS and Council of Regency were good bodies to report a vote count.  But I felt that Convocation should also have someone counting votes, hence the "Herald." Regarding the Council of Regency, this presumes no. 5 in my suggestions is adopted, so the CoR cannot vote anyway.  To ensure there it's not four against two, I tried to make it so the CoR get to report a single result (i.e. the CoR will speak with one voice, not four).  In any event, only a report received within 96 hours may be counted, and each of the three counts must be separate and independent.  Meaning, they are completely independent.  The counter will have verified the vote came from a properly sat Elector and then just mark their vote.  The report should be the total number of votes for a candidate. Presumably the numbers will be the same.   

"The Ziu may enact legislation to impose civil and criminal sanctions upon any person guilty of dispensing to another an Elector's vote absent the express permission of that Elector or absent law providing such.  The Ziu may also enact legislation for the investigation of any suspected malfeasance referred to it by the Convocation, and, if warranted, the enforcement of a violation of any law resulting such investigation may reveal."

Purpose: The integrity of the Convocation and the vote must be protected, but within reason.  The Organic Law should not have criminal conduct. The Ziu should have very limited influence on the Convocation, but the Convocation should not be able to control the Ziu.  So I figured a balance.  In reverse order: The Convocation can refer a suspected malfeasance, whatever that means, to the Ziu.  But the Ziu must have already enacted legislation agreeing to that referral.  This is to cover concerns that really are connected and inseparable from the Convocation, and neither the Ziu nor Convocation can force how the other acts.  The Ziu can enact broad legislation that accepts all referrals for investigation, or it can limit it to specific conduct. The Convocation can select which conduct to investigate, but doesn't have the authority to investigate itself.  Of course, the Organic right to due process and the Organic protection against ex post facto laws means that the Ziu's acceptance and potential liability must exist at the time of the suspected conduct.  Finally, because of the CpI's involvement in the CoR, I wanted to leave open how such conduct might be prosecuted (i.e. a special court, maybe the Common Cort  only, etc.). 

There is an exemption--If the Ziu enacts a law imposing some type of liability on someone who reveals the contents of an Elector's vote, it does not need the Convocation to grant authority for an investigation and possible legal action to follow.  The conduct is actually not tied into the Convocation per se because a Herald or SoS or person on the CoR from a Convocation 10 years ago does not get to decide that the vote is no longer secret.  And also, I felt it necessary to protect the secrecy of the vote. 

Just my 2¢. (I started writing this in response to the concern about the CpI, and then I just kept going.)

I would rather all this be handled by statute

[Viteu]

I would rather all this be handled by statute

Fair enough. But absent some provision granting the Ziu authority to do so, I doubt any statute to regulate a Convocation would be enforceable.   Maybe that is a good thing though.

[Sir Ian Plätschisch]

I would rather all this be handled by statute

Fair enough. But absent some provision granting the Ziu authority to do so, I doubt any statute to regulate a Convocation would be enforceable.   Maybe that is a good thing though.

There is this:

All other operations of the Convocation shall be decided by the Convocation or prescribed by statute.

[Viteu]

I would rather all this be handled by statute

Fair enough. But absent some provision granting the Ziu authority to do so, I doubt any statute to regulate a Convocation would be enforceable.   Maybe that is a good thing though.

There is this:

All other operations of the Convocation shall be decided by the Convocation or prescribed by statute.

I'll concede I missed the provision (or forgot it was there) in reading through the thread. Anyway, ignore my comments. :-)

[Glüc]

Some thoughts:

a Convocation shall be called by the Senior Judge of the Uppermost Cort, or in their absence the next available Judge in order of seniority"

Does that mean the Senior Judge shall also chair the convocation? If so, that should probably be explicitly mentioned. If there is to be some other arrangement, that should probably be mentioned as well.

Secondly, what exactly does it mean for a convocation to get called? Perhaps it would be good to include something like:
"Whenever a convocation is called by a judge, said judge shall submit to the Secretary of State a message to all eligible electors announcing the convocation and providing instructions on how and when to register to participate. Whenever the convocation is called by the Ziu, the Túischac'h shall submit this message instead. The convocation shall commence 14 days from the moment the convocation is called. Upon receiving the message the Secretary of State shall be responsible for communicating the message to all eligible electors." (or similar)

The deadline bit seems especially important to me. Under the current proposal, what is to stop the judge calling the convocation and then have the convocation commence immediately after the composition of registered electors seems favourable to them, or alternatively, postpone commencing when the composition seems unfavourable? And even assuming good faith, how does the convocation know when to commence?

I'm not a big fan of setting such things by statute as the monarchy (and therefore the convocation) seems integral to our constitutional framework. I'm also worried we will pass this and then when the times comes nobody will know how to proceed because no statute has been passed.

[Glüc]

"Before any vote for King is cast, the Conclave shall choose an Elector to serve as Herald in a manner it deems appropriate.  Within 96 hours of a vote for King ending, the Herald, the Secretary of State, and the Council of Regency shall, separately and independently of the other, count such votes, and the Herald, the Secretary of State, and the Council of Regency shall, separately and independently of the other, report one result to the Convocation.   After 96 hours, the vote for King is verified based on the vote count of the majority of timely reported results."

Also like this idea.

[Sir Ian Plätschisch]

Some thoughts:

a Convocation shall be called by the Senior Judge of the Uppermost Cort, or in their absence the next available Judge in order of seniority"

Does that mean the Senior Judge shall also chair the convocation? If so, that should probably be explicitly mentioned. If there is to be some other arrangement, that should probably be mentioned as well.

Secondly, what exactly does it mean for a convocation to get called? Perhaps it would be good to include something like:
"Whenever a convocation is called by a judge, said judge shall submit to the Secretary of State a message to all eligible electors announcing the convocation and providing instructions on how and when to register to participate. Whenever the convocation is called by the Ziu, the Túischac'h shall submit this message instead. The convocation shall commence 14 days from the moment the convocation is called. Upon receiving the message the Secretary of State shall be responsible for communicating the message to all eligible electors." (or similar)

The deadline bit seems especially important to me. Under the current proposal, what is to stop the judge calling the convocation and then have the convocation commence immediately after the composition of registered electors seems favourable to them, or alternatively, postpone commencing when the composition seems unfavourable? And even assuming good faith, how does the convocation know when to commence?

I'm not a big fan of setting such things by statute as the monarchy (and therefore the convocation) seems integral to our constitutional framework. I'm also worried we will pass this and then when the times comes nobody will know how to proceed because no statute has been passed.

What if I made the statutes part of the bill

[Glüc]

What if I made the statutes part of the bill

Well that would definitely be better than nothing (I generally think that if statutes are needed for an orglaw amendment to be functional, best practice is to include these in the bill instead of adding them later.)

but I would still urge you to consider at least putting the starting date (relative to the convocation being called) in the orglaw. For comparison, exact election dates are in there as well. And this is really important because it's going to have a large effect on the composition of the convocation. Do we really want a Ziu majority to be able to alter this during the same term as the convocation itself? This seems like exactly the kind of thing to anchor in the constitution.

[Sir Ian Plätschisch]

I have added the timeline to the amendment and added the statutes V suggested.

[Sir Ian Plätschisch]

Patience is a virtue.

(If any new citizens are up for a bit of a challenge, try to figure out why the "2017 Organic Law" was passed in 2019 and didn't come into effect until 2020).

[Breneir Tzaracomprada]

I am thankful that voters have given the Free Democrats more opportunities to practice this virtue.