I like the idea of doctrinal interpretation -- a focus on the principles of a particular case and the relevant precedent. I think this should have special relevance for Talossan law because of it has been such a scattershot field, with very few consistent practitioners over time on either side of the bench. This results in a fundamental inequity, since any case can be decided on any conceivable theoretical basis and there is very little surety under the law. That's a problem, since it means Talossans sometimes lack even the most basic knowledge about what their laws permit. Is such-and-such a crime? If there's even the slightest ambiguity or contradiction in the wording of the law, then it's a crapshoot. And while that happens under any legal system, Talossa has shown an unusual degree of instability. Establishing clear precedents and tests based on the fundamental principles at hand, supported by a majority of the Cort will help alleviate that.
That's all very broad, but it's a broad question -- if you have any further questions on any particular point, I'd be happy to elaborate.
I do not know exactly how this approach will interact with the philosophies of other potential justices, but I would be surprised to find any difficulties.
That's all very broad, but it's a broad question -- if you have any further questions on any particular point, I'd be happy to elaborate.
I do not know exactly how this approach will interact with the philosophies of other potential justices, but I would be surprised to find any difficulties.