The "Reform" Plan

[Mic’haglh Autófil, SMC EiP]

As part of the Government's commitment to revitalize and improve the structure of our state apparatus, we have thus far held a discussion in which many valuable ideas were submitted, discussed, and initially refined. The next step is to allow, as per the Avant! coalition agreement, "each party [to] promote its own preferences." To that end, I submit the Reform Plan (in that it is the proposal of the Reform Party, not the definitive roadmap for reform -- cf. the Virginia Plan, the New Jersey Plan, etc.) Keep in mind of course that this is not a concrete legislative proposal -- we need to know what the goal is in order to know what legal changes must be proposed, after all!

The main points of the plan can be found here.

For a bit more detail:
Crown Reform:

• The Crown and Ziu execute a bit of power-swapping arrangement.
• The King regains the right to appoint a Seneschal after consultations with the various party leaders in the Cosa, but it also becomes easier for the Cosa to override a royal veto.
• The royal veto on Organic amendments is eliminated, simplifying the process and ensuring vital amendments are not logjammed by a single individual.

Ziu Reform:

• The Senäts is abolished with the general election following ratification of the relevant Organic amendment.
• Because Senators pay to serve in the Senäts, and in doing so directly contribute to the upkeep of our nation (web presence etc), I believe it unfair to strip them of something before they have gotten that which they pay for. As a result, I believe it necessary to "grandfather" in Senators to Cosa membership for the remainder of their Senatorial term -- effectively making this somewhat of a "merger" as opposed to an "abolition". There are two ways to do this that I foresee, which I will go into more detail below.
• Option 1: Biproportional Representation:
  • As a means of retaining a form of "provincial representation" despite a lack of Senäts, the Cosa is now elected using electoral districts (which for the sake of ease are coterminous with provinces). (I should point out here that this practice is actually fairly common, very few proportional-representation legislatures use the entire country as a single electoral district.)
  • Seats are apportioned among each province based on how many votes were cast from that province in the previous election. This is meant to be equivalent to "apportionment by population", but renders useless any attempts to "gerrymander" catchment areas. It also is useful as a tool to both encourage and reward activity.
  • Parties are awarded seats within a given province based on their proportion of votes within that province (these seats do not necessarily need to be assigned to an MC from that province).
  • Any seats that cannot be assigned to a single party (for example, if one province has two seats left to be apportioned and three parties equally deserving) are awarded at the national level via a "topping-off" once all provincial seats possible are awarded. This method takes all provincial seats into account as well as the nationwide proportional vote.
  • The apportionment of seats to provinces and the awarding of seats to parties (both at the provincial level and the nationwide "topping-off" stage) is all accomplished via the Webster method.
  • In this case, incumbent Senators at the time of the Senäts' dissolution (of which there would be five) are automatically assigned half of their respective province's seats for each election during the remainder of what would have been their current Senatorial term. Should any of these ex-Senators appear on a party's list (with their consent) during such an election, their automatic seat assignment will count towards that party's seats in that province instead.
• Option 2: Retain a Single District:
  • The Cosa remains elected on a purely nationwide basis, but the Webster method is still adopted. This maintains a very proportionate outcome in terms of seats awarded to each party, but also abolishes the "percentile dice" system currently in place for something that uses straightforward mathematical rule as opposed to pseudo-random number generation.
  • In this case, incumbent Senators could be granted some equal number of Cosa seats (perhaps 10 each?) outside of the 200 seats normally elected. In other words, this would see the Cosa increase from 200 to 250 at the Senäts' dissolution, shrink to 220 at the next election after that, and then return to 200 seats starting with the election after that. Ex-Senators may still be assigned party seats, but are of course subject to the same limit as every other MC on the number of seats an individual MC may hold, and these additional seats count towards that limit.

A Fixed Legislative Schedule:

• Elections now occur annually from January 15 - February 1.
• This increases the length of a Cosa term from six Clarks to nine. Namely, March through November, with December kept clear for the sake of the Chancery (preventing too much overlap between holidays and election prep work).
• The Seneschal may still issue a single month of recess per Cosa term, but this no longer pushes back subsequent Clarks (in other words, this Cosa will instead have eight Clarks instead of nine). This aligns with the preceding point of keeping December clear.
• Because elections are now fixed, a Vote of Confidence is no longer capable of calling a new election. As a result, VoCs now become "constructive" -- MCs voting Non are asked to provide a replacement candidate for Seneschal, who, upon review by the King and consultation with party leaders, can name a new Seneschal should a VoC fail (as per their restored power to do so anyway).

Other Reforms:

• MCs may petition the Chancery for official recognition / "parliamentary status" for a new party in the middle of a Cosa term.
  • Each MC who defects from their original party forfeits half of their personally-assigned seats to do so (which, as all their seats do, return to the original party).
  • Each MC may not defect more than once per Cosa term.
• A convention / commission / panel / what-have-you will examine, in a coordinated manner, the best possible paths to reduce the number of provinces. Individual provinces are strongly encouraged to heed their recommendations.

[Miestră Schivă, UrN]

I would just re-iterate that this is not the consensus plan of the Cabinet, nor a preferred one; but one from which we can start open discussion and perhaps submit a formal proposal this Cosa.

[Miestră Schivă, UrN]

I'm not personally in favour of a year-long Cosă term, since - as I've previously noted - Talossa only "comes alive" in election seasons. The specific amendments to the electoral system seem over-the-top and complicated to me. However, I think the "King/Ziu power swap" proposal has something to recommend it, and I'm in favour of unicameralism/an MMP Cosă if it can be done with minimal fuss.

I encourage other input.

[Breneir Tzaracomprada]

I am reviewing and will have comments within the a day or two. There are several elements which Open Society ran on in the PdR proposal so initial impressions are positive.

[Mic’haglh Autófil, SMC EiP]

[...] and I'm in favour of unicameralism/an MMP Cosă if it can be done with minimal fuss.

I think we've discussed in the past that my own sympathies are with MMP, however I went with the current system for two reasons:
- It would actually appear easier to implement than an MMP Cosa, and
- Given the potential for outcomes that are notably more disproportionate than either the current method or the proposal, it seemed to be a more difficult method to gain support for.

[Breneir Tzaracomprada]

A Fixed Legislative Schedule:

• Elections now occur annually from January 15 - February 1.
• This increases the length of a Cosa term from six Clarks to nine. Namely, March through November, with December kept clear for the sake of the Chancery (preventing too much overlap between holidays and election prep work).
• The Seneschal may still issue a single month of recess per Cosa term, but this no longer pushes back subsequent Clarks (in other words, this Cosa will instead have eight Clarks instead of nine). This aligns with the preceding point of keeping December clear.
• Because elections are now fixed, a Vote of Confidence is no longer capable of calling a new election. As a result, VoCs now become "constructive" -- MCs voting Non are asked to provide a replacement candidate for Seneschal, who, upon review by the King and consultation with party leaders, can name a new Seneschal should a VoC fail (as per their restored power to do so anyway).

Open Society is pretty much completely in support of this section. Annual elections was a part of the party's last election program. We do not believe it is sign of good cultural health to use elections as a way to gin-up societal activities. If we want to increase the space for apolitical Talossans then we need to actually increase the time between elections. And we have supported constructive VoCs during earlier reform discussions.

MCs may petition the Chancery for official recognition / "parliamentary status" for a new party in the middle of a Cosa term.

• Each MC who defects from their original party forfeits half of their personally-assigned seats to do so (which, as all their seats do, return to the original party).
• Each MC may not defect more than once per Cosa term.

For goodness sakes, yes.

A convention / commission / panel / what-have-you will examine, in a coordinated manner, the best possible paths to reduce the number of provinces. Individual provinces are strongly encouraged to heed their recommendations.

I would suggest that this should also be applied to questions of Cosa reform. "Big-pants" countries have put electoral reform to a referendum. I believe this occurred for MMP in New Zealand in the 1990s and again in the 2010s?

The Senäts is abolished with the general election following ratification of the relevant Organic amendment.

With the current FreeDems composition of the Senats you are NEVER going to get them to support this. Open Society gives it a thumbs up though.

The royal veto on Organic amendments is eliminated, simplifying the process and ensuring vital amendments are not logjammed by a single individual.

Long-term whether we have a president or a king, Open Society supports the preservation of some reserve powers for the head of state, with the stipulation that their use is limited, to extraordinary circumstances.

Notes for potential addition:

-(CRL Abolition) Luc has made an important point concerning the CRL. The Scribery or some other body would be a more elegant solution to the problem the CRL was proposed to solve.
-(Mandatory Live Cosa Session) We really need to make better use of technology to connect. In combination with longer parliamentary terms we should have one live session (during the middle of the term perhaps) where we actually have direct terpelaziuns and ministerial reports. Let's be honest it is fun and notable when we actually get to see one another even if we nurture dislike of the words we see from each other.
-(No Directorate?!) Color me shocked there is no suggestion for a directorial republic.

One more note:
I am highly amused by the "King? No, thank you" logo.

[GV]

The great problem I see in the current iteration of the Senäts is too much power being vested in too few people.  If I understand things aright, no more than four people can bork the will of the Cosâ, the other half of the Senäts, and the Monarch.

Even with a FREEDEM majority in the Senäts, this is a dangerous state of affairs.  Yet, we do not have enough of a potential pool of candidates to make having two persons per province in the Senäts be practical, and we absolutely do *not* want people to serve in both Cosâ and Senäts concurrently. 

Ergo, so long as there can still be people to specifically represent the interests of their province, the idea of abolishing the Senäts - at least for the time being - has my cautious support so long as the new Senäts-less plan (whatever it might be) is actually workable.

If at all possible, we should set up computer-systems to simulate elections with whatever MMP-Cosâ we can dream up.  I'm no good with such things, but this is 2024, and putting things together like this has honestly never been easier.  In fact, I urge the Powers-that-Be to strongly consider digital simulations of such new-Cosâ setups.

It's hard to believe, but it it's true: we are three years removed from the fortieth anniversary of the publication of the first Clark.  It is even harder to believe the records for each and every Clark (minus text for some bills in the early years, I think) have been preserved.

GV, Senator for Fiova

[Mic’haglh Autófil, SMC EiP]

MCs may petition the Chancery for official recognition / "parliamentary status" for a new party in the middle of a Cosa term.

• Each MC who defects from their original party forfeits half of their personally-assigned seats to do so (which, as all their seats do, return to the original party).
• Each MC may not defect more than once per Cosa term.

For goodness sakes, yes.

I thought these limitations on your suggestion were reasonable to prevent abuse while still respecting MCs' freedom of association. Glad to see you agree!

I would suggest that this should also be applied to questions of Cosa reform. "Big-pants" countries have put electoral reform to a referendum. I believe this occurred for MMP in New Zealand in the 1990s and again in the 2010s?

I had been referring to a commission for provincial reform, but it sounds like you're talking about a referendum. I'm not opposed to a "Cosa Reform Commission", but at some point we just get caught in an endless loop of "X has been referred to the Sub-Committee on the So-and-so".

With the current FreeDems composition of the Senats you are NEVER going to get them to support this. Open Society gives it a thumbs up though.

This feels a little uncharitable, given Miestra herself has supported unicameralism but last month.

Also, given the "merging" in of incumbent Senators, that would further help to soften the impact.

Long-term whether we have a president or a king, Open Society supports the preservation of some reserve powers for the head of state, with the stipulation that their use is limited, to extraordinary circumstances.

Do I understand correctly that you are in favor of keeping said royal Organic veto?

Notes for potential addition:

-(CRL Abolition) Luc has made an important point concerning the CRL. The Scribery or some other body would be a more elegant solution to the problem the CRL was proposed to solve.
-(Mandatory Live Cosa Session) We really need to make better use of technology to connect. In combination with longer parliamentary terms we should have one live session (during the middle of the term perhaps) where we actually have direct terpelaziuns and ministerial reports. Let's be honest it is fun and notable when we actually get to see one another even if we nurture dislike of the words we see from each other.

Both fine points, and things I support, but I felt they were outside the scope of this proposal.

-(No Directorate?!) Color me shocked there is no suggestion for a directorial republic.

Soon (TM)

One more note:
I am highly amused by the "King? No, thank you" logo.

The Smiling Sun is ripe for parody. It seemed a natural fit.

If at all possible, we should set up computer-systems to simulate elections with whatever MMP-Cosâ we can dream up.  I'm no good with such things, but this is 2024, and putting things together like this has honestly never been easier.  In fact, I urge the Powers-that-Be to strongly consider digital simulations of such new-Cosâ setups.

Well, as you can see, I've already simulated the outcome of the "Biproportional Representation" system, in the linked document in the OP. I ran the numbers on an MMP system here quick this morning, in three different variations. (see attached)

• Provinces are assigned an equal number of seats such that the total number of provincial seats does not exceed half the nominal size of the Cosa -- with 8 provinces, this means 12 seats per province for 96 / 200 seats.
• The remaining 104 are distributed proportionately between parties using the Webster method still for sake of continuity.
• I re-used the assumptions on how each province voted from the methods I discussed above.
• Provincial seats were elected using first-past-the-post, since I have no real way of judging how a ranked-choice election would have gone (I did use my best judgement in a sort of "ranked-choice" election since one province did have a tie).
• The first result caps the number of Cosa seats at 200. This has the potential to result in "overhang seats", which are those provincial seats which exceed the proportion of seats the party would be entitled to on the list vote. The FreeDems won 4 such seats.
• The second result increases the size of the Cosa beyond its nominal size by the number of overhang seats. This ensures that every party receives its proportion of the nominal size, while also not taking away from the parties that do very well in provinces. With four overhang seats, this results in a 204-seat Cosa.
• The third result increases the size of the Cosa such that every party receives a proportionate number of seats -- the more overhang seats there are, the greater the size of the Cosa is likely to be. This is effectively just proportional representation with extra steps, and is my least-preferred of the three variations.

[Breneir Tzaracomprada]

@Mic'haglh Autófil, SMC EiP

This feels a little uncharitable, given Miestra herself has supported unicameralism but last month.

Also, given the "merging" in of incumbent Senators, that would further help to soften the impact.

What one says publicly can be far different than the behind the scenes debates so I will wait to see what is actually supported by FreeDems concerning Senats abolition, Mic'haglh. We had to have a secret committee last Cosa to allow for frank discussion on a nonpartisan Chancery so I'm skeptical.

Yes, I support retaining a veto.

[Breneir Tzaracomprada]

A general question. Do we know when the FreeDems and COFFEE proposals are expected?

[Baron Alexandreu Davinescu]

There's a lot here that's worrying, but also some good ideas.

More predictable elections, for example, might be a good thing... but not by making them so less frequent.  Talossans love elections.  They're the time people are most interested in Talossa.  If we have fewer elections, it won't magically force people to learn the language or start a newspaper... they'll just be less interested in Talossa!

The Crown provision would just "trade" the current very weak veto for nothing, unless you're saying the king would have the power to pick any Seneschal they please -- and that'd be too much power for the monarch.

I'll wait to see more details on the Ziu reform, but a few notes:

-We already have barely any checks in our system to curtail a Government.  They have steadily vanished over the years.  This would eliminate yet another.  This is a serious problem.

-From the look of things, in Option 1 we'd expect Fiova to have as many seats as Maritiimi-Maxhestic and Florencia combined.  And Maricopa would have twice as many seats as Vuode.  That seems like a problem.  Likewise, it also seems like a problem that Option 2 gives no reason for anyone to care about Vuode's interests as a province.

-Senators do not own seats just because they paid a fee after their election.  Those seats belong to the people.  If you want to transition into this system, fine, but it's unwise to give any credence to the idea that they need to be compensated for their fee.

[Miestră Schivă, UrN]

A general question. Do we know when the FreeDems and COFFEE proposals are expected?

The FreeDems aren't making any formal proposal, and I don't think COFFEE are either.  That's not how this is going to work, because the Coalition parties wanted this to debate to achieve broad social consensus, not a partisan numbers game.  But PdR had a plan, and we encouraged them to present it to start the debate. I've given my personal opinion.

With the current FreeDems composition of the Senats you are NEVER going to get them to support this. Open Society gives it a thumbs up though.

This feels a little uncharitable, given Miestra herself has supported unicameralism but last month.

It's more than uncharitable. It's mean, and near to actual political disinformation.

Once again, I personally am pro-unicameral, because I am motivated by things other than partisan advantage.

[Breneir Tzaracomprada]

A general question. Do we know when the FreeDems and COFFEE proposals are expected?

The FreeDems aren't making any formal proposal, and I don't think COFFEE are either.  That's not how this is going to work, because the Coalition parties wanted this to debate to achieve broad social consensus, not a partisan numbers game.  But PdR had a plan, and we encouraged them to present it to start the debate. I've given my personal opinion.

With the current FreeDems composition of the Senats you are NEVER going to get them to support this. Open Society gives it a thumbs up though.

This feels a little uncharitable, given Miestra herself has supported unicameralism but last month.

It's more than uncharitable. It's mean, and near to actual political disinformation.

Once again, I personally am pro-unicameral, because I am motivated by things other than partisan advantage.

advantage

Now who is being "uncharitable?" I'll believe the FreeDems support Senats abolition when they propose it and make an effort to pass it. But please note I said "the FreeDems" not Miestra personally. I hope that distinction matters.

Looks like GV, a FreeDems senator, supports the abolition, which is surprising but I'm looking forward to seeing more COFFEE and FreeDems members chiming in on this if it is not a contribution based on internal coalition discussions.

[Mic’haglh Autófil, SMC EiP]

More predictable elections, for example, might be a good thing... but not by making them so less frequent.  Talossans love elections.  They're the time people are most interested in Talossa.  If we have fewer elections, it won't magically force people to learn the language or start a newspaper... they'll just be less interested in Talossa!

Given that predictability would imply a fixed schedule, is your solution then to increase the frequency of elections?

The Crown provision would just "trade" the current very weak veto for nothing, unless you're saying the king would have the power to pick any Seneschal they please -- and that'd be too much power for the monarch.

A 2/3 threshold is in fact quite strong. Even the proposed threshold is not something the incumbent Government could overcome; no government since the Schiva III Cabinet (during the 55th Cosa) would have had those numbers. As a result, the override still requires opposition support outside of an overwhelming electoral mandate.
And yes, the idea was that the King would have discretion when appointing a Seneschal -- though that Seneschal would naturally need to survive votes of confidence.

We already have barely any checks in our system to curtail a Government.  They have steadily vanished over the years.  This would eliminate yet another.  This is a serious problem.

The best solution would be to move to a model of government in which the executive and legislature are separated. Thankfully, we have a party dedicated to advocating for that.

From the look of things, in Option 1 we'd expect Fiova to have as many seats as Maritiimi-Maxhestic and Florencia combined.  And Maricopa would have twice as many seats as Vuode.

Yes, this is how apportionment by population works. The tradeoff is that this makes an individual voter in M-M more powerful when it comes to selecting who earns their province's seats.

Likewise, it also seems like a problem that Option 2 gives no reason for anyone to care about Vuode's interests as a province.

A fair concern, though as the Cosa is currently constructed, this is also the case. I will freely admit that Option 1 is my preferred of the two systems.

If you want to transition into this system, fine, but it's unwise to give any credence to the idea that they need to be compensated for their fee.

I think it equally unwise to simply say "hey, we're pulling the rug out from underneath you now". This is a one-time, transitional measure, and is meant as a compromise and acknowledgement to incumbent Senators.

This last part isn't particularly directed at the Baron, but it is at least inspired by his feedback. If we were to move to an MMP Cosa, it may make it possible to hold "mid-term" elections, so to speak. I envision the yearly schedule looking a little something like this:

• January: Balloting begins for "Class A" seats (one-half of each province's seats, rounded up) along with all Party List seats (15th)
• February: Polls close (1st); Certification due (14th)
• March: First Clark (1st - 21st)
• April: Second Clark (1st - 21st)
• May: Third Clark (1st - 21st)
• June: Fourth Clark (1st - 21st); Balloting begins for "Class B" seats (one-half of each province's seats, rounded down) (along with all Party List seats?) (15th)
• July: Polls close (1st); Certification due (14th)
• August: Fifth Clark (1st - 21st)
• September: Sixth Clark (1st - 21st)
• October: Seventh Clark (1st - 21st)
• November: Eighth Clark (1st - 21st)
• December: No Clarks

Realistically what this actually does is make two "mini-Cosas" throughout the calendar year, but I'm trying to think outside the box if we are to follow his logic to its conclusion. This makes elections more frequent, yet still on a predictable schedule.

[Miestră Schivă, UrN]

I'll believe the FreeDems support Senats abolition when they propose it and make an effort to pass it. But please note I said "the FreeDems" not Miestra personally...

Looks like GV, a FreeDems senator, supports the abolition, which is surprising ...

Do you even listen to yourself speak?