May I congratulate S:reu Istefan Perþonest on the unique honor of being nominated to the Uppermost Cort. To be considered worthy of a functionally lifetime appointment to the highest judicial body of our nation is by itself humbling. I would like to acknowledge and compliment his contributions to the nation of Talossa over the many years, and I wish him well on his nomination.
As Mençei, I would like to see continue the importance and prestige of the Senate through the political process. As such, I believe, it is incumbent on this body to carry on the very novel but still monumentally crucial tradition of scrutiny of judicial nominees, no less in the form of a public hearing.
This hearing by the Senate will be conducted in a similar - albeit slightly modified - manner as the previous one done just some months ago in January. For example, we will be using a Special Committee rather than a Committee of the Whole. I have enumerated below the actual rules, and I intend that the hearing will commence in earnest not later than Monday 12 October 2020.
I invite cordially that fellow Members of this House make their communications here in this Committee exclusively in place of any other medium, if not to each other then at least to me.
Any other Citizen of Talossa may speak here without qualification, provided that they first seek and receive confirmation of that privilege from myself or the Deputy Mençei. For this purpose, a PM is preferred.
To my esteemed colleagues of this right honorable House, greetings:
Having received of Istefan Perþonest
a nomination of S:reu Alexandreu Davinescu
to the Uppermost Cort of the Kingdom of Talossa;
and,
Seeing the necessity of a hearing on the matter,
In respect of our traditions,
By veneration for our Duties to this Nation, and
For the purpose to see due process and undertake just scrutiny;
I, as our Mençei, do hereby convene
a Special Committee
to consider and report upon the qualifications of the Nominee.
Rules of this Special Committee [REVISED per my post to that effect found later on in this thread. You will know it when you see it. - GV]:
1. The Members of the Committee shall be exclusively the duly elected and seated Members of the Senate of the Kingdom of Talossa. None else shall have equal privileges.
2. The business of the Committee shall not preclude the Senate from conducting its normal business.
3. The Mençei shall be the Chairman of the Committee, and the Deputy Mençei the Deputy Chairman, who shall have plenary and conclusive powers upon and during all its business.
4. The sole purpose of the Committee is to realize a public hearing of the nomination of S:reuIstefan Perþonest to the Uppermost Cort of the Kingdom of Talossa, and its powers shall extend not beyond the scope or the bona fide interests thereof.
5. The sole goal of the hearing of the Committee is to scrutinize the qualifications of the nominee and ascertain his ability or fitness to service as a Puisne Justice of the Uppermost Cort. The Committee shall report its findings on those matters to both the entire Senate and the public of Talossa at large.
6. The Committee may elect in its ultimate report whether to endorse for or to endorse against the nomination, but it shall be not requisite or binding. The Committee shall be adjourned sine die upon the deliverance of its report to the Mençei or Deputy Mençei.
7. A Quorum shall be unnecessary, but the power to make finals decisions with respect to the Committee or its business shall be reserved to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman.
8. The Chairman or Deputy Chairman shall publish and maintain a schedule for the hearing, which shall control the sequence, time, and privileges of speeches. The schedule shall be impermanent and respond accordingly to ongoing circumstances.
9. Any Member of the Committee or non-Member who may wish to speak during the hearing shall make a request for it to this Wittenberg thread at least two (2) days in advance to the Chairman or Deputy Chairman, who shall approve, modify, or deny the request publicly on this Wittenberg thread.
10. Members of the Committee shall have precedence in all manners over non-Members with regard to the sequence, time, and privileges of their speeches. Each Member shall have no less than one equal opportunity to speak with regard to other Members.
11. Speeches shall be germane, and shall be inquisitive of and directed to the nominee. Questions shall be asked of the nominee and answers provided by him, and the dialogue between the nominee and the speaker shall remain courteous.
12. A Member of the Committee may invite guests to use up some or all of a scheduled speech, but sufficient notice thereof shall be given in advance to the Chairman or Deputy Chairman. Guest speakers shall respect this privilege, which may be denied by the Chairman or Deputy Chairman in whichever manner they find proper.
13. The Committee shall begin its business immediately, but the first scheduled speech of the hearing shall occur not sooner than Monday 12 October 2020.
14. The first speech of the hearing shall be reserved to the nominee himself, unless he reject this privilege knowingly and willfully, so that he may make his own introduction. The Chairman or Deputy Chairman may invite that the nominee make the final speech.
15. The Committee shall finish its business and submit its report to the Senate and the public of Talossa at least before if not sooner than Thursday 29 October 2020 235959 Talossan time.
Thank you all very much!
GV, Mençei
Estimat Mencei,
Might I inquire as to the status and schedule of this hearing?
Quote from: Eiric S. Bornatfiglheu on October 09, 2020, 08:58:36 AM
Estimat Mencei,
Might I inquire as to the status and schedule of this hearing?
With apologies to all and to Istefan in particular, I have modified dates for said hearing per above. I dropped the ball on this and must remember to put these sorts of things on my calendar, else I do not remember them.
GV
All right, by the schedule, the first speech of the hearing is supposed to be no earlier than yesterday, and I get the first one, and everyone's supposed to make a request to make the speech to this thread. So, here's my request (which, really, I should have made rather earlier, but I had just skimmed for the date rather than reading everything carefully).
Request
Per Rule #3...
Quote3. The Mençei shall be the Chairman of the Committee, and the Deputy Mençei the Deputy Chairman, who shall have plenary and conclusive powers upon and during all its business.
...and as the Deputy Chairman of this Committee, I am going to announce the following items:
First: This Committee shall finish its business and submit its report to the Senate and the public of Talossa at least before if not sooner than
Thursday, 29 October 2020 Tuesday, 17 November 2020.
Second: S:reu Istefan Perþonest may make the first speech anytime before this Friday the 16th.
Third: Either upon the delivery of such speech or on Saturday the 17th, whichever may be sooner, our colleague from Benito shall have time to ask questions and receive answers of the nominee from then and through the end of Monday the 19th. This reserved time may be extended, but I ask cordially that the nominee take care to answer questions punctually.
Fourth: I invite all others to request speaking time, whether or not you are a member of the Senate. Particularly I would like to see a request from the Seneschal and the Leader of the Opposition.
Thank you.
Thank you sir, for catching my dropped stuff. :-(
Requested and here goes...
The position of Burgermeister is the most sensitive, the most critical, and the most precarious in all of Talossa, even more so than Secretary of State. Burgermeister's duties are not as constant as those of the SoS, but they are far more consequential.
Istefan Perthonest as Burgermeister has lived into every best intention of the post, his love for and activity in Talossa has been sterling. In making Reunision happen, his 'Perthonest Plan' was critical.
I believe he is fully-qualified to be on the Uppermost Cort and help steward our laws, and I urge the Senäts to confirm as soon as possible.
I have no questions to ask him.
GV, Fiôvâ
With many thanks to Açafat del Val for his work in keeping on top of things... With one exception (as noted below), everything Açafat has done with the Rules is to my liking. The one change I made was minor. - GV, Mençei
Rules of this Special Committee:
1. The Members of the Committee shall be exclusively the duly elected and seated Members of the Senate of the Kingdom of Talossa. None else shall have equal privileges.
2. The business of the Committee shall not preclude the Senate from conducting its normal business.
3. The Mençei shall be the Chairman of the Committee, and the Deputy Mençei the Deputy Chairman, who shall have plenary and conclusive powers upon and during all its business.
4. The sole purpose of the Committee is to realize a public hearing of the nomination of S:reuIstefan Perþonest to the Uppermost Cort of the Kingdom of Talossa, and its powers shall extend not beyond the scope or the bona fide interests thereof.
5. The sole goal of the hearing of the Committee is to scrutinize the qualifications of the nominee and ascertain his ability or fitness to service as a Puisne Justice of the Uppermost Cort. The Committee shall report its findings on those matters to both the entire Senate and the public of Talossa at large.
6. The Committee may elect in its ultimate report whether to endorse for or to endorse against the nomination, but it shall be not requisite or binding. The Committee shall be adjourned sine die upon the deliverance of its report to the Mençei or Deputy Mençei.
7. A Quorum shall be unnecessary, but the power to make finals decisions with respect to the Committee or its business shall be reserved to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman.
8. The Chairman or Deputy Chairman shall publish and maintain a schedule for the hearing, which shall control the sequence, time, and privileges of speeches. The schedule shall be impermanent and respond accordingly to ongoing circumstances.
9. Any Member of the Committee or non-Member who may wish to speak during the hearing shall make a request for it to this Wittenberg thread at least two (2) days in advance to the Chairman or Deputy Chairman, who shall approve, modify, or deny the request publicly on this Wittenberg thread.
10. Members of the Committee shall have precedence in all manners over non-Members with regard to the sequence, time, and privileges of their speeches. Each Member shall have no less than one equal opportunity to speak with regard to other Members.
11. Speeches shall be germane, and shall be inquisitive of and directed to the nominee. Questions shall be asked of the nominee and answers provided by him, and the dialogue between the nominee and the speaker shall remain courteous.
12. A Member of the Committee may invite guests to use up some or all of a scheduled speech, but sufficient notice thereof shall be given in advance to the Chairman or Deputy Chairman. Guest speakers shall respect this privilege, which may be denied by the Chairman or Deputy Chairman in whichever manner they find proper.
13. The Committee shall begin its business immediately, but the first scheduled speech of the hearing shall occur not sooner than Monday 12 October 2020.
14. The first speech of the hearing shall be reserved to the nominee himself, unless he reject this privilege knowingly and willfully, so that he may make his own introduction. The Chairman or Deputy Chairman may invite that the nominee make the final speech.
S:reu Istefan Perþonest may make the first speech anytime before this Saturday the 17th. [change by GV from Açafat del Val's post 14 Oct 2020 11:40:46 as Açafat ends Istefan's time on the 15th with the 16th being a dead day]
Either upon the delivery of such speech or on Saturday the 17th, whichever may be sooner, our colleague from Benito shall have time to ask questions and receive answers of the nominee from then and through the end of Monday the 19th. This reserved time may be extended, but I ask cordially that the nominee take care to answer questions punctually.
All others are invited to request speaking time, whether or not you are a member of the Senate. Particularly I would like to see a request from the Seneschal and the Leader of the Opposition.
16. The Committee shall finish its business and submit its report to the Senate and the public of Talossa at least before if not sooner than Tuesday 17 November 2020 235959 Talossan time.
Honorable Senators, thank you for this opportunity to speak.
When I was a nine-year-old boy, I came across a book on the United States Supreme Court in my elementary school library. By the card in the back of that book (this was back before computerization), I was the first student to take that book out of the library. As a result of reading that book, I conceived an ambition to become a Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Two years later, as part of an assembly celebrating the bicentennial of the US Bill of Rights, correctly answering a question about what proceeded the Constitution in the US got me put on a mock Supreme Court, where I wound up (after manipulating the line-up so I'd be in the middle, and thus Chief Justice) casting a deciding vote against allowing 13-year-olds to drive cars.
Nine years later, various events in my life had caused me to abandon my childhood ambition, but the echo survived. When I became Talossan, in both my citizenship application and discussion on that era's Wittenberg, I expressed interest in serving on the Uppermost Cort. The dramas of that era wore on me, and I started a pattern of going inactive for long stretches of time, and I let the ghost of my childhood ambition slumber.
When I returned to the changed Talossa of the Reunision era, that ambition continued to sleep for the most part. On a couple occasions I expressed interest in joining the Talossan bar, but my timing was poor when I did; the bar had lapsed into inactivity. On one occasion I did privately message it to one person about my willingness to be on the Cort, but I did not vigorously pursue it; I thought that actively campaigning to be a Justice was unseemly, and I was quite afraid of rejection.
Then, recently, Seneschál Miestră Schivă, UrN, asked me if I would be interested in serving on the Cort. I leapt on the opportunity like my cat attacking a catnip-stuffed toy. The nine-year-old boy still inside this forty-two-year-old man is downright gleeful at the chance to become a member of Talossa's Uppermost Cort.
So, enough about how this, in of course its own Talossan way, would fulfill a childhood dream of mine. I'm sure many of you have questions and opinions about what sort of Justice I would be, so let's get to them.
Éu requestéu, piaçar.
Estimat S:reu Perþonest,
I thank you for your opening statement. I think micronationalism speaks, in some way, to the nine-year-old in all of us in some way. It is a warming and touching story.
Could you begin, if you please, by outlining your judicial philosophy for the Senats and public who are following these proceedings? How do you balance concepts like the impersonal rule of law with the deeply personal that small group dynamics (such as found in a micronation) engender?
So that the nominee may answer the questions asked of him by the Senator from Benito, the same shall continue to have speaking time through the end of Thursday, October 22nd.
The Senator from Vuode shall have speaking time (to ask questions and receive answers) from Friday, October 21st, through Monday the 26th.
My broad judicial philosophy is textualism; that the actual, ordinary, public meaning of the words should prevail. (Fortunately, in Talossa, our laws are not so old as to raise the question of linguistic drift.) This itself is based on two principles.
The first is democratic legitimacy. What, exactly, was the intent of each and every one of the legislators at the time they voted for the legislation is impossible to know, and so any version of reading legislative intent or considering the question of the problem the law was intended to address inherently privileges some votes over others. The actual language they voted all for, however, is unambiguously the language they all chose to enact. And when an unelected judge substitutes his sense of justice for what the law says, he is usurping power from the representatives that made the law; and here it is a worse usurpation of democracy, because while the legislature can change the intent by passing a new law, they certainly can't change the judge's sense of justice the same way. The defect of democracy is that it never can implement uncompromised justice; the glory is that it is far more amenable to correction than any other system.
The second reason is the principle of fair notice. Any individual person should be held to adhering only to the law as written, rather than being expected to know the intent of those who wrote it or of the sense of justice of the judge. The "crime of analogy" seen in Soviet and Imperial Chinese law creates a structurally unjust society in a way that no unjust but published statute possibly can.
(The concept of lapsus linguae still applies; obvious human error should be treated as such. I grant that my predicates are vague enough that there's a sorites paradox in drawing the line between noticing drafting errors and trying to read intent.)
Now, how does all this impersonal theoretical principle rubber hit the road when you reach the personal end of small-group dynamics and the emotions? I think, ultimately, it works better for a judge to adhere to the principle than to try to directly address the dynamics. While I think it is potentially worthwhile for a judge to promote non-public discussion between the parties to reach a settlement friendlier to the dynamics, if there is no settlement, the best way to rule is, in fact, impersonally. A party that loses what it think it deserved is going to be all the more incensed if it thinks it was a case of the judge personally siding against the party, to the detriment of the group dynamics, and every millimeter by which the judge deviates from the impersonal application of the law is the more justification for feeling so.
Of course, other people will disagree with me on pretty much all those points, and I can see their arguments for doing so, even if they do not persuade me. If any of you find my approach truly unacceptable, I urge you to vote against my appointment, because after decades of amateur legal philosophizing it is very unlikely that I will change my mind.
Quote from: Açafat del Val on October 19, 2020, 06:53:35 PM
So that the nominee may answer the questions asked of him by the Senator from Benito, the same shall continue to have speaking time through the end of Thursday, October 22nd.
The Senator from Vuode shall have speaking time (to ask questions and receive answers) from Friday, October 21st, through Monday the 26th.
(Sorry, should have mentioned. I only request time to speak and don't intend to question the nominee. I will not need all those days. The Friday alone will suffice.)
Thank you, S:reu Perþonest, for your answer.
I think of UC Justice positions as less political in some ways, and more theological. The Justice looks at the text, draws upon their learning, and writes an opinion that has all of the binding force of law simply because they are charged with declaring what the law means. This is not something to take lightly, even in a small and young nation like Talossa.
You currently execute an important office in the Civil Service, Burgermeister of Inland Revenue. By both tradition and, to a lesser degree, statute, the Justices of the UC step back from Talossan political life a bit. Can you speak to any potential conflicts between these two positions? Or do you feel they are ultimately compatible with one another?
Following from that, what do you see as the UC Justice's place in our wider Talossan society, given the step back from politics that is customarily taken?
The ideal of the Civil Service is that it nonpolitically serves Talossa in administering the state under the direction of the Government of the day, and I believe my service as Burgermeister of Inland Revenue has exemplified that standard. I think my role as such is, indeed, fundamentally compatible with a role on the Uppermost Cort, at least under current Talossan conditions.
Now, I do acknowledge that I was involved in policy and politics early in my tenure as Burgermeister, but that was in my then-role of Minister of Finance. Since my (stormy) resignation from that office in 2014, the closest I believe I've come to national politics is giving advice to the Government when that advice has been requested. The lesson I took from that experience, after I had some time to clear my head, was that I'm not temperamentally suited to a political role in Talossa. I'll note that not only have I not held national political office since (not even a seat in the Cosa), but I've also not been a member of any party, and to my recollection have largely refrained from even expressing political opinions. I have, I feel, already stepped back from Talossan politics. (Inherent in saying that is that I believe my performance in the other offices I've held in the last six years has been consistent with having stepped back from politics. Whether as Cunstaval of Fiova, Arvitieir Prima of Benito, Electoral Commissioner, or even Maestro of Benito, I believe I've largely avoided politics.)
In a perfect world, I would drop all my other offices upon becoming a Justice, to eliminate as many potential conflicts as possible. But in a perfect world, there'd be a bunch of active and qualified candidates to take over them all. As it is, I don't currently plan to resign any of them.
On the more general point, I don't have a lot of insight, I'm afraid. Given how central political activity is to Talossa, being both active and apolitical are in tension with each other, and thus there's a marked historical tendency for Justices to drift away from paying attention. I don't have a good idea as to how to square that circle in general, even if it seems like I've done it in my personal case.
Thank you.
Estimat Mencei, I have no further questions.
Quote from: Eðo Grischun on October 19, 2020, 10:24:36 PM
Quote from: Açafat del Val on October 19, 2020, 06:53:35 PM
So that the nominee may answer the questions asked of him by the Senator from Benito, the same shall continue to have speaking time through the end of Thursday, October 22nd.
The Senator from Vuode shall have speaking time (to ask questions and receive answers) from Friday, October 21st, through Monday the 26th.
(Sorry, should have mentioned. I only request time to speak and don't intend to question the nominee. I will not need all those days. The Friday alone will suffice.)
Does the Senator from Vuode wish to speak? If not within the next 24 hours, then I will commence to ask questions of the nominee.
On that note: does anyone else wish to request speaking time?
S:reu Perþonest, thank you kindly for participating wholeheartedly in this hearing.
I do have other questions, but foremost I would like to ask: how should the Uppermost Cort endeavor to increase overall engagement, education, and enthusiasm with the judiciary itself and the law more generally? Are you concerned, if at all, that too few Talossans appreciate our unique legal system?
On that note: what would be your legal analysis in the semi-recent criminal case, re: Legality of non-Talossan Name? I would like to hear not only whether you think that the court of original jurisdiction reached a sound conclusion (and why it did or did not), but also whether you worry that it set(s) a bad legal precedent.
Lastly for this round: what is your favorite flavor of ice cream, and what is your most enjoyed activity during the winter months?
Quote from: Istefan Perþonest on October 19, 2020, 07:05:44 PM
My broad judicial philosophy is textualism; that the actual, ordinary, public meaning of the words should prevail. (Fortunately, in Talossa, our laws are not so old as to raise the question of linguistic drift.) This itself is based on two principles.
The first is democratic legitimacy. What, exactly, was the intent of each and every one of the legislators at the time they voted for the legislation is impossible to know, and so any version of reading legislative intent or considering the question of the problem the law was intended to address inherently privileges some votes over others. The actual language they voted all for, however, is unambiguously the language they all chose to enact. And when an unelected judge substitutes his sense of justice for what the law says, he is usurping power from the representatives that made the law; and here it is a worse usurpation of democracy, because while the legislature can change the intent by passing a new law, they certainly can't change the judge's sense of justice the same way. The defect of democracy is that it never can implement uncompromised justice; the glory is that it is far more amenable to correction than any other system.
The second reason is the principle of fair notice. Any individual person should be held to adhering only to the law as written, rather than being expected to know the intent of those who wrote it or of the sense of justice of the judge. The "crime of analogy" seen in Soviet and Imperial Chinese law creates a structurally unjust society in a way that no unjust but published statute possibly can.
(The concept of lapsus linguae still applies; obvious human error should be treated as such. I grant that my predicates are vague enough that there's a sorites paradox in drawing the line between noticing drafting errors and trying to read intent.)
Now, how does all this impersonal theoretical principle rubber hit the road when you reach the personal end of small-group dynamics and the emotions? I think, ultimately, it works better for a judge to adhere to the principle than to try to directly address the dynamics. While I think it is potentially worthwhile for a judge to promote non-public discussion between the parties to reach a settlement friendlier to the dynamics, if there is no settlement, the best way to rule is, in fact, impersonally. A party that loses what it think it deserved is going to be all the more incensed if it thinks it was a case of the judge personally siding against the party, to the detriment of the group dynamics, and every millimeter by which the judge deviates from the impersonal application of the law is the more justification for feeling so.
Of course, other people will disagree with me on pretty much all those points, and I can see their arguments for doing so, even if they do not persuade me. If any of you find my approach truly unacceptable, I urge you to vote against my appointment, because after decades of amateur legal philosophizing it is very unlikely that I will change my mind.
Upon reading this in further detail, I am curious about a few details.
It seems incongruent to suggest on the one hand that an unelected judge should not make law, and on the other hand that only an unelected judge can determine what the intent of the authors was or is.
My question here is: Do you see the irony in those assertions, S:reu Perþonest? Please explain your answer thoroughly, as to why these statements are or are not mutually exclusive.
As a matter of dialogue, I would like to offer my own answer succinctly: Authors cannot possibly predict the interpretation of their own language, and therefore their intent is not somehow perfectly clear or obvious. As a matter of fact, just in Talossa, we recently amended the Organic Law because the author of a section - the King, no less - insisted adamantly that the section was being misinterpreted, even if it seemed plain to everyone else that it meant something different than the King said it did.
Follow-up question, then: What if your own interpretation of a law, particularly while in your official capacity as a judge, comes at odds with the authors' own intent? What if the language says something so obviously to you, but the author testifies that the language means something else? Would you then defer to the author's intent? If so, can you really call yourself a textualist?; and if not, how do you reconcile the hypocrisy?
My apologies for the long time it's taken me to reply to your questions, Senator del Val. My parents and I were all affected by an unusually strong cold (and in my and my mother's cases, a compounding sinus infection) that, coinciding with El Paso being a COVID-19 hotspot, seriously disrupted our normal activities, which we've slowly been getting back into order. (We're fine.)
Now, to address your questions:
Quote from: Açafat del Val on November 10, 2020, 11:02:57 AM
I do have other questions, but foremost I would like to ask: how should the Uppermost Cort endeavor to increase overall engagement, education, and enthusiasm with the judiciary itself and the law more generally? Are you concerned, if at all, that too few Talossans appreciate our unique legal system?
I think the ideal, and of course impossible, situation for any society is that both law and justice be so clear and so adhered to by every citizen that there is never any need to have a judge. Accordingly, the ideal Talossa would have little engagement or enthusiasm with the judiciary at all, it being a forgotten and dusty corner of the Organic Law with no relevance. However, we are quite unlikely to ever reach that ideal.
In the world we have, enthusiasm and engagement assist in necessary tasks, and education is vital to them. And the Cort absolutely needs to take the matter of education in-hand, particularly as regards to its supervision of the National Bar. I expect that as soon as it does, we'll see any number of people engage enthusiastically with that opportunity, and grow in appreciation of the Talossan legal system. If I become a member of the Cort, I expect I'll be in a position to get the ball rolling on educational initiatives.
Quote from: Açafat del Val on November 10, 2020, 11:02:57 AM
On that note: what would be your legal analysis in the semi-recent criminal case, re: Legality of non-Talossan Name? I would like to hear not only whether you think that the court of original jurisdiction reached a sound conclusion (and why it did or did not), but also whether you worry that it set(s) a bad legal precedent.
As it is entirely possible this specific case as a precedent will come up in a case before the Uppermost Cort, particularly as you specifically asked about its nature as a precedent, in accordance with the American Bar Association's Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and the so-called "Ginsburg Rule" regarding giving "no hints, no forecasts, no previews" about how a nominee would rule as a judge in a particular case, I respectfully decline to answer this question.
I grant that those are American rather than Talossan principles on the conduct of judicial nominees, and are not binding as law even for Americans, but I think they make a good ethical guideline.
Quote from: Açafat del Val on November 10, 2020, 11:02:57 AM
Lastly for this round: what is your favorite flavor of ice cream, and what is your most enjoyed activity during the winter months?
My favorite flavor of ice cream varies according to my mood, but is almost always either Cookies 'n' Cream or Moose Tracks. (Variations on those themes, like a Dairy Queen Blizzard/Sonic Blast made with either Oreo pieces or with peanut butter cups, also work.)
Winter conditions in El Paso are usually much like late fall/early spring where I grew up (Detroit), except rather drier, so my mind sort of glitches at this. While El Paso has what the locals
call "winter months", it's generally a period where it's merely too cold to engage in "summer" activities (like swimming outdoors), rather than a period with its own winter activities. Accumulated snowfall, for example, is a one-week-every-seven-years sort of thing; the average daily low temperature in January is still above freezing. And reaching back decades to my youth would ignore that I'm a rather different person now than I was then.
However, after writing all that, one definitely winter-specific activity that I do engage in is driving around at night to look at displays of Christmas lights and luminaria (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luminaria) displays.
Quote from: Açafat del Val on November 12, 2020, 02:59:31 PM
Upon reading this in further detail, I am curious about a few details.
It seems incongruent to suggest on the one hand that an unelected judge should not make law, and on the other hand that only an unelected judge can determine what the intent of the authors was or is.
My question here is: Do you see the irony in those assertions, S:reu Perþonest? Please explain your answer thoroughly, as to why these statements are or are not mutually exclusive.
Follow-up question, then: What if your own interpretation of a law, particularly while in your official capacity as a judge, comes at odds with the authors' own intent? What if the language says something so obviously to you, but the author testifies that the language means something else? Would you then defer to the author's intent? If so, can you really call yourself a textualist?; and if not, how do you reconcile the hypocrisy?
To begin with, I must say that I do
not assert that a judge is in the business of determining what the intent of the authors was. Rather, I assert that determining what the intent of the authors was is entirely outside what a judge should be doing.
The first reason, going back to the matter of democratic principle, is that the
authors of a law did not
enact the law. Insofar as the intent of the lawmakers matters, in a democracy it is not the intent of the authors that needs to be considered, but the joint intent of all the persons who enacted the law. In the case of Talossan statute law, the Ziu enacted the law, and in the case of the Organic Law, the Ziu
and the voters in the referendum enacted the law. It is undemocratic to privilege the intent of the authors of the text over the intent of the representatives of the people, and even the people themselves, who made that text into law. That, then, becomes the core of the democratic reason for dealing with the text; most of the people who actually enacted the law did so based on reading the text and choosing to ratify it, and the best evidence of what they intended by their ratification is the text itself.
The second reason, the principle of fair notice, discourages trying to divine the intent of even those who enacted the law, because the text is written down for people to read and comply with, while the intent of the legislators is not. People can read, understand, and calibrate their conduct to comply with the written law, but face obvious difficulties in doing so with "legislative intent". This is especially true since an unwritten intent cannot be verified to be unchanged; what a legislature intended to enact at the time and what the legislators currently think should be enacted are not necessarily the same thing, even when the legislators honestly believe (due to the workings of human memory) that their intent is unchanged. This principle is one of justice even more fundamental than democracy; a place where you can be punished for violations of an unknowable or
ex post facto law is a worse tyranny than one where you can only be punished for clear violations of clearly known laws, even if the former laws are made democratically and the latter's aren't.
Accordingly, my response to an author of a given law that says his intent was other than the meaning I think obvious is, "Then you should amend the law to more clearly express your intent; I judge what the law is, not what you meant it to be." I do not believe, in so doing, I am engaged in any hypocrisy.
As to whether
only an unelected judge can say what the law is, well, the judicial power is specifically the power to determine what the law means and apply it in a case, so that was determined by the choice to vest the judicial power in unelected judges in the Organic Law. It would be possible to make other arrangements; for example, it would be possible to make the author of a law the judge of what a law means. While I think that would work poorly in practice for several reasons, in any case it is not the arrangement that Talossans have chosen with the Organic Law we have. Since the judicial power is vested in the unelected Cort pü Inalt, it is necessarily the role of unelected Justices to determine the meaning of the law in applying it to a case.
I've been so busy this month with Archives work I have neglected this hearing.
If there are no objections, I'd like to cast my vote Për for sending this onto the Ziu and open the floor for voting to end on 28 December to allow time for the Seneschal to properly Clark this thing.
GV, Mencei